جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه "فراسازگاری" در نشریات گروه "فلسفه و کلام"

According to model-theoretic inferentialism (and despite proof-theoretic semantics and model-theoretic semantics), both proof-theoretic and model-theoretic notions play a role in the meaning of logical constants. However, proof-theoretic notions have a more fundamental role compared to model-theoretic notions, so that the semantics and its structure are determined by the proof-theoretic notions. In other words, in proof-theoretic inferentialism, we follow a method by which we can read the semantics from the proof theory. This approach is related to the problem of categoricity and Carnap's non-normal models for proof systems. In this paper we investigate this issue for two paraconsistent logics, mbC and LP. We show that while multi-succedent sequent calculi are categorical for mbC, they are not for LP. That latter has non-normal models. We argue that for the latter we cannot easily read the semantics from the proof theory, except at the cost of distorting the notion of logical consequence.

According to some important philosophers of science, such as Popper, Hempel and Tarski, consistency is a necessary condition of establishing any scientific theory. They hold that all inconsistent scientific theories are uninformative, meaningless or deficient. In this paper I will first argue against their clams, then I consider some inconsistencies which happened at the heart of some well-accepted scientific theories (Empirical or Non-Empirical), and by this I will try to open the door for the possibility of the paraconsistent philosophy of science.

David Lewis was a reductivist and nominalist. He saw the majority of his philosophical works to be a campaign on behalf of Humean Supervenience; a doctrine according to which the distribution of perfectly natural properties (/relations) acts as a supervenience basis for all contingent truths; such as causation, counterfactuals, events, and laws. He also extends his reductivism to the domain of a necessary discourse like mathematics by trying to reconstruct second-order ZFC through mereology. A domain that he never addressed, though, was logic. The purpose of this article is to present a Lewisian interpretation of logic which similar to his own interpretation of mathematics, is based on mereology. On this interpretation, the relation of logical consequence is reduced to a mereological relation between singletons of possible worlds. Furthermore, the implications of this interpretation for the two main characteristics of logical consequence, i.e. necessity and formality, and also the consistency and completeness of logic are examined.

This article examines the concept of contradiction، law of non-contradiction and dialetheism in non-classical logic. The main purpose of this paper is examining different definitions of the concept of contradiction and the influence of such differences in accepting or rejecting the low of non-contradiction. Here I try to show، by appealing to an especial conception of contradiction، that how it is possible to make dialetheism plausible. In section 1، basic terms are introduced. Section 2 covers different definitions of contradiction. This section shows that according to diverse conceptions of contradiction، we could have different notions of dialetheism. In section 3، I review most important arguments of the proponents of the low of non-contradiction and try to refute them on the basis of the definitions of section 2. Finally it will be showed that new approaches to dialetheism is due to using semantic instead of ontology، multi-valued logic، vagueness and alternates theory of truth.

The article by Graham Priest, the contemporary logician and writer, seeks not only to deny the widely-held logical principle of non- contradiction (the principle that the conjunction of a proposition and its negation is impossible), but also to assert both the possibility and existence of contradictions. To affirm his position, he brings to light some paradoxical cases (propositions), which belong neither to any specific time nor place. He gives some examples from both western and eastern philosophies. On the other hand, he states that all arguments for the principle in question are prone to objections, and concludes that some contradictions are possible, or in other words, some propositions are both true and false. The author makes some remarks on Priest's view of contradictions, insisting that the conjunction of a proposition and is negation is impossible. To prove this, he examines some arguments given by Aristotle and considers them as hints at a self-evident matter instead of technical arguments. Elaborating on some propositions Priest uses to establish his position, the author concludes his discussion by stating that the impossibility of contradictions is self-evident to any mind or common sense, at any time or place. The only difficulty arises from the fact that it has been misconceived by some thinkers and much of its denial comes from the very misunderstanding.