جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « علت بالعرض » در نشریات گروه « فلسفه و کلام »

Ibn Sina's views on induction are considered among the most accurate, not only among Muslim philosophers but also among early philosophers in general. This renowned Iranian philosopher critiqued Aristotle's theory of induction while still working within the Aristotelian framework. Through his scholarly critique, he exposed its limitations. He then introduced the concept of experience in a precise manner and combined induction with a hidden analogy to address the problem of achieving certainty through induction. However, he recognized that this certainty could not be absolute. Therefore, Ibn Sina sought to determine the conditions for obtaining certainty. He showed that certainty derived from experience is conditional, achievable only under specific circumstances. The first premise of his hidden analogy is the ‘Random Rule’ (qaʿidat al-ittifaqi), which has been subject to much criticism. One of the most significant criticisms concerns the empirical nature of the Random Rule. This article will first explain Ibn Sina's perspective. It will then examine Khwajah Nasir's views on experience and induction. By drawing on Khwajah Nasir's ideas, the article will present a rational analysis of the Random Rule, demonstrating that it can be explained rationally using the principle of causality and is not merely an empirical rule.

Aristotle's discussions about Tuche (Τύχη) or fortune have obvious contradictions in two domains of ontology and axiology. In the domain of ontology, he has testified to the existence of fortune as a cause by accident- a cause by accident for an event which has occurred out of a choice based on thought and for a given intention. Aristotle believes that fortune-based affairs are subjects of intention and intellection which emerge from those agents who can take volitional actions. At the same time, he introduced fortune as an anti-rule and instable affair with indeterminate and purposeless causes. He accepted the existence of fortune even in the domain of the actions related to Techne and human happiness. However, he does not attach any value to it in axiology and declares it to be a cause by accident that comes after nature and intellect, even believing that there is no knowledge for it. Moreover, it is valueless in the domain of the action related to human happiness.

Chance is the efficient cause itself but it appears as if it somehow has final cause. The critical means to enter into the analysis of luck is adapting an account of luck tailored to the realm of agency and along with the contrast between beneficial occurrences from which the for the sake of something is absent with the those in which it is present. Aristotle considers chance as "how occurrences with certain ends take place while they do not happen by nature or as the result of thought. He also mentions in Metaphysics that just as being is either intrinsic or coincidental, in the same ways it is possible to be a cause. Since the main component of chance is the irrelevancy of the end to the result, therefore luck is a cause by accident among those things that are for the sake of something that are according to choice. Aristotle’s argument for the priority of per se causation for the sake of something and the consequent impossibility of chance causation per accidens apart from it, forms the core of his account of chance. In investigating the relationship of chance and frequency of an event, there are many doubts in coextensivity of the rarity of happening of an event with it being accidental. Thus, for the analysis of chance, understanding the relationship between an analysis based on the ‘always/for the most part/rarely’ classification and a teleological analysis considering the opposition between the per accidens and the per se, is necessary.