جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « عینیت گرایی » در نشریات گروه « فلسفه و کلام »

Theological voluntarism, which is a deep-rooted approach in the philosophy of ethics and is also expressed in Ethyphron's treatise, seeks to prove the dependence of ethics on God. In this article, which has been investigated with an analytical and library method, a comprehensive system for the classification of realist theories is presented first by focusing on minimal realism - which includes subjectivism, intersubjectivity and objectivism. In the following, by explaining the components of the new theological voluntarism, it will be clear that the new theological voluntarism in values is in the category of maximal realism and a novel type of objectivism. The new theological voluntarists in the field of valuing consider moral propositions to be an external nature, which is the good nature of God. Theological voluntarists in the field of conscientiousness are by no means classified as maximal realists. The new theological voluntarism in the section of moral duties supports a special type of subjectivism in which God's desires and wishes are central and not human tendencies and preferences.

Hermeneutics has been defined as "interpreting". Hermeneutics has faced many differences and conflicts in its tumultuous history, and the views of theorists on the mission of hermeneutics and its realm have varied widely. One of the most controversial issues in hermeneutics, which has even led to a fundamental shift in hermeneutic issues, was the ontological view of understanding, as regarded by Heidegger and Gadamer. They did not know the truth, as in previous periods, through the presentation of methods can be achieved. Philosophical hermeneutics believed in subjectivism; Prior to the emergence of this view, hermeneutics such as Schleiermacher and Delta sought to find a way to understand and to understand the correctly in terms of author and objectivity will be possible. Although ontological approach to the understanding of discourse are considered by many of twenty century philosophers, It also has been faced the criticism. Emilio Betty Warrick Hirsch defended objectivism in understanding texts with a critical and methodological view of understanding. This methodological approach is called methodological hermeneutics and the ontological approach is called philosophical hermeneutics. In this article, we try to explain the objectivist methodological hermeneutics through a library method and, referring to Heidegger and Gadamer's views, address the most important critiques of Hirsch in the subjective approach of philosophical hermeneutics.

"Certainty" occupies an important place in Wittgenstein’s epistemology: it does not belong to the category of knowledge but constitutes its foundation. In his view, knowledge boils down to language games, and language games are based on indubitable certainties. According to Wittgenstein, scepticism is meaningless, and if there is no certainty, then even doubt would be meaningless. Wittgesntein maintains that [relative] doubt and knowledge are epistemic categories, whereas absolute doubt and certainty are non-epistemic categories. Epistemic categories are meaningful and when expressed by means of statements could be either true or false. In contrast, non-epistemic categories are meaningless and when expressed by means of statements the properties of truth and falsehood do not apply to them. The aim of the present paper is two fold: 1- Providing an explanation of the status of certainty in comparison to categories such as doubt and knowledge in Wittgenstein’s thought; 2- Providing a critical assessment of Wittgenstein's approach to certainty through the prism of critical rationalism. The main arguments of the paper are as follows: 1. Although Wittgenstein considers certainty to be meaningless and therefore not on a par with epistemological categories, he regards it as an objective concept that functions as the foundation upon which all human knowledge is based; 2. Wittgenstein's efforts to show the objectivity of certainty have not been entirely successful, partly due to his reliance on a defective notion of ‘objectivity’ and partly as a result of the prominence he assigns to the category of ‘meaning’ at the expense of the category of ‘truth’.

Arguing against relativism and constructivism and defending objectivism, Paul Boghossian considers three theories concerning description-dependence of fact, including Putnam's theory on the interpenetration of fact and convention. Boghossian holds that the basis of Putnam's theory is the phenomenon of conceptual relativity; so, if we reject his view about the phenomenon, his theory will be rejected. Accordingly, He explains this phenomenon and criticizes Putnam's attitudes towards it and finally concludes that this ‘argument’ cannot prove Putnam's theory. Here firstly it will be argued that Putnam himself was aware of these objections and had developed some ideas to solve them; so, using his texts and arguments, we try to reply to the main objections of Boghossian to Putnam's view about this phenomenon. Secondly, it will be argued that, in contrast to Bogghossian's belief, Putnam's theory is not based on the phenomenon of conceptual relativity. Instead, the idea of the interpenetration of fact and convention is based on two other arguments: the model-theoretic argument and the argument from the brain-in-a-vat scenario. Therefore, even if Boghossian's objections to Putnam's view about the phenomenon of conceptual relativity were acceptable, they could not reject Putnam's ideas on the interpenetration of fact and convention.

According to Rooty's version of the tradition of western philosophy, truth, namely, the correspondence between mental beliefs and objective facts , is the main subject of the history of philosophy ; so on this point of view, " truth was detectable, not constructible." However, Rorty says, since we have no way of describing facts but to use language, truth cannot be separated from our practical usage of language for articulating our claims. Because sentences might not exist outside of the mind. Therefor,"truth is constructible, not detectable". Although Rorty rejects the traditional meanings of truth an objectivity, our assumption is that he partly falls right into the realism and objectivism trap, and again truth in the forms of other conceptions appears in his philosophy.

In this paper, according to C. S. Lewis's approach to moral objectivism and belief in some sort of relativism in ethical behavior, and also considering his theistic view to human moral life, we will explain part of moral philosophy Motahari and to justify his belief in moral relativism in behaviors and customs in various societies human, we will follow this claim that Motahari, like Lewis, belief that moral values is absolute, eternal and true and generally objective, and he supported of theistic view as backup and represents of moral values. By comparison between these philosophical discourses of two philosophers will be obvious that transcendent moral principles and values can be achieved only by believe in absolute and eternal moral values and believe in existence of God as the protector of this moral life and will be obvious that believe in Meta-ethics relativism, that influenced by the materialist view of the universe, can’t justify properly this transcendent and holy principles and values.

Following Heidegger, Gadamer looks at history and understanding from the angle of ontology. This is based on his description of man as a being thrown into the world that belongs to history and is primarily affected by it. But his view with regard to history is open to the major criticism that he cannot extract an epistemological principle out of an ontological description of understanding and present a transhistorical criterion to measure the validity and objectivity of interpretation; so he clashes with the challenge of relativism. Yet Gadamer claims that his being accused of relativism is driven by his epistemological view of history, while his proposition delves deeper, dealing with understanding and history at the level of ontology. Gadamer is of the belief that history plays an undeniable role in promoting understanding. Not only do history and language not pose an obstacle to understanding, but they constitute the transporters of truth. Truth is projected to us through history and language. Therefore, a historical approach to understanding does not mean that everyone can tackle a topic in his own way, because though truth is projected in history and language, it is not made by history and language.

The trying scholars` way of studying ethical problems such as objectivism or subjectivism, consequentialism or deontologism, functionalism or vertuism, those attracting the attention of them nowadays, is rooted in their different principles and presuppositions. In this paper, it has been sought to find out Molla Sadra`s principles and presuppositions firstly and then, relying on his principles, have presented his outlook in ethics with regard to his solutions for the mentioned problems. Relying on such bases as principality of existence, gradational unity of existence and … he has given a new idea of such categories as human being, good and evil. For him, ethics is known as a natural gift with regard to primary nature and distinct point of human beings with regard to secondary nature. As is viewed by Sadra, religion and reason support one another in ethical training of human being. Furthermore, in such a deep and comprehensive unity, the duality of objectivism or subjectivism, consequentialism or deontologism, functionalism or vertuism would disappear and all of them are known to be directed to one final goal. Finally, human nature, free will and knowledge have been known for him as the main agents for ethical training.

Sense perception can be studied from different perspectives. Reviewing the place of sense perception in various disciplines, the author suggests some of the most important issues in this regard that can be investigated from an epistemological point of view. He considers most notable from among them problems such as whether sense perception is a kind of knowledge by presence or a type of knowledge by representation, the way sense concepts refer to their referents, the possibility of understanding essentials and the nature of objects, and the reliability of sense perception.It seems that our knowledge of sense perception—namely, corporal reaction itself—is born by way of knowledge by presence, while sense perception is a knowledge by representation, leading to a notion and idea, not to a proposition and affirmation. On the one hand, one cannot reach the depth and real differentia of things through senses nor through reason, and on the other, sense perception is unerring. Possible errors are the result of rational judgments and interpretations about them.

Cultural relativism and ethical subjectivism are two theories that are against ethical objectivism. In this essay, James Rachels shows that cultural relativism is based on invalid argument; that the consequences of taking it seriously are irrational; that it exaggerates moral disagreement. Yet he holds that we can learn lessons from it. Next, he presents and criticizes two versions of ethical subjectivism; the first version (simple personalism) is rejected by him, because it denies the facts of humen fallibility and moral disagreement. The second version (emotivism) is regarded incomplete, because it can not explain the role of reason and argumentation in ethics. He shows that argumentation and reasoning in ethics is possible and favourable, and because of this, ethics is objective, not subject to personal taste or cultural assumptions of cultural assumption of one special society.