جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه "اقدامات تلافی جویانه" در نشریات گروه "علوم اجتماعی"

The anarchical status of cyberspace brings about deep effects on countries’ interests and national security. A large number of anonymous global players threaten the interests or even the vital infrastructures of their counterparts on a daily basis. This has made the states around the world to think about finding a real approach to decrease such damages, threats, etc. in the cyberspace. And the Deterrence Strategy, as an efficient tool in dealing with such a significant issue, is the outcome of this long endeavor. The current essay aims to discover the effectiveness of Deterrence Strategy in cyberspace and those conditions it is in need of to be regarded as a most efficient deterring tool. The findings here in this essay prove that the Deterrence Strategy cannot have the same performance in cyberspace as it had during the Cold War. However, at the same time, they establish that the Deterrence Strategy enjoys great potentials through which it protects the countries’ interests and national security. Great defense capability, the power of identifying the invaders, and the capability of conducting harsh retaliatory acts are the main three components that make this strategy effective. However, it is worth saying that among all those components, the ‘identification’ factor plays the most fundamental role in making the Deterrence Strategy effective in cyberspace. The reason is that an unbeaten identifying process guarantees the effectiveness and usefulness of retaliatory acts. Furthermore, such a triumph will force the real threat to be wiped out forever. The findings also show that the Deterrence Strategy is something imperfect without the presence of retaliatory acts. In fact, such a shortcoming allows the potential invaders to revise their plans in order to resume their attacks against their rivals in cyberspace.