جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « دیلتای » در نشریات گروه « فلسفه و کلام »

History, under the influence of Hegel's thoughts in the 19th century, took a high place. In the following, some historians with a positivist way of thinking proposed the idea of scientific historiography. Based on that, history becomes a definite science and, like natural sciences, it is separated from the researcher's mentalities. The problem starts from here that German historicism, believing in the normative force of history, emphasized the importance that the historian should provide a direction for society and culture by discovering the pure facts and revealing their historical meaning.Based on this idea of history, the social and cultural function of philosophy was challenged. In this chaotic situation that made philosophy face the crisis of identity, Nietzsche's and Dilthey's projects, i.e. the broad and diverse movement of "philosophy of life," became the driving force of the renewal of philosophy in the 19th century.Nietzsche and Dilthey agreed on the issue that comprehensive historiography in its understanding of human beings has created the problem of relativism, which causes "dissolution" and "pessimism" and cannot predict the future of human culture. Therefore, they called for a new philosophy that should reveal the purpose of human culture and support its progress towards reaching its goal. Although they chose a similar path to confirm the cultural authority of philosophy against the results of historical criticism, they arrived at a completely different solution.Nietzsche calls the antidotes against historicism "supra-historical", which includes the art of forgetting history and living in an enclosed and determined horizon; It means having the talent to know when to sense history and when to leave it aside.In his opinion, both of these methods are equally necessary for the health of a person, the health of a nation and culture. Dilthey, unlike Nietzsche, considers history to be an antidote and a cure for the failures of the philosophy of life: If history creates a wound, it must also heal it.

The epistemological problem of Kant and Dilthey is the objectivity and validity of knowledge in the natural sciences and the human sciences respectively. In this context, they undertake a critique of reason and determine the scope of the theoretical reason’s ability and the concepts applied in acquiring knowledge. However, the two philosophers disagree in different respects: Kant deals with the critique of theoretical reason and delineation of the faculty of judgment, whereas Dilthey introduces the idea of the critique of historical reason characteristic of human sciences and seeks to establish the criterion by which human sciences could be distinguished from natural sciences. To this end, both introduce the concepts and categories involved in acquiring knowledge and justify their application. In this paper, after comparing the views of the two philosophers, we have concluded that given the comprehensive nature of categories of life compared to categories of understanding, and the hermeneutical relationship between them, neither Kant's categories of understanding are equivalent, counterparts to Dilthey's categories of life, nor natural and human sciences are at one level. Rather, the relation between them is derivational one, that is, one is grounded in the other; and Dilthey attempts to discover and provide a foundation of categories of understanding and natural sciences, which are, respectively, the categories of life and human sciences.

The role and influence of delta in theories related to the humanities is unique. Dilthey contrasted the "methodic hermeneutics" with the "positivist method" of the natural sciences. Just as the natural sciences have a single method for themselves, so hermeneutics is a method for the "humanities"; Distinguishing between the natural sciences and the humanities, in order to emphasize its independent identity vis the natural sciences and to show that the nature of the humanities works differently from the natural sciences, he emphasized that the humanities lived or experienced with the world of life. The same "life-world" deals with, and therefore the type of encounter and the way we go to the natural world is different from the type of way we go to the living world and lived life. The natural world is a mechanical world. But the living and living world is a living and dynamic world and requires a different method from the one that exists in the field of natural sciences.In this essay, inspired by the concept of life-world in Dilthey, we have gone to Sadra's philosophy and transcendent wisdom and through his philosophical principles such as principality of being, gradation of being, substantial motion, explanation of the concept of will, evolution of the soul and gradational unity of the knower and the known. We have talked about the concept of "transcendent life" in Sadra's philosophy and have tried to show how, given these principles and concepts, the conditions for the possibility of "transcendent human sciences" can be explained on the basis of transcendent wisdom.

In various occasions, Heidegger acknowledges the extensive and profound effects of Dilthey on his thought, so that some of Heidegger's scholars believe Dilthey has a greater role than Husserl in the formation of Heidegger's ideas. For instance, in Being and Time, he frequently mentions that his views on life and history are greatly affected by Dilthey's views in these areas. Furthermore, the publication of Heidegger's 1919-1923 lectures has revealed this influence and thematic links between their ideas more than ever. Our aim in this paper is to better understand the relation of Heidegger and Dilthey, especially regarding the subject of analyzing life and historicality and the implications of this influence on early Heidegger.

Humanities discuss human voluntary action, hence the man's free will is the most important basis for distinguishing the humanities from the natural sciences. In view of the fact that there are, in general, two Compatible and Incompatible versions of free will, it is necessary, in general, to consider the ratio of different perspectives on the distinction of the humanities from the natural sciences with these two general statements of free will, in this way the humanities and sciences Naturally, they define their relationship between their last and next, according to the free will's statements. This paper, by descriptive-analytic method, examines the role of different statements of free will in the distinction between humanities and natural sciences, and concludes that the intrinsic distinction of the humanities from the natural sciences is possible only on the basis of an Incompatible narrative, and the attitude of Compatibility can not distinguish the human sciences from the natural sciences, except through exogenous factors.

Dilthey is one of the philosophers of life who has examined the text of life. His view of the "experience of life" has many similarities with the thoughts of life in Mulla Sadra's transcendentalist wisdom. The term "life experience" is not meant by the term "lived experience" in the Diltian philosophy, but the purpose of any kind of time-to-life perspective that examines human activity over time. The study of the goals and the general course of these two philosophers and the characteristics of the experience of life illustrates a kind of affiliation in this matter that one can think of between these two thinkers. The date and time, feeling, experience and perception are the things that are discussed in this article. The flood of life, the active, common, and immediate understanding of life, is also recognized as the most important points of the two philosophers; That is, the self during the movement and the flood in life with a kind of exaltation of values, is associated with its volitional act, for the purpose of its evolution, and the body defines its own example.

One of the matters discussed in the Mozaf (determined) philosophies is to investigate of the kind of relationship and scientific transaction between each science and its related sciences; therefore the investigation of the relation between humanities and methodological hermeneutics is discussed in the philosophy of humanities.
To study the relation between methodological hermeneutics and humanities it is necessary to investigate the views of methodological hermeneutists who have discussed this topic. Therefore it is important to see the ideas of Dilthey to understand this relationship because, among methodological hermeneutists, he has concerned humanities and has applied hermeneutics in these sciences. He believes humanities are historical sciences because the subject of these sciences is "human being as itself" which he considers , following Hegel, as the dominant soul of all humans at all the times and believes the whole history is his manifestation. Dilthey believes the method of these sciences, according to his latest theory, is Schleiermacher's methodological hermeneutics.
But this claim is not generally acceptable both in his understanding of humanities and in its method; because neither are humanities restricted to historical sciences nor their method is limited to methodological hermeneutics; especially considering the fact that this perception of humanities and his belief regarding some principles of methodological hermeneutics is in contradiction with his main purpose for dealing with humanities which is to provide strong and non-relative bases for those sciences.

The lived-experience, Erlebnis, and "knowledge by presence" are two key concepts in the philosophies of Dilthey and Mulla Sadra. Insisting on immediatedness and infallibility of lived experience and knowledge by presence, both philosophers have try to ground the whole of human knowledge in the two way of cognition. Moreover, they do treat the understanding achieved in this manner, not much mere reception of external facts, passive act, as an active act. The other point is that Dilthey believes that the scope of lived experience and the understanding derived from it, includes not just internal states of percipient but also internal states of the other people and manifestations of these states. However, knowledge by presence, for Mulla Sadra, has a more narrow extent; namely, it comprises only the percipient's soul and its faculties and states. Nevertheless, the problem that lived experience and knowledge by presence faced is subjectivity and relativity. Dilthey endeavor to overcome this difficulty through appeal to the unproven supposition of human congeniality in consciousness; while Mulla Sadra tries to cope with the problem in like manner, but basing on the principle of the unity of being.

Dilthey, no doubt, has a significant role in theories on human sciences. This role should be investigated in an attitude which considers human sciences independent from natural sciences. In spite of the fact that he was under the influence of different thinkers’ views, most of whom did not consider human sciences independent from natural sciences, he held that human sciences is independent, and distinct regarding its subject matter, aim, and method. Hence, he has tried to explain practically the features of human sciences in view of its subject, aim, and method. The lack of Persian resources about Dithey’s views on the subject led to the explication of his views in this paper. The main aim is to find Dithey’s intellectual foundations, particularly in his great work-“Introduction to the Human Science" which has recently been translated into Persian, and to compare these foundations with those of great Muslim philosopher, Mullā Şadrā shirazi. The comparison shows that although such thinkers as Mullā Şadrā did not focus on human sciences in its modern sense, Dithey’s views were based on a kind of criticism of Aristotelian and medieval metaphysics. This criticism, of course, does not apply to Sadraian metaphysics. According to this criticism, focusing on intellectual foundations of Sadraian thinking can be considered as a first step for followers of Mullā Şadrā to provide a different interpretation of human sciences.