جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « زاگزبسکی » در نشریات گروه « فلسفه و کلام »

The nature of virtue is a subject that has been a source of philosophical reflection for philosophers since the time of Aristotle. Aristotle is the first thinker who gave a classical explanation of virtue. In Aristotle's thought, virtue is a characteristic trait that lies in the middle. Analyzing the human soul, he divides virtue into two types, moral and rational. On the other hand, Linda Zagzebski, an eminent American philosopher who is among the neo-Aristoteans, insists that moral concepts are ultimately derived from the concept of virtue. And therefore, he tries his best to provide a precise definition of the nature of virtue and its characteristics. In this article, after revealing the position of both philosophers regarding the nature of virtue, by comparing and revealing points of commonality and difference, we will show how and why these two philosophers differ in defining the nature and division of virtue.

The question of the divine foreknowledge and the human freewill (volition) is among the most important and complex philosophical issues within the Abrahamic religions tradition, which has come to be called theological fatalism. In the article at hand, we present the new reading of this issue by Zagzebski and discuss the three traditional solutions by Boethius, William of Ockham, and Molina. According to Boethian solution, God is atemporal. William of Ockham deems God’s knowledge of our freewill as a soft fact rather than a hard one, while Molina denies the premise of the transfer of past necessity. This article shows that the question and its solutions have wrongly deemed the eternity of God within time. That viewpoint is against Anselm’s theology that takes God as atemporal. Finally, we show that atemporality solution agrees with Anselm’s theology and God’s actual knowledge. The human’s agency is in line with God’s agency. That is to say, on the one hand, God’s knowledge is at the top of the causal chain that leads to the realization of an act and is considered as one of the conditions for the realization of the voluntary act. On the other hand, the human knowledge and power is part of the causal chain of that action. Therefore, the consideration of the finite human knowledge as relying on the infinite and atemporal knowledge of God does not contradict the human freewill.

The moral evaluation of belief is one of the issues of discussion in epistemology. Accepting this fact is based on a proper approach in epistemology that allows the moral evaluation of belief. The Neo-Aristotelian approach in virtue-centered epistemology, now well-known with Mrs. Linda Zagzebski, has put forward some reasons for the superiority of that approach in explanation of aforementioned issue. These reasons are as follows: superiority of virtue-centered epistemology over other related approaches, problems of contemporary epistemology due to focus on the issue of skepticism and neglecting understanding and, finally, reasons related to philosophy of mind which deals with the relationship between belief and emotion. She continues her discussion with the relationship between belief and morality and considers a general meaning for libertarianism to pose the possibility of moral evaluation of all levels of knowledge. The main critique of this writing is on expanding liberty to all varieties of knowledge.

Autonomy is a rational virtue that assumes that an individual is independent of the other, with the ability to choose and decide in areas such as ethics, politics, and knowledge. The autonomous person with this definition resists religious authority. For this reason, autonomy always prevents the acceptance of religious teachings without independent evidence. The relationship between religious belief and rationality has made a hard choice for modern religious people. Modern humans have to relinquish rationality and believe in religious authority, or limit their religious beliefs to a small proposition for which it has evidence. Philosophers such as Zagzebski, Coady, and Robert & Wood are attempting to reinterpret the concept of autonomy that does not conflict with the acceptance of epistemological authority, including religious authority. In this article, after reviewing the definition of autonomy and its history, the relation between this concept and concepts such as independence and authority is discussed. Then, by providing a consistent interpretation of this concept, it analyzes the relationship between this new concept and religious authority.

The intelligibility of the belief in the existence of God is the most important issue in religious epistemology. Zagzebski’s conception of virtue-based epistemology both criticizes the externalist and individualist viewpoints of reformed epistemology and emphasizes the voluntariness of the belief and its influence by the community. In this stance, the authoritativeness of the religious belief is explained based on the virtue of “epistemic trust” on oneself and other members of the epistemic community. Therefore, the believers’ belief in the existence of God at different times and places can be the basis of the authoritativeness of one’s belief in the existence of God. This issue has been explained via an argumentation that indicates the superiority of epistemic universality over epistemic self-determinism and epistemic self-centrism.

One of the most controversial questions on Virtue Theory is the relation between virtue and skill. Skill, like virtue, is an acquired excellence. Amongst contemporary epistemologists, Zagzebski is one of the pioneers of virtue epistemology who pays good attention. She tries to put forward an accurate account of pure virtue theory as involves all things that are called virtue. One of the problems explored is distinguishing between skill and virtue. In Zagzebski’s view, virtue is distinct from skill. We have intellectual and moral virtues, as well as intellectual and moral skills. Virtues and skills have numerous connections. Skills allow a virtuous person to be effective in action. However, virtues psychically precede skills. This article aims to study this problem. Furthermore, virtues stand prior to skills. This article proceeds to study this problem with an analytic- descriptive approach.

The relation of virtues with each other is among the controversial issues about virtues that was firstly dealt with by Socrates and Plato and they proposed the theory of uniqueness of virtue. Aristotle did not accept this theory and divided virtues into two rational and ethical groups. He has mostly dealt with ethical virtue and has provided no clear response to this question that what relation is between rational and ethical virtues. Farabi and Zagzebeski do not accept the theory of uniqueness of virtue and they believe that rational virtues are different from ethical ones. In response to the relation between virtues¡ Farabi and Zagzebeski have proposed priority and posteriority¡ and subset theories respectively. The analysis that Farabi and Zagzebeski propose from the relation between virtues is finally another version of uniqueness of virtues.

Zagzebski is a peeoner of virtue epistemology. She reject the claim of Aristotel about distinction between intellectual virtue and moral virtue. Zagzebski argue that an intellectual virtue dose not differ from certain moral virtues any more then one moral virtue differs from another. She argue that intellectual virtue are a kind of moral virtues and subset of It. only reason fore distinguish virtue from each other is motivation component. Each of virtue have fundamental motivation that is different from others. This article explor and critic Zagzebski's view distinction between virtues with descriptive and analysis of content method.

Linda Zagzebski presents a new kind of foundational moral theory in her exemplarist virtue theory which exemplary persons have considered as the foundation. In this theory all of the basic moral concepts such as good ends and right acts are defined by direct reference to paradigmatically good person. One of the most important consequences of this theory is that moral propositions are a posteriori and because of that the theory gives special attention to narrative ethics. By emphasizing the significant functions of emotions in morality, Zagzebski tries to show that paradigmatically good persons are identified by the emotion of admiration. She believes that the emotion is a kind of perception that has both cognitive and affective aspects. Since this theory is based on the attractiveness of the good, it can provide an attractive foundation for ethics. Because of this matter, Zagzebski considers this theory better and more justifiable than other moral theories. This article seeks to give a brief review of Zagzebski's moral theory, express the considerations of other philosophers about her theory and in the end show the important problems that undermine the justifiability and acceptability of it.

Divine Motivation theory is an ethical theory with a theological foundation، attempting to explain the relation between religion and morality in the context of Christian theology with emphasizing on neo-Aristotelian and motivation-based ethics. This theory that is presented by Linda Zagzebski، provides a new form of virtue ethics that God''s motives، especially that of love، are foundations of moral life and these motivational states are considered ontologically and explanatorily the basis for all moral properties and values. This theory uses five steps to advance its destination. In the first step، this theory proves the personhood of God. In the second step، it argues that God has perfect virtues and motives. In the third step، it shows that God''s motive in the Creation is motive of love that is the central and fundamental divine motive. In the fourth step، it discusses the doctrine of imitatio Dei and focuses on the problems of this doctrine. In the last step، it attempts to link this doctrine to the doctrine of the incarnation to resolve its problems.

The present essay is a critical study of Zagzebski’s reading and criticism of Plantinga’s virtue-epistemology. Zagzebski, on the account of her definition of knowledge and the role that she assigns to ‘volition’ and ‘awareness’ in virtuous acts, along with her acceptance of the uniformity of moral and epistemic virtue, challenges Plantinga’s theory of Knowledge. Zagzebski believes that although Plantinga’s theory of Proper Function is better than Straight Reliabilism and that it is possible to interpret it in a way that is analogous to her own theory of Knowledge and even the fact that its calling virtueepistemology seems appropriate, yet taking into account Plantinga’s epistemological presuppositions and his mechanistic picture of the theory of Knowledge, his theory of Proper Function owing to its disregard for the elements of volition and awareness, in the final analysis, cannot be considered as a type of virtue-epistemology.