جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « value judgment » در نشریات گروه « علوم اجتماعی »

Sociology is a science that explains social phenomena. But the nature of causal explanation in the social sciences has always been controversial. One of the main disputes in the causal explanation of social phenomena is about the relationship between knowledge and value, whether it is necessary and possible for the social scientist to avoid the entry of cultural values or whether values are the logical elements of causal analysis. In this case, how can a value-laden causal analysis be objective and valid for others? The response of the classics and contemporaries of sociology and social theory to the possibility of "objectivity of value-based analysis" can be formulated in the form of two competing theses. Positive thesis; Causal analysis is Value-Neutrality and objective. From post-positive; Causal analysis is value-laden but objective. The present paper argues through the analysis of Weber's post-positivist theory that, first; Causal analysis is value-laden. Second; value-laden causal explanation is not only detrimental to objectivity but also a condition for achieving objectivity in the social sciences.

The logic of conceptualization in the social sciences is one of the epistemological and methodological controversies of the social sciences. One of the main disputes over the relationship between knowledge and value is whether it is necessary and possible for the social scientist to avoid the introduction of cultural values in the construction of concepts or are values an integral and logical element of conceptualization? In this case, how can conceptualization imbued with the values of the researcher not hinder objectivity? In answer to this question, Durkheim's positivist and naturalistic approach argues that the concepts of the social sciences are value-laden and that the involvement of researcher values in conceptualization is detrimental to objectivity. Based on Weber's post-positivist approach, which is based on the epistemology of Kant's idealism, neo-Kantians, and Nietzschean's perspectivism , the present study argues that the concepts of the social sciences are value-laden, and that value-laden of social concepts is not only an obstacle to objectivity, it is also a subjective condition of objectivity. Based on Weber's separation of Value Relation from Value Judgment, the author shows to what extent the interference of social researcher values in conceptualization is permissible and to what extent it is impermissible and detrimental to the neutrality of science and objectivity.

The nature of fact in the social sciences and their relation to values has been one of the most important classical and modern controversies of the methodology of the social sciences. The present article addresses the question, "Is social fact value-laden? "If so, how is the objectivity of a valuable social fact possible?". In response to this question, the three approaches of positivity, anti-positivity and post-positivity of three competing theses are discussed.The present study argues through the content analysis of Max Weber's post-positive views, which are based on Kant's epistemology and the neo-Kantian school of Baden, that in the social sciences, first; The intervention of values in the collection, recording and construction of social fact is possible, legitimate and even necessary, and therefore, social fact is value-laden.Secondly; The value of social fact is not only detrimental to objectivity but also to the subjective condition of objectivity. In Weber's approach, the values of social actors play a " constitutive " role and the values of social researchers play a "regulating" role in constructing social fact.