جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « ‘allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’Ī » در نشریات گروه « علوم قرآن و حدیث »

From the perspective of every Muslim, righteous deed is based on knowledge of religion, and every knowledge requires the tools of understanding. The nature and scope of the power of reason as the most important tool for understanding in humans have been subjects of discussion and debate since ancient times. In the Islamic world, from the period of translation of Greek philosophy and logic and the first compilation of philosophical and logical books, this discussion has been the center of disputes among literalists, theologians, and philosophers. Among Shia Muslims, this dispute escalated with Mullā Amīn Astarābādī's writing of "Fawāyid al-Madaniyyah" and the Usūlī scholars also entered the discussion. Among philosophers, Mullā Ṣadrā, claiming to reconcile wisdom and divine law, presented the transcendent philosophy system. Our goal is to examine the criticisms to Mullā Amīn based on transcendent philosophy according to the views of ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī. The spirit of literalism is strongly flowing in the Islamic seminary and certain thoughts today, and therefore, critiquing the foundations of this current is crucial. Our method involves first analyzing the concept of reason based on its two components; its nature, and the scope of its power in understanding religion, and then conducting internal and external critiques. In internal critique, it can be said: Firstly, the lack of use of reason and logic is incompatible with their own scientific behavior, which is based on these two. Secondly, the verses and traditions that are the source of knowledge according to Mullā Amīn have encouraged us to use reason. Thirdly, the criticism of reason in traditions pertains to the analogical approach in fiqh, and not logical reasoning. In external critique, it can be said that differences among philosophers cannot be the evidence of incorrect use of reason since differences in jurisprudence will also have the same consequence. The transcendent philosophy has observed moderation in determining the place of reason, but Mullā Amīn has placed it lower than its position in verses and traditions.

The theory of subjective considerations (i’tibāriyāt) is an epistemological theory that has had a significant influence in various domains of knowledge. The Principles of Jurisprudence is one of the most important sciences where the theory of subjective considerations has been foundational, and ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī, in his book "Al-Kifāyah with annotation", has utilized this theory to explore the issues of this major science. According to him, "command and prohibition" are subjective matters, and the consequences of subjectivity is the leadership. Command is the act of associating and connecting the desire and will to another action. One of the most contemporary issues in the domain of command in the Principles of Jurisprudence is the problem of the unity of desire and will, where scholars like Ākhūnd Khurāsānī have endorsed unity of desire and will in terms of meaning, creation, and the outside. However, ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī has addressed this issue in the three domains: linguistic, usūlī and rational. He utilizes the implications of the theory of subjective considerations to explain and resolve it.

In logic, a proof is categorized into a priori and its types, as well as a posteriori and its types, which further divides into absolute a posteriori and argument. But the validity and credibility of all these types is not inherent, as some are accidentally justifiable and valid. Through an examination of the rules of proof (burhān), it becomes apparent that only the ‘a priori proof’ and ‘the absolute a posteriori proof of the third kind’ are proofs by essence, and other types are not proofs (burhān), except in an accidental sense. This research, providing proofs and utilizing an analytical approach, demonstrates that, according to ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī, a prior proof is not applicable in philosophy and other sciences that deal with the establishment of essential accidents of the subject. Based on this foundation, an essential accident is that which is posited by positing the subject and removed by removing it. A priori proof can prove predicates as non-essential accidents for the subjects in the sciences. But, through a priori proof, it is not possible in philosophy to prove a predicate as an essential or non-essential accident for its subject which is existent in so far as it is an existent. This is because the existent is not the effect of a cause. Therefore, the only valid proof in philosophy and other sciences is the absolute a posteriori proof of the third kind.

‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī is one of the founders of the branches of philosophy in the realm of Islamic thought. Philosophy of ethics is one such branch that he has discussed in his book "The Principles of Philosophy and the Method of Realism", Tafsīr al-Mīzān, and in his other treatises, under the title of "subjective considerations" (i’tibāriyāt). ‘Allāmah’s perspective in the field of ethical judgments seems non-realistic. However, careful examination of different aspects of his thought reveals that he is a realist. Despite considering ethical obligations and the moral goodness and evil as subjective, he interprets them based on reality. For this reason, he should be considered among the realists. According to ‘Allāmah, the goodness and evil are considered based on ethical obligations and the ethical obligations are considered based on the real necessity between action and the goal. The goal of ethics is felicity, and the motive to achieve felicity is not subject to taste, agreement, command, or prohibition. Therefore, its desirability is real, and since achieving the goal is not possible without performing an action, a person has to inevitably consider the necessity between oneself and the actions essential for the goal, which is termed as ethical obligation. In this way, the subjective consideration of the ethical obligations is based on the real desirability of the ethical goal, and the real necessity between action and that goal. The basis of the subjective consideration of goodness and evil to be real, is also explained in this manner.

The issue of goodness and evil has been discussed since ancient times, from the days of ancient Greece before Christ. Socrates, for example, first used the terms good and bad, and later Aristotle discussed it in practical reason. In the field of Islam, the issue of goodness and evil is also one of the most important theological issues. Some theologians consider it to be a firm principle in recognizing the actions of God and His attributes of action. Various opinions have been presented on this issue. One of these perspectives is the viewpoint of the late ‘Allāmah Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabā’ī. He presented the theory of subjective considerations (i’tibāriyāt) and regarded goodness and evil amongst the subjective considerations in the specific sense. The theory of subjective considerations has been discussed before ‘Allāmah as well, but he discussed it systematically. In the meantime, some attributed relativism to ‘Allāmah. However, the reality is that ‘Allāmah is an absolutist, not a relativist. He provides a precise interpretation of the subjectivity of goodness and evil, which requires careful understanding and deep contemplation. What is presented in this article is an analysis and explanation of ‘Allāmah's viewpoint on the issue of goodness and evil. This article is divided into three sections: semantics, epistemology, and ontology. If these three sections are correctly explained, we will get closer to the crux of ‘Allāmah's opinion. In semantics, he mentions two meanings for goodness and evil:1. agreement and disagreement with social goals and purposes, and 2. goodness and evil in the sense of what should or should not be done. Regarding the ontology of goodness and evil, he believes goodness and evil to be essential and real. He distinguishes between goodness and evil in the actual fact and goodness and evil in the practical aspect. Goodness and evil in the actual fact is constant, but goodness and evil in the practical aspect is variable and depends on the inner feelings of individuals. In the epistemology of goodness and evil, he is not a relativist; rather, he accepts the reality of goodness and evil, and intellect has the ability to understand it.

Theological discussions hold a significant place in philosophy and theoretical mysticism (‘irfān), and are discussed under the rules of the reality of existence and its accidents or determinations. One of the issues raised in this field is the elucidation of the levels of divine knowledge. The prevailing view in theoretical mysticism expounds detailed knowledge before creation through the determination of unity. In the determination of unity, the Almighty has the knowledge of the affairs, names and perfections of the essence, which is detailed and in the form of immutable essences. The cognitive forms and the immutable essences (a’yān-i thābitāh) within unity serve as the criterion for pre-creation detailed knowledge and act as the mediator for manifesting multiplicity of objects in the external world. The question arises whether the perspective of mystics in associating this form of detailed knowledge to the Almighty can be accepted or not. Despite the discussions presented in explaining and correcting the mystics' viewpoint, accepting a formal detailed knowledge for the Almighty needs to be reconsidered. ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī has criticized the mystics' immutable essences perspective in explaining the detailed knowledge of the Almighty, criticizing in the same context of the Mu'tazilites’ thoughts regarding the pre-eternal subsistents (thābitāt-i azalī). In this article, through an analytical approach, we delve into the explanation and reinforcement of ‘Allāmah's critique of the mystics' perspective, demonstrating that accepting the unity presented in mysticism as a level of pre-creation detailed knowledge of the Almighty is a matter of contemplation and doubt.

One of the fundamental teachings of Islam to activate all human capacities and elevate them to the highest possible level is the doctrine of “self-knowledge”. This doctrine has been examined by religious scholars through various approaches, perspectives, and different methods, presenting diverse and sometimes contradictory interpretations. Among these interpretations, given ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī's distinguished position in the matters of religious research, the significance of examining his interpretation becomes evident. Hence, this research, after presenting ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī's interpretation of the doctrine of "self-knowledge" in a cohesive and systematic framework, aims to evaluate it. Based on the results of this study, ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī's interpretation of this religious doctrine (i.e., the “necessity of witnessing the dependent identity and the absolute nexus of the soul to achieve presential knowledge of God”) can be introduced as the “benchmark interpretation”. This interpretation is characterized by features such as the dependence of the doctrine of “self-knowledge” on the “verses of the holy Quran”, its explanation based on “narrative propositions”, presenting a historical, analytical, and comparative perspective on the concept of “self-knowledge” and proving the possibility of “knowledge of God” and “knowledge of the soul” while rejecting its impossibility. This interpretation also provides practical solutions such as “purifying the heart” and “freeing the mind” to attain “self-knowledge”, emphasizes the non-conflict between “self-knowledge” and “social responsibilities”," and strives for an “operational, competitive model” of the doctrine of “self-knowledge”.

The proofs in theology pertain to the existence of god, His unity or His creatorship and the like. According to philosophers, the existence of god based on the principle of “that which has no cause” is self-evident, and the proofs establishing His existence are merely elucidations of this self-evident matter. The proofs presented in theology and philosophy on the existence of god, firstly and essentially, do not establish the existence of god in itself. Or if they do, they are elucidating proofs and His existence does not require a proof. The Holy Quran, from the perspective of ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī, contains proofs on God. However, none of them are on the existence of god in itself, because His existence is considered self-evident in the Quran and even the elucidating proof on His existence is not presented.  The verses related to the proofs are either establishing the unity and oneness of the Almighty God, or His creatorship, or other attributes of Him, and none of them establish the existence of the Almighty God itself.

Feminism, in general, is a theory that advocates for equal opportunities and rights for women in political, economic, and social aspects. Multiple tendencies can be seen within this theory, where radical feminism belongs to the movements of the second wave of feminism. Radical feminists deny and oppose matters such as marriage, reproduction, motherhood, and family in general. Similarly, they consider marriage equivalent to immodesty, label motherhood as a burden on women, and perceive it as a tool for suppressing them. Conversely, various thinkers and movements amongst the Western or Islamic philosophers have scrutinized and criticized the components of radical feminism. Sometimes, their viewpoints serve as criteria in the process of explaining these issues. In the Islamic context, prominent scholars like ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī consider marriage a natural and intrinsic phenomenon, viewing reproduction and childbearing as the only intrinsic factor of marriage. From his perspective, a cause and effect relationship exists between a mother and her child, originating from reality, rather than mere convention or the product of education and  upbringing.  Another example of considerable influence in this discussion is  ‘Allāmah’s perspective on the "inherent dignity of human." Similarly, numerous other aspects can be found in his viewpoints, based on which many components of feminism can be examined. This article seeks to undertake this task.

The attribution of good and evil deeds to God and human has always been regarded by the qur’ānic culture, and figures including interpreters, theologians, philosophers, and mystics have focused their attention on it. In this regard, the verse 78 of the Woman chapter has been taken to allude that the good and evil deeds are from God, while the next verse has been regarded as evidence to the attribution of good deeds to God and the evil deeds to the human. As an important challenge, this difference in attribution has been constantly discussed by thinkers. Consequently, this study set out to organize, interpret, compare, and evaluate the viewpoints of Ibn Taymiyya Ḥarrānī (661-728 AH) and ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī (1281-1360 AH) about this issue. The results of the study reveal that Ibn Taymiyya has taken the first verse to indicate that the Prophet’s (s) orders originate from the divine orders in the domain of legislation and the second verse to designate that the good deeds existentially originate from God. However, in ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s viewpoint, both verses have an existential attitude, express the qur’ānic principle of “the similarity of creation and beauty” and the ontological view to evil deeds, and proclaim “the non-existential nature of evil deeds” through a comparative stance and attribute them to the human due to his sins.