جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « زمان » در نشریات گروه « فلسفه و کلام »

The concept of space and time are intertwined as dimensions of the natural world, the study of each is dependent on the study of the other in order to obtain a better and greater understanding of both. For a better and more complete explanation of the discussion of space and time, we need a discussion of movement, and of course this relationship is two-way, and it is not possible to talk about movement without discussing the discussion of space and time. The aspects of the prism of space, time and motion are invalid without explaining the other two clauses. The purpose of this research is to compare the views of Mulla Sadra essential movement and Einstein's theory of relativity in terms of force, action and event (time-space) and the research is descriptive. It is analytical. The method of collecting information is a library, which has been done by referring to the relevant libraries, extracting files from Mulla Sadra works, articles and other written works on the topic of research. The findings indicated that Sadr al-Mutalahin believed that the essence of things is in motion, and if the essence of things was not in motion, there would be no movement in their symptoms. Because the existence of substance and width outside of our imagination is one and the movement of modernity is existence. There are two types of existence: fixed existence and fluid existence, the existence of the natural world is fluid and modern, which gradually comes into existence and disappears, and at the same time, its unity and personality are preserved. "Einstein" also considers time as the amount of movement and generalizes movement in all universes. And that's why he considers time and space together and to measure anything, he considers time as a fourth dimension.

Plotinus is the greatest Neoplatonic philosopher and one of the most prominent thinkers of ancient times, whose ideas have greatly influenced later philosophers. The issue of time is of great importance to philosophers and philosophical schools after Aristotle, especially in the thinking of Plotinus. One of the important aspects of time-related discussions is how temporal fluid entities are related to fixed and discrete entities. Regarding the issue of time, Plotin first criticized Aristotle's definition of time and then explained the eternal, eternal and fixedness of the order of ages. pay Plotin finally proves his innovative point of view about the time of the image or the appearance of the soul in the world of matter. In the current research, it has been stated with the analytical-comparative method that Plotin's problems with the definition of time are not correct from Mulla Sadra's point of view. Plotin's claim that time is the image of the soul also faces many problems according to Mulla Sadra's principles in transcendental wisdom.

Although the fourth dimension has gone beyond the boundaries of philosophy and is now a major concern in physics, the exact origins and history remain a mystery. Therefore, it should be investigated in the context of which philosophical problems of the Islamic world the fourth dimension was formed and then, how it developed. We will see that in the philosophical society of Iran, it has been traced back to Mullā Sadrā; we will show that, however, in the Islamic world prior to him, there are quite explicit statements in the works of Naṣīr al–Dīn Ṭūsī, Ibn Kammūna, Quṭb al–Dīn Shīrāzī, Mīrak Bukhārī, Qūshchī, Mīr Dāmād and others. In Western philosophy, the fourth dimension has been arguably traced back to the opinions of some medieval thinkers such as Anselm; but some western thinkers have correctly shown that there is no explicit statement about this in their works. In short, in this article, we will collect the views of the mentioned thinkers in a historical way and analyze them rationally. In the end, we will take a glance at the history of Ibn ʿArafa’s relevant opinion about reductional four–dimensionalism.

According to Kant, Synthesis is temporally structured. However, the "transcendental I" which serves as the foundation for temporal Synthesis, is out of time. In the analogies of experience, the "transcendental I" does not put into any moods of time (persistence, succession, and simultaneity). This may seem contradictory, as it raises the question of how the timeless "transcendental I" can form the basis of a synthetic judgment while also being out of time. This article aims to show that, based on the discussion on synthesis and the analogies of experience, the timelessness of the transcendental self does not entail a disconnection from time. Because the disconnection with time will render the transcendence of the self meaningless in Kant's philosophy. Although the "transcendental I" is not "in" time, it is always "with" time. Being "with" time means that the subject, as pure spontaneity, constitutes objectivity through time. This is because the existence of phenomena and their objective knowledge is only possible through objectivity as a determination in time. By giving time to itself a priori, the transcendental self affects itself and thus guarantees its transcendence through its finitude which is the constant companionship to time.IntroductionKant's philosophy posits that every synthesis, such as apprehension, reproduction, or recognition, is temporally structured. However, the unity of these combinations requires the existence of the transcendental self as their a priori ground for knowledge. According to Kant, the transcendental self, as the ground of the temporality of combinations, exists outside of time. In the analogies of experience, Kant goes beyond this and claims that the transcendental self is even outside of any of the modes of time (persistence, succession, and simultaneity). This raises a problem: if the transcendental I is outside of time, then its transcendence would be meaningless in Kant's philosophy. We will show that the synthetic unity of knowledge occurs in all its stages in connection with time. Furthermore, it has been demonstrated that the possibility of a priori synthetic knowledge depends on the relationship between time and the transcendental self. This article has tried to show with the phenomenological approach and by examining the discussion of synthesis and analogies of experience that the temporality of the transcendental self does not mean its "being in time" but rather, it means the constant companionship of the transcendental self and time itself.The relationship between time and SynthesisAccording to Kant, multiplicity needs synthesis to be known. The multiplicity of time cannot be understood unless the unity of time is assumed beforehand. The unity of time is the formal and a priori condition of the intuition of all phenomena. The synthesis of apprehension is related to the present. The synthesis of reproduction that is related to the past is the synthesis of the current moments with the previous moments. This is the responsibility of the transcendental imagination. The synthesis of recognition is related to the future because the a priori identity of the two moments will be the end based on which the imagination can order the multiplicity of intuitions (moments).The combination of recognition or the identification of understanding itself requires a fundamental identity that unites all three combinations. This second identity is called “Transcendental Apperception” which according to Kant is outside of time. How can the timeless transcendental self be the ground of the temporal combination? If the transcendental self is outside of time, it is no longer transcendental, and if it is in time, like other phenomena, it becomes an object of knowledge. How can this conflict be resolved in Kant? The answer to this question can be found in the section on analogies of experience.Analogies of experience: relation of time with the transcendentalself-consciousnessIn the analogies of experience, In analogies of experience, Kant talks about the moods of time. The moods of time are persistence, succession, and simultaneity. Even in analogies of experience, although Kant proposes these three modes of time, the above conflict is not resolved. Therefore, not only is the transcendental self not placed in any of the divisions of time, but also according to the analogies of experience, it is not placed in any moods of time.The conflict is resolved only when we note that all three analogies are related to the categories of relation. In addition to being related to the categories of relation, analogies reveal the meaning of "relation"; The "relation" between the subject and the predicate of the sentence and the relationship between the subject and the object in general. The pure unity of time - which is assumed by the transcendental subject - is the necessity that makes possible not only the knowledge of objects but also the realization of objectivity. Therefore, transcendental self-consciousness, as the necessary condition for knowing objects, must always consider its connection with the pure unity of time. If these rules - the analogies of experience - do not exist as transcendental time- determinations, the unity of nature and the temporality of phenomena will be lost. As a result, experience in the sense of a priori synthesis of phenomena also becomes meaningless.Therefore, even though nothing has been directly said about the relationship between time and transcendental self-consciousness in analogies, there is a fundamental connection between transcendental self-consciousness and time. The objectivity of synthetic judgments depends on time; Although, time is neither something outside the transcendental subject nor inside the subject. Rather, time is the way by which the subject affects itself. According to Heidegger, time is the continuous self-affecting of the subject.ConclusionAccording to what has been said, in the discussion of the analogies, it becomes clear how the transcendental subject, though it is not "in" time, makes it possible to be "in" time, And this is the same constant companionship of the transcendental self with time itself. Time and transcendental self are two sides of a pure combination. The transcendental self makes possible one side of knowledge - that is, subjectivity - and time - the other side - that is, objectivity. Neither time nor the transcendent self is "in" time. At the same time, both of them are a priori to all of the intra-temporal objects.Moreover, the transcendent self is not "in" time but "with" time. And in being with time, The transcendent self can make all the moods of time possible. This companionship means the persistence of the relationship.Finally, only being "with" time can justify the paradox of receptivity of self in intuition and spontaneity of understanding. The transcendental self as pure spontaneity accompanied with time can pose the receptive self in front of itself as objectivity and it guarantees the transcendence of the subject.

The present article attempts to explore two principles out of four literary and poetic principles with the centrality of Kant's conceptual turn concerning the concept of time that Deleuze opted for treating Kant's philosophy. In order to reformulate the Critique of Pure Reason, Deleuze exploits two literary principles. The first one is taken from Hamlet according to which time is out of control, the second one is taken from Arthur Rambo as he said, I is another. For appreciating such complicated statements and explaining Deleuze's particular reading of Critique of Pure Reason, the author proceeds to explore Deleuze's writings and seminars on Kant in order to show that the presupposition of having a good command over Deleuze's philosophy is to study his confrontation with Kant's philosophy. For achieving such an end, the author accompanies Deleuze's treatment of Kant's philosophy step by step in order to shed some light on the concept of time in his reading of The Critique of Pure Reason from various perspectives so to apprehend the two poetic principles concerning the time.

The question of time has always been one of the greatest questions of philosophers and physicists throughout history. Undoubtedly, every philosophical thought is manifested in different forms in literary and artistic works, and among them there are writers and artists who use philosophy as the basis of their works. Samuel Beckett is one of the most influential writers in shaping the school of thought of Absurd Theater, which has its roots in philosophy. This article purports to examine and express the issue of time in the play Waiting for Godot using the ideas of Martin Heidegger. Martin Heidegger looks at the question of "time" from an ontological point of view and in his divisions, he considers "time" in both original and non-original forms for Dasein (existence). As in the play Waiting for Godot, the most important action of the play "the issue of time" is the characters' conflict in the form of two Dasein. Thus, according to Heidegger's definition of the original and non-original "time" with which Dasein is involved in life, "time" was examined as the most important element in the play Waiting for Godot. To achieve this analysis, it was first necessary to provide an exhaustive definition of "time" in the philosophical thought of Heidegger and the philosophers before him, and then by examining the issue of wait and its meaning in Heidegger's "time", the play Waiting for Godot and the characters' continuous wait were interpreted. Analytical research has been used in this study and by examining Heidegger's thoughts and Samuel Beckett's the play Waiting for Godot, and using descriptive-analytical method, it has been tried to find the common ground between Beckett's thought on writing and performing the scenes of this play and Heidegger's philosophical thoughts to shed new light on its analysis and conducting.

.The main problem of the article is to examine the relationship between the three concepts of time, life and moral life, and the goal is to answer the question, what is the philosophical relationship between these three concepts? In this article, it has been tried to prove with the descriptive and analytical method that the relationship between time and the meaning of life can be analyzed and explained only in the third angle, which is moral life. Because the truth of man is nothing but existence and all perfectional attributes are a way of existence, but the essence of existence, the stronger and more noble the existence, the higher the perfectional attributes will be. Also, moral life has an ontological approach. And man is a fluid and changing being. It is that one order of existence goes towards a more complete order with its essential movement to reach the goal of elimination, that is, to reach happiness or destruction in the presence of God. Acquiring moral virtues over time and in accordance with the essential movement of the human soul over time is a part of moral life, and moral life is the same period of life; sometimes short and sometimes long; It is used to achieve the goal and acquire moral virtues to beautify it and achieve the goal; Consequently, it takes time to gain purpose or meaning in life.

Time is one of the most important features of the world of matter, and the knowledge of which has always attracted the attention of philosophers. The simplicity of perception of time and the difficulty of its explanation have resulted in some disagreements among philosophers concerning its definition. Islamic philosophers are no exception in this regard, and the roots of their disagreements go back to Plato’s and Aristotle’s different definitions of time. Plato defined time as a self-subsistent and essentially independent substance that is a differentiated form of the world of Ideas. In Aristotle’s view, time represents the number of motion from its priority and posteriority aspects, which cannot be gathered with each other. While acknowledging the difference between these two definitions, Islamic philosophers have usually chosen one of these definitions and tried to respond to the suspicions about their selected definition and reject the arguments in favor of the opposing one. Some philosophers such as Ibn Rushd, Ibn Sīnā, and Suhrawardī adopted Aristotle’s definition, while Zakarīyyā Rāzī and Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī advocated Plato’s definition. Nevertheless, no effort as to demonstrating the contrast between Aristotelean and Platonic definitions of time is justified because both philosophers believe that although time is different from motion, their existences are inseparable from each other. In other words, the perception of one depends on the perception of the other. accordingly, the present paper, while clarifying Plato’s view, initially intends to explain that it is not in contrast to Aristotle’s view and, secondly, aims to demonstrate the effects of their view on those of Muslim philosophers.

According to the verses and Hadithes, time is one of the most valuable things that a person benefits from in his life. Life is an opportunity and time that is considered as one of the most important divine blessings, for which man is responsible and wasting it will lead to punishment. Given that in the viewpoint of some thinkers, time is an unreal thing, and on the other hand, time, assuming its existence, is a non-optional phenomenon, the question that is raised is how the human responsibility towards time is justified? Analyzing the nature of time from Mullah Sadra's point of view, this article tries to explain philosophically the responsibility of man towards time. The hypothesis of the discussion is that achievement of beatitude, which is the goal of human creation, depends on paying attention to time, life and not neglecting it and using it as much as possible, and in this sense, time is not only an optional matter and a duty, but rather the only way to human beatitude is to use this great blessing that God has given to man. Paying attention to this point can show the reason for the necessity of this discussion.

The present paper based on a descriptive-analytical research method, tries to survey the place of time in Dariush Shaygan's intellectual system, especially its appearanceand emergence in the realm of traditional and modern culture, poetry, painting, architecture and novel. The results show that he considers time to be the central signifier or core of culture. This central core in traditional Oriental cultures is mythical time and in modern Western culture is linear time. With a deep attachment which has to the mythical time and its manifestations, he tries to find it by digging into various thoughts. According to Shaygan, although with the advent of modernity in Western culture, the mythical time was abolished and replaced by linear time, but at the end of the twentieth century, following the electronic revolution, linear time gave it’s place to the global present time which has great affinity with mythical time. Of course, their ontological differences should not be disregarded. Eventually, this effort of Shaygan leads him to the novel, and he finds the time of the early myths in Marcel Proust's novel In Search of Lost Time.

This article follows Heidegger’s criticism and analysis of Bergson’s philosophy of life. Heidegger’s interest is because Bergson is looking for a way to understand life as it is. In his research, Heidegger considers some of Bergson’s opinions promising, such as paying attention to the concept of time as a key to grasping the truth. Still, he criticizes some of Bergson’s theories, such as the inadequacy of language in understanding life. In general, the results of this research are divided into three parts; In the first part, the concept of time in Bergson’s philosophy is given as a key to understanding life, where Heidegger introduces Bergson as one of the pioneers of modern philosophy. The second part of the article is devoted to the issue of language and the inadequacy of the concept in Bergson’s philosophy. In the third and final part, Heidegger criticizes Bergson’s theories about language and tries to find a way to understand the truth through the concept of time. Attention to consciousness and its connection with life through Bergson’s time or duration is another topic of great importance to Heidegger. Despite all of Heidegger’s criticisms of the philosophy of life, he still considers Bergson’s work as the most promising research and effort to reach the truth.

Bergson's philosophy has been based on two fundamental questions of real or "inertia" and intuition, and has established a deep linkage between the three concepts of time, movement, and intercourse. He believes that intuition is the movement of evolution and the creative activity of exuberance, and in response to the spatial and sociopolitical views, the existence of a self-evolving, self-evident creative movement, which constantly creates new forms of life, and progresses in nature and excitement To higher levels of development. In studying motion, first, we have tried to prove and clarify freedom and freedom, and it has paid attention to the problem of time in order to study it. In Bergson's view, the controversies that have been made between those who believe in their algebra and their recklessness are due to the incorrect understanding of the concept of late, and then, to the sequence and coincidence, to some extent, and to some extent, and to address this mistake, the set of algebraic doubts and definitions for which And the problem itself will be ruled out. Bergson is not opposed to the theory of evolution, but with the opposite of the scientific theories of evolution, which deny the creative activity of life and consider evolution as much as the arrangement of material parts. In this paper, Bergson's dynamic interpretation of three time talk, intuition, and motion, which is the same as the constant mood.

The issue of movement in the two systems of thought including Islamic philosophy and Islamic theology has followed two different paths. An important issue in this is to find those epistemological, methodological and ontological foundations that have led to the formation of the theologians' special approach to nature and movement. The problem of the article is: what is the approach of Islamic theologians to the question of nature and movement and what principles and what methods is it based on and studied with? According to the findings of the article, from their point of view, knowing nature means knowing God's actions and it leads to knowing God. Therefore, natural science is not an essentially sought knowledge, but an organic knowledge and a ladder to know the Supreme Being and His distinction from others. The negative epistemology of theologians is the main reason for believing in the corporeality of contingent world and believing in the individual substance, jawhar. Also, movement is not a single, connected, and gradual thing in its philosophical sense, but based on the theory of individual substance, four beings, akwan, and vaccum, khala`, movement is a discrete and a unique thing in transitional movement. This article deals with the problem in an analytical way.

The rule of "miscellaneous articles in the time , complexes in the "duration" is one of the most widely used rules in Islamic philosophy, which directly or indirectly in discussions such as the relationship between the variable and the constant, the occurrence of the universe, divine knowledge, jurisprudence and Divine predestination, divine action, God's presence with the world of time, adaptation of worlds, transformation of sequence and infinite actual realization, as well as rational explanation of some religious teachings such as the simultaneous presence of the Imams on the bed of various mortals or the absence of time on the divine essence are used.Therefore, this rule plays an essential role in the intellectual system of thinkers such as Mirdamad. This rule has various interpretations have not yet been comprehensively expressed together and has provided grounds for fallacies. Leading research provides an overview of the various interpretations of this rule and some of their applications. The diversity of these interpretations is primarily due to the fact that Duration itself has three separate meanings that have only verbal commonalities with each other. Also, what is present in the universe can be a person existing in time, a status of existing statuses in time, or a superior existence in time, and ultimately the stability of the world of time can only be achieved from the perspective of fixed beings, or this Stability does not depend on the cognitive subject. According to the factors, a total of four interpretations of the rule are organized,

In this article, after the precise statement of the topic and purpose of occurrence and progress, Ibn Sina's, Fakhr Razi's, and Sadr al-Mutalahin Shirazi's views on the occurrence or time step of the natural world have been presented and critically analyzed. According to the historical order, Ibn Sina's opinion based on the antiquity of nature, and a reason for it, based on the natural-philosophical rule, "every event is preceded by matter and duration" is established. Then, the criticisms of Ghazali and Fakhr Razi, which are similar to each other, and Khwaja Tusi's response to Fakhr Razi's criticism are presented, and, in the continuation, the opinion of Mullasadra, which agrees with Ibn Sina, is narrated. In the following, a reference was made to Mulla Sadra's special opinion about the temporal occurrence of nature based on intrinsic movement, and it was pointed out that this opinion can be summed up with any occurrence or step of nature. Then, two side problems related to the discussion the infinite sequence of equipment and the specific problem of entities, have been raised and resolved. The summary and conclusion of the article are also given at the end and, in the conclusion, the theologian's opinion regarding the temporal occurrence of nature is ambiguous and inefficient, and the opinion of philosophers is preferred over nature's step.

To clarify the reason why presentism is preferable to four–dimensionalism, we have to see what serious criticisms have been posed against four–dimensionalism throughout history. Several criticisms have been raised by some contemporary western thinkers the most important of which is the fact that the four–dimensionalism denies movement and therefore it is highly counterintuitive. Some Muslim thinkers, too, have sometimes tried to intensely criticize it in a similar way since the four–dimensionalism was proposed by Naṣīr al–Dīn Ṭūsī. For instance, ʿAllāmah Ḥillī maintains that we self–evidently know that the past and the future, e.g., yesterday and tomorrow, are nonexistent and it is not the case to say that they are fixed in their own context. In other words, since the fourth dimension denies the movement and change, it is counterintuitive and even leads to sophism. Therefore, Muslim thinkers’ objections to the four–dimensionalism must be studied historically and analyzed rationally to see whether they are plausible.

Some Muslim thinkers, from the very time that the four–dimensionalism (static Eternalism) was suggested by Naṣīr al–Dīn Ṭūsī (1201-1274 AD) to resolve some difficulties of time, have intensely tried to criticize it. Critiques of Quṭb al–Dīn al–Rāzī (d. 1375 AD) in Muḥākamāt are of particular importance among them specially from a historical point of view. Because, so many Muslim thinkers here – i.e. in the sub–commentaries of Muḥākamāt – have tried to offer their own views about the four–dimensionalism either negatively or positively. So, we have paid a special attention to the so numerous sub–commentaries of Muḥākamāt most of them are unedited and unpublished manuscripts. Al–Rāzī in his critique puts an emphasis first on the fact that the movement and change are self–evidently existent in the present time and not in the past and future and then on the facts that the movement is nonfixed and the qaṭʿīyyah movement is nonexistent in the external world. Some of the sub–commentators have proposed even further critiques the most famous of them is Dawwānī’s view: contradictory coincidence of the qaṭʿīyyah movement and the past(/present) property. The other critiques of four–dimensionalism are: absolute nonexistence of the qaṭʿīyyah movement in future; its being counterintuitive; its being inconceivable; appearance of the impossible infinite regress; its being eristic. We will collect all of the views scattered in the sub–commentaries throughout history and will analyze them rationally to show that why the presentism is a suitable alternative to the four–dimensionalism: if there were not such a difficulty as being an infinitesimal atom about the presentism, it would be possible to say that it is correct and the four–dimensionalism is not. But, since there is such a difficulty, we can only say that it is a suitable alternative to the four–dimensionalism.

Narrative time has fundamental differences with real and linear time and brings out aot of freedoms for humans. The narrator by different manipulation methodskeeps control of time while in the real world humans are subject to a linear time. The methods of manipulation in narrative time are divided into three major categories and genres: order, duration and frequency. Time duration, which is the main subject of this article, is defined by distinguishing and examining the relation between story duration and narrative duration. The ratio of narrative and story time duration in a work can be expressed in three general ways: reduction, increase and semmetrical. These three refer to four main genres: omission, brief, scene and hasitent.The narrator manipulates narrative time by means of these four duration genres to convey meaning more beautifully and effectively. This article examines the role of these four genres in speed, acceleration, rhythm of the narration and its impact on sense making.

Ibn Sīnā has provided two definitions for time, which Khwājah Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī believes to be circular. The first definition has appeared in Ibn Sīnā’s al-Ishārāt and introduces time as incompatible priority and posteriority. Some philosophers, such as Āqā Ḥussayn Khānsārī, believe that the circular nature of Ibn Sīnā’s definition of time in this book poses no problem because the concept of time is an axiom, and the existence of circularity in the definition of an axiom is natural. His other definition has been given in al-Shifā. Here, the nature of time is defined in the sense of a measure of motion as divided into prior and posterior components. In this definition, time contains disjunctive quantity (time as the number of motion) in addition to continuous quantity (time as amount of motion). The present paper aims to provide a clear picture of the definition of the nature of time in Ibn Sīnā’s view in his al-Ishārāt and al-Shifā in al-Ṭabi’iyyāt chapter. Following an analytic comparative study of Ibn Sīnā’s works, the author concludes that Khwājah Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī’s perception of Ibn Sīnā’s definitions of the nature of time were not inconsistent and, rather, he intended to provide another analysis of the truth of time.