جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه "درستی و اعتبار استدلال" در نشریات گروه "فلسفه و کلام"

In classical logic, the rules of inference allow any conclusion to be deduced from the premises of an argument if they are inconsistent, just as they allow the conclusion of the deduction to be deduced from any premise if it is a theorem. In the book "A New Outlook on the Elements of Logic", 2nd edition, 2023, Hajihosseini introduced a revised definition for the validity of an argument by adding two new conditions to known criteria for validity. According to this definition, an argument is valid if and only if, in addition to the conditions of validity in classical logic, if the conclusion of the argument is not inconsistent, its premises together do not form an inconsistent set. Moreover, if all the premises of the argument are not axioms or theorems/ logical truths, its conclusion is not a theorem/ logical truth.Asadollah Fallahi, in his article Logic and Informativeness in Hajhosseini's Systems, Existence and Knowledge, Vol.9, No.1, criticizes the foundations of logical systems of this book and claims that the new conditions for the validity of an argument are epistemological and not logical conditions. In the forthcoming article, we address these critiques and demonstrate that they are susceptible to numerous fallacies. Furthermore, we show that Fallahi's proposal to transform the new conditions into epistemic conditions is based on unaccepted assumptions.