جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « فاعل بالتجلی » در نشریات گروه « فلسفه و کلام »

The purpose of this research is to answer the question, what is the relationship between God and the universe from the perspective of Mirza Javad Tehrani? For this purpose, his written works were analyzed by means of content analysis of sources in a library manner. Sages in response to this question of rational assumptions such as; They have used the principle of causation, falsification, composition, the principle of oneness, the subject of manifestation, etc., and by proposing a separation between the first creation and the first emission, they have considered the relationship as an existential matter. Mirza Javad, one of the thinkers of the separation school, while not accepting the aforementioned principles, does not consider the claim of the sages to be free of problems. He believes that determining the example of the first creature and expressing the type of relationship is beyond the realm of human knowledge, so we must obey the Sharia texts in this regard. Therefore, the relationship between God and the universe is definitely established. Although its quality is unknown to us.

"Human action" is one of the issues that have always been considered by thinkers. In this regard, Muslim philosophers have made lots of efforts to explain the problem of human action. They divide human actions into two categories, "Javareh" (those of bodily organs) and "Javaneh" (those of the mind); although they disagree over the explanation of the latter, in the analysis of the former, they agree that human action is of the type of "agent by intention". Their analysis of Javarehi actions faces some challenges one of the important of which is that they failed to reconcile between human free will and causal relation. Having offered a novel interpretation about how human action takes place, the authors go to demonstrate that human actions including both Javarehi and Javanehi are of the type of "agent by manifestation". Accordingly, human free will does not contradict causal necessity. This is because "agent by manifestation" theory gives an interpretation consistent with both human free will and causal necessity.

The discussion of divine activity and the quality of the creation of existents has always been a challenging discussion, and different thinkers have provided different views, each based on their philosophical thoughts. Among them, Mullā Ṣadrā has sometimes acknowledged agent-by-foreknowledge and sometimes agent-by-self-manifestation regarding the quality of God’s Agency in his various works. These two apparently contradictory views have made the commentators of his works to try to reveal his ultimate intention. This paper, which has been written following a descriptive analytic method, discusses the views of Mullā Hādī Sabziwārī and Ḥassanzādeh Āmulī as two of the important commentators of the Transcendent Philosophy and concludes that, through referring agent-by-self-manifestation to providence in its general sense, Sabziwārī tries to reconcile these two views. However, with his particular interpretation of the Peripatetics’ view of God’s agency, Ḥassanzādeh Āmulī equates agent-by-foreknowledge with agent-by-self-manifestation. Nevertheless, the authors believe that the main basis of agent-by-foreknowledge that has persuaded Mullā Ṣadrā to acknowledge it is active knowledge. For this reason, by accepting agent-by-foreknowledge, he agrees with such affairs as the addition of knowledge to essence, which the Peripatetics have suggested in this regard. Accordingly, we can conclude from Mullā Ṣadrā’s different statements about the quality of divine agency that his view is based on active knowledge, which also exists in agent-by-foreknowledge. Hence, he speaks of agency-by-foreknowledge in relation to God’s Activity, which is consistent with agent-by-self-knowledge.

The human will is a phenomenon that has always been considered by the thinkers in the field of intellectual studies. The whatness of will, the process of its realization, its relationship to basics, explaining its optionality, the impact of the divine will on its realization are among the cases of study on this phenomenon. Using a descriptive-analytical method and adopting a rational approach this paper studies the whatness and hownesss of the issuance of will from Sadr al-Muta'allihin's the point of view. The findings show that, will is one of the actions of the soul that is freewill issued by the soul without the need for another will and its agents in relation to the will is of agent by self-manifestation. Since in the intellectual system of Sadr al-Muta'allihin, actions and attributes of the effect, like their existence, are a matter of divine manifestation, the verbal actions of the soul, including the will, will in fact be a divine act; though, it does not negate the attribution of the will to the self

Having the intention of improving philosophers' theory about voluntary action, the proponents of Na'ini's school introduced two concepts of seeking (Talab) and sovereignty (Saltanah). One can see disagreement between philosophers and Na'ini's school on their theories about the origin of humans' will. According to Na'ini's school, the analysis of humans' free will, reveals that its root is their soul's sovereignty. Meanwhile, the examination of Allamah Jafari's thought shows that his theory about this problem differs from both philosophers and Na'ini's school. Based on his anthropological principles, he starts talking about determination and free will from humans' self-love and considers free will as the action and effect of the soul. Different souls mean different free will and personalities. Introducing a new definition for free will as an "I" who oversees the positive and negative aspects of an action, he discusses the role of "I" in originating free will and fulfilling a voluntary act.

Explanation of God's agency is one of the most important topics in philosophical theology. The causality through self-manifestation (Fa'aliyyat Bi al Tajalli) is perceived as Mulla Sadra's chosen point of view in his works. According to it, God, based on his knowledge of the creatures, which is the same to essence of God, but is the same to his knowledge to Himself, is the immediate creater of all creations, so that the creations are Dependent Creatures in their essense, and God is the only original being. However, Mulla Sadra in some of his works, discribtes the theory of causality through providence (Fa'aliyyat Bi al inayat), that is considered as Peripatetic philosophers' view, as his chosen theory in circumstance of God's agency. So, using this term by Mulla Sadra has led to this ambiguity that wht's the ultimate view of Mulla Sadra in this issue, and what's the different between Mulla Sadra and peripatetic philosophers in this topic. This article has describsed the solutions suggested by Sadrai Philosophers, and finnaly, has chosed Mulla Ali's view as a correct. Based on chosen solution, the term of (Fa'aliyyat Bi al inayat) isn’t specific for peripatetic philosophers, and their specifics views, aren’t inherent of this term.

This paper seeks to investigate and explain Ghazzali's theories and criticize them on the basis of Mullah Sadra's views. Ghazzali does not present an accurate explanation of man’s free will and only resort to the outward aspects of Quranic and traditional documents. He regards that man’s freewill is incompatible with monotheism of God, divine knowledge and power and only seeks to prove God’s will. Thus, even if it is assumed that man has a share of free will, questions will arise about monotheism in creative power. For this reason, the issue of determinism is raised. Mullah Sadra, on the other hand, considers man’s free will as a human factor and something connected with soul. He also believes that man is an agent by self-manifestation in as far as his internal acts are concerned and proves that his free will does not contradict divine priori knowledge and unity of Divine Acts. In Mullah Sadra's philosophy, the necessity of cause and effect by no means contradicts man’s free will. He accepts man’s free will and authority, yet he considers God as the proximate agent of man's acts.

Are ‘Divine freedom’ and ‘necessity of His will and action’ compatible? There are two different answers to this theological question: compatibilism، which confirms the compatibility of these doctrines، and incompatibilism، which claims that those beliefs are incompatible. Compatibilists advocate their position through two distinct approaches; the first approach presents five reasons that why necessity of divine will and action are consistent with His freedom، while the second، without arguing directly، claims that incompatibilism implies attribution of contingency to God، so accepting compatibilism is the only way to avoid such a false consequence. These two approaches، however، have not been immune from the criticisms of contemporary incompatibilists. In this article I want to explain compatibilist views and review their contemporary criticisms.

In spite of Aristotle، who settled the fundamental basis of his philosophical system «the metaphysical difference between matter and form»، to reach the difference between sensible and nonsensory and to reach the unmoved mover that is natural agent، Avicenna chose «the metaphysical difference between existence and essence» to reach the difference between necessity and possibility and to prove the divine agent، namely creational agent cause and pure being that is Allah Almighty. But Mulla Sadra discussed about objective reality of existence and its gradational degrees، instead of discussion about extensions of existence and conformity of the concept of existence on them، to settle the fundamental basis of his philosophical system «primacy of existence over quiddity» or «principality of existence». This article، explains various views about agency of Allah Almighty and finally concludes that Avicenna believes in Allah Almighty as agent-by-foreknowledge in the first sense، but Mulla Sadra believes in Allah Almighty as agent by self-manifestation and، in his another view، as agent-by-foreknowledge in the second sense.

One of the main theistic questions is the question of God's agency. His agency, like the agency of any other agent, is completely related with his knowledge of his action, which is another main question in theology. God's agency has been recognized by Muslim philosophers from the very first creation of Islamic philosophy. One of the main theories in this regard is the theory of agent-by-foreknowledge. One of the believers of this theory is Ibn-Sina. Molla-Sadra has also accepted it and has changed some parts of it. The theory of the mystics is another theory posed in this regard. They believe God is agent-by-self-manifestation; His action is his manifestation. Molla-Sadra has accepted this theory as well and believes there is no contradiction between this theory and the theory of agent-byforeknowledge. Allamah Tabatabai has accepted the two theories as well; yet in his accepted theory of agent-by-foreknowledge, God's will does not return to his knowledge rather his will is an active attribute. This is the main difference between his theory and Molla-Sadra's theory in this regard.