جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « Religious Goodness » در نشریات گروه « علوم قرآن و حدیث »

Goodness and badness are one of most important subjects of the Islamic theology that have different results in areas and branches such as ethics and beliefs. The Ash'arites consider goodness and badness as the religious and product of Shari'a rules, and the Mu'tazilites and Shiites consider it as one of the rules of reason and prior to Shari'a. According to the second category, goodness and badness of rulings are subject to their interests and corruptions. The verdict of goodness is subject to expediency and the verdict of badness is corrupt. Of course, due to the limitations of human intellect, finding supporting materials and corruptions or the good and bad of rulings is achieved only for some rulings and not as a general rule. The present study, with an analytical-descriptive approach based on a library method, seeks to investigate the attitude of Nahj al-Balaghah to the issue of goodness and badness and answer the question whether it can be used as a reason for the theory of goodness and badness? In answer to the central question of the research, some may claim that this book is not concerned with the issue of goodness and badness and does not refer to this principle. However, some of its interpretations can be used to prove and confirm the claim of this important theological principle. Therefore, with the help of Nahj al-Balaghah's attitude to the issue of nature, the role and position of reason, as well as parts of Imam's (as) statements, the answer to the research question can be found; Given that the rationality of goodness and badness is a conscience. Presenting narrated reasons and evidences on it is mostly punitive and negligent.

The problem of human deed`s Goodness and badness is one basic problem in theology, usuli fiqh and ethics; it may be studied in different aspect of semantics, ontology and epistemology. Whether goodness and badness are essential to deeds or not is ontological; but whether it is rational or not, is epistemological. Often, these two aspects are not properly distinguished and it leads to some fallacies. This paper, having distinguished the two aspects, deciding the place of dispute and describing epistemological consequences, has argued for rationality of those propositions of goodness and badness by giving three proofs. Upon the first, if the goodness and badness are not rational, one may not be of any knowledge of the goodness of human deeds at all, even by way of religion. The second proof proves that these propositions carry certainty and, therefore, are used in the premises of logical demonstration; they are not among those known only as well-known used in dialectic. On the third reason, the validity of certain deeds is known as self-evident and, thereof, certain and rational. Although numerous epistemological objections have been given against the proofs, finally the paper, giving certain arguments, has defended rationality of the goodness and badness of these propositions.