جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه "copulative existence" در نشریات گروه "علوم قرآن و حدیث"

The common perspective on the relationship between the special sort of gradation (tashkīk-i khāṣṣī) and the particular unity (al-waḥdat al-shakhsī) of existence suggests their contradiction. According to this view, if one adheres to the particular unity of existence, they must go past the special sort of gradation and believe in the gradation of manifestations of existence rather than the gradation of existence. However, ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī, in his "Conversations," presents a different perspective and believes that these two concepts are not contradictory. This article, employing a descriptive-analytical approach, aims to elucidate the manner of compatibility between the special sort of gradation and the particular unity of existence based on the philosophical foundations of ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī. Finally it becomes evident that, according to ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā'ī’s viewpoint, every cause has an encompassing distinction concerning its effect and, as a result, enjoys a category absoluteness (iṭlāq-i maqsamī). Additionally, he believes that although the effect does not have an independent existence, it does exist. These principles lead to the explanation of the particular unity of existence due to its category absoluteness and the clarification of gradation of existence because of the existence of effects.

Intelligibles as universal concepts are divided into three groups of primary, secondary logical and secondary philosophical intelligibles. Highlighting the role of presential knowledge in obtaining the latter sort of intelligibles Allama Tabatabaei has defined them as concepts that though abstracted by mind characterize external objects. Similarly, Mesbah Yazdi regards such terms as abstracted by mind and indicating mode of being. He also focuses the role of knowledge by presence and activities of mind in exploration of such concepts and in this way expanded the extent of secondary philosophical intelligibles. Whether or not such concepts exist externally is the matter of disagreement between Allama and Mesbah. According to Allama they are somewhat existent as depending altogether on other beings but in the eyes of Mesbah they lack any external realization and exist only because their origin of abstraction exists and so such concepts serve the purpose of characterizing the ways and modes things are.

The term copulative existence is used in three different ways: the first being of non-nominal meaning that belongs to propositions as connective element as opposed to propositional being in existential propositions which is nominal meaning i.e. taken by itself, it is conceivable with no other concept from without. In second usage copulative existence is taken as being in itself for other than itself. According to third usage which is coined by Mulla Sadra this term is taken to mean a dependent being as against independent existence in discussions of cause and effect. According to Mulla Sadra existence of all contingent beings is but the very existential poverty and a pure relation to the Cause. That is why they are called wojūd-e-rābet ­i.e. copulative being while earlier philosophers had deemed such beings as related to the cause or in their term wojūd-e-rābeti. The present article is to survey these three terms and gives a due attention to the explanation of copulative being in transcendent theosophy.

Immanuel Kant's ideas and true understanding of them is possible only in the subjectivist context of his critical philosophy. In examining his view of existence therefore one must consider the foundations of his thought like distinction of the noumenal from the phenomenal world and inaccessibility of the former to human reason.Kant reduced existence from external and real domain to mental category in the domain of mind and denied the predicative existence acknowledging only copula existence. He thus regarded existence not as a dimension of reality but only as a mentally constructed matter. in the domain of mind therefore unlike other concepts the concept of existence when attributed does not add anything new to the content of the subject but only acts as a copula (a connective role) in compound propositions and posits the subject itself in simple propositions.