جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه "goodness" در نشریات گروه "علوم قرآن و حدیث"

‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī is one of the founders of the branches of philosophy in the realm of Islamic thought. Philosophy of ethics is one such branch that he has discussed in his book "The Principles of Philosophy and the Method of Realism", Tafsīr al-Mīzān, and in his other treatises, under the title of "subjective considerations" (i’tibāriyāt). ‘Allāmah’s perspective in the field of ethical judgments seems non-realistic. However, careful examination of different aspects of his thought reveals that he is a realist. Despite considering ethical obligations and the moral goodness and evil as subjective, he interprets them based on reality. For this reason, he should be considered among the realists. According to ‘Allāmah, the goodness and evil are considered based on ethical obligations and the ethical obligations are considered based on the real necessity between action and the goal. The goal of ethics is felicity, and the motive to achieve felicity is not subject to taste, agreement, command, or prohibition. Therefore, its desirability is real, and since achieving the goal is not possible without performing an action, a person has to inevitably consider the necessity between oneself and the actions essential for the goal, which is termed as ethical obligation. In this way, the subjective consideration of the ethical obligations is based on the real desirability of the ethical goal, and the real necessity between action and that goal. The basis of the subjective consideration of goodness and evil to be real, is also explained in this manner.

The issue of goodness and evil has been discussed since ancient times, from the days of ancient Greece before Christ. Socrates, for example, first used the terms good and bad, and later Aristotle discussed it in practical reason. In the field of Islam, the issue of goodness and evil is also one of the most important theological issues. Some theologians consider it to be a firm principle in recognizing the actions of God and His attributes of action. Various opinions have been presented on this issue. One of these perspectives is the viewpoint of the late ‘Allāmah Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabā’ī. He presented the theory of subjective considerations (i’tibāriyāt) and regarded goodness and evil amongst the subjective considerations in the specific sense. The theory of subjective considerations has been discussed before ‘Allāmah as well, but he discussed it systematically. In the meantime, some attributed relativism to ‘Allāmah. However, the reality is that ‘Allāmah is an absolutist, not a relativist. He provides a precise interpretation of the subjectivity of goodness and evil, which requires careful understanding and deep contemplation. What is presented in this article is an analysis and explanation of ‘Allāmah's viewpoint on the issue of goodness and evil. This article is divided into three sections: semantics, epistemology, and ontology. If these three sections are correctly explained, we will get closer to the crux of ‘Allāmah's opinion. In semantics, he mentions two meanings for goodness and evil:1. agreement and disagreement with social goals and purposes, and 2. goodness and evil in the sense of what should or should not be done. Regarding the ontology of goodness and evil, he believes goodness and evil to be essential and real. He distinguishes between goodness and evil in the actual fact and goodness and evil in the practical aspect. Goodness and evil in the actual fact is constant, but goodness and evil in the practical aspect is variable and depends on the inner feelings of individuals. In the epistemology of goodness and evil, he is not a relativist; rather, he accepts the reality of goodness and evil, and intellect has the ability to understand it.

Robert Merrihew Adams‒the contemporary moral philosopher‒has offered an ontological theory of goodness known as the “theory of resemblance.” By “goodness” he means to refer to a kind of intrinsic goodness which he calls “excellence.” Nevertheless, Adams’s theory includes both moral goodness (in his own terms, “moral excellence”) and the intrinsic goodness which is irrelevant to morality, such as aesthetic goodness. In his view, God is the highest good and the most perfect instance of goodness, and the goodness of other things arises from their resemblance to God. On this account, “goodness,” or in Adams’s words, “excellence” of something depends on its resemblance to God. Ṣadrā’s philosophy introduces the theory of existential gradation (tashkīk) to establish the highest degree of goodness for the highest degree of existence‒that is, God. In his view, other degrees of existence count as good to the extent of their closeness to God’s essence. Although Adams provides a theological account of the moral end, in response to the fundamental non-theological ground of morality, his theory has failed to evade the problem of arbitrariness. In this paper, I compare Adams’s resemblance theory with the theory of existential gradation in Ṣadrāean philosophy, and then improve some flaws of the resemblance theory in terms of the Islamic philosophical account.

The relation between virtue, intuitive knowledge, and goodness is one of the basic pivots of philosophy of ethics. The kind of outlook on this relation would naturally lead to some outcomes concerning scientism or pragmatism or adopting a third viewpoint. In this field, Plato – the great Greek philosopher – and Mullah Sadra – the great thinker of Islamic philosophy – both have an exclusive outlook about virtue, which confirms a close relation between ethics, epistemology, and ontology. While studying the philosophical principles of Plato (including the idea theory) and Mulla Sadra (including the analogical gradation of existence as well as a specific perspective on soul and its ontogenetic motion) and with the use of an analytical-descriptive method, this research is intended to express the similarities and correspondence of their opinions and explore and analyze the differences existing in this respect. By expounding the notion of virtue and structural analytical of opinions as well as noticing the different philosophical principles of the two thinkers, one can find out the existential identity of intuitive knowledge, virtue, and goodness. The unity of the above three categories would be with an emphasis on the centrality of intuitive knowledge and its conceptual command on virtue and goodness; in such a way that the actualization of intuitive knowledge means attaining virtue and appearance of goodness.

The problem of human deed`s Goodness and badness is one basic problem in theology, usuli fiqh and ethics; it may be studied in different aspect of semantics, ontology and epistemology. Whether goodness and badness are essential to deeds or not is ontological; but whether it is rational or not, is epistemological. Often, these two aspects are not properly distinguished and it leads to some fallacies. This paper, having distinguished the two aspects, deciding the place of dispute and describing epistemological consequences, has argued for rationality of those propositions of goodness and badness by giving three proofs. Upon the first, if the goodness and badness are not rational, one may not be of any knowledge of the goodness of human deeds at all, even by way of religion. The second proof proves that these propositions carry certainty and, therefore, are used in the premises of logical demonstration; they are not among those known only as well-known used in dialectic. On the third reason, the validity of certain deeds is known as self-evident and, thereof, certain and rational. Although numerous epistemological objections have been given against the proofs, finally the paper, giving certain arguments, has defended rationality of the goodness and badness of these propositions.

Shaykh Muḥammad Ḥusayn Iṣfahānī, the Shiite scholar of Ūṣūl al-Fiqh (principles of Islamic jurisprudence), has appealed to remarks by Muslim philosophers in order to give a common-sense picture of the moral propositions being types of “mashhūrāt” (generally held) propositions and provided a new theory. According to his view, moral goodness and badness amounts to being praiseworthy or blameworthy, because semantically speaking, moral value is meant to refer to being worthy of praise and blame. There are two elements in Muḥaqqiq Iṣfahānī’s ontological account of moral goodness and badness: praise and blame by rational people, and an instrumental view of the praise and the blame, that is, rational people praise or blame an action because moral actions are ways to protect the social system, gain interests, and prevent harms. We criticize Iṣfahānī’s view in that, first, our evaluations of the moral are made in terms of discovery, rather than construction, and second, the value we perceive in the moral is one that can be perceived by seeing their essences, and so, they do not have an instrumental nature. In this paper, after an analysis of the gist of Muḥaqqiq Iṣfahānī’s claim and its implications, we will criticize his view.

Exploring the question of goodness and badness, Martyr Sadr has aimed to explain the meaning of goodness and badness and their status in the station of realization and affirmation and typology of statements of goodness and badness. According to his view, interpretation of goodness and badness as “expediency and aftermath”, “deserving reward and punishment”, “deserving praise and blame”, “desire and instinct” is not correct but the authentic meaning of goodness and badness is the moral necessity which - regardless of the realm of conventions - has had actuality in the tablet of reality and is other than cosmic necessity. According to him, the difference between essential and canonical goodness and badness is substantial and is not limited to the quality of ascription. He has criticized some of justice-oriented ('adliyyah) theologians for proving essential and rational goodness and badness and regarded the two propositions of “justice is good” and “oppression is bad” as assertoric propositions. According to him, the propositions of goodness and badness are indemonstrable and are among certainties and Muhaqqiq Isfahani’s argument for their being among conventional proposition is not valid. Beside its strong points, Martyr Sadr’s view has some weak points which have been dealt with in the present article.

Beneficence and goodness is one of invaluable ethical concepts and high educational themes emphasized seriously by the holy Quran and teachings of the school of Ahl al-Bayt. Although the ultimate goal of divine religion is nothing but privilege of goodness and expansion of beneficence,some invaluable and constructive hadiths concerning such virtues are quoted from Imam Ali whose application can guide the wayfarer to his desired destination and make him closer to the Divine court. In fact, one of the most central issues of Nahj al-Balagha is consideration of the significant issue of beneficence whose precious effects are frequently mentioned in that invaluable book. The purpose of the present research is to expound Imam Ali’s views on the issue of beneficence through investigating authentic books of hadith, especially Nahj al-Balagha, so that one can obtain a firm determination in the way of goodness and beneficence.

Explication of the connection between religion and ethics is particularly important in the philosophy of ethics and it should be done with enough care and precision. A variety of views and opinions has been expressed on this issue; some scholars believe that religion and ethics oppose each other and some others believe that ethics has priority over religion. This article deals with the connection between religion and ethics from the viewpoint of Allameh Tabatabaee. He believes in the unity of religion and ethics and explicates this issue through monotheistic nature and ethical nature.