جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه "شباهت خانوادگی" در نشریات گروه "فلسفه و کلام"

The idea of ideal language is one of the most important and central issues in analytic philosophy. The major philosophers of the first stream of analytic philosophy, which began with Frege and developed in Russell and early Wittgenstein and logical positivists, not only welcome this idea, but also pursue its realization as a central goal. But the idea of the ideal language was declined by the second stream of analytic philosophy, which is also inspired by Frege's work and ideas and developed in Moore and later Wittgenstein. Here I will try, first, to show the influence of the classical modern philosophers (Descartes, Leibniz, and classical empiricists) on the philosophers of the first stream in development of the idea of the ideal language, and second, to explain how both streams -the first in supporting and the latter in rejecting the idea of the ideal language – were under the influence of aspects of Frege's thought about sense and its relation to reference, and finally to show the role of later Wittgenstein's view on the meaning and his concept of "family resemblance" in declining the idea of “ideal language”.

The family resemblance’s theory of Wittgenstein is the most influential contemporary theory of, or, to put it more precisely, against “definition”. The theory’s main opposition is towards essential definitions, whose leading theoretician is known to be Aristotle. In modern era, This theory have been considered a challenge to essentialism. In this essay, after expressing the theory of family resemblance and backgrounds of those in opposition to the Aristotelian definition, By extracting criticisms of the theory to essential definitions and answers them according to the text of Aristotle, I’m trying to show that expressing such criticisms to the Aristotelian definition due wittgenstein’s misunderstanding and ignorance than the Aristotle’s essential definitions. To achieve this thesis, will be used of phenomenology and analytical methods. Examining the philosophers’ own works was among the investigation’s priorities.

Since ancient Greece, and even after the establishment of the science of aesthetics, the question of what beauty is has always been unresolved among scientists. However, apart from these struggles, human beings deal with beautifying their environment and instruments, and even themselves at the expense of risking their life. What is beauty that man protects it with his life? How is the existence it enjoys? The present study uses library resources and gathers the scholars’ views in this sphere and analyzes them logically to find the answers to the aforementioned questions and some other related questions. Stressing the objectivity of beauty and rejecting its subjectivity, rejecting the idea of non-definability of beauty, and suggesting solutions for defining it in the form of establishing or reinforcing previous definitions or offering new definitions using genus and composite differentia are among the findings of the present study.

Universal concepts can be viewed from two perspectives: ontological and epistemological. From an ontological perspective, the nature of universals are dealt with, while from an epistemological perspective, the way we become aware of universal concepts, as well as how they are formed in the mind are discussed. After studying ontological views regarding universals, the present article deals with the way of their formation. The article is to clarify that universal concepts are made while encountering (even a single encounter) particulars, and numerous encounters with several examples or instances are not necessary. However, after these concepts are formed, the more one encounters their instances, the more their accuracy and the better their representation of their instances.

Some subjects, like mysticism, have very diverse meanings and applications. This article purposes to find a common meaning or sense for such subjects and to answer how we can reach this common meaning. Among these subjects, we have chosen mysticism and have found seven possible assumptions in answering whether we can find a common meaning for mysticism. Then we have discussed each of them. These assumptions make a spectrum from the theories that accept a natural essence for mysticism, to the theories that held that mysticism is a homonymous term. Finally we have preferred the famous model of elephantology but with some restrictions.

This article deals with Wittgenstein¨s philosophical views in his later philosophy. His views are radically different from those of most philosophers. This later philosophy is suggested not to solve the issues by a new method, but is a rereading of the main issues of philosophy. In order to get to such a goal, Wittgenstein has set forth the grammatical propositions which are to pore over the usage of words ans show their undue applications. "Language games" is one of his innovations which plays a significant role in demonstrating the variety of different domains of language: such games have a "family resemblance" and all are somehow regular. Wittgenstein embraces the various language games as self-evident and goes merely to describe them: such an approach is construed as "Wittgenstein¨s naturalism". Language is a form of life which can not be separated from other human activities. Language, according to Wittgenstein, is some human institute: this means that language is a set of individual and collective activities, The closer survey of language and its peculiarities gives us the more precise knowledge of language games. This precise knowledge is used by Wittgenstein to show the boundaries of games and to clarify philosophical questions. The article ends with a comparison between Tractatus and Philosophical Investigations showing how Wittgenstein¨s views of philosophical propositions have changed form Tractatus to Philosophical Investigations.