جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه "مادی" در نشریات گروه "فلسفه و کلام"

Among the Muslim philosophers, Ibn Sina had an important view on the material and abstract issue. According to his theory of grace, which believes in the arc of descent and ascent, he believes in the obligatory grace of all beings, both material and abstract. His thought on the type of material and immaterial relationship and the way these two concepts influence each other is such that he has reached the inability to prove the physical resurrection and has left it to the Shari'ah. Based on his talking about cosmology, which divides beings into single and material ones, he comes to the conclusion that physical resurrection is not provable and the words of the Prophet must be trusted. The main question is: what are the consequences of the material and abstract concept in Ibn Sina's philosophy upon his psychology and eschatology. The current study aims to clarify the consequences of these two concepts in Ibn Sina's philosophy by examining the definition, and then he considers physical resurrection as an unprovable proof with these two concepts.

In the works of philosophers, the existing division of beings into immaterial and material ones has been done based on different criteria. Peripatetic scholars consider material beings ascribed to prime matter. Although some philosophers, like Sheikh Ishraq, who deny the existence of prime matter, believe in both immaterial and material beings, they maintain that the criterion of this division is not the prime matter but other things such as impotentiality and potentiality, denying and acceptance of sensible indication, and absence and presence. Mulla Sadra has also used these criteria in the division of beings into immaterial and material. In this research, by descriptive-analytical method, we have shown the inefficiency of these criteria, and, relying on Mulla Sadra's views and principles, we have shown equality of existence with the immateriality based on the principles of transcendent wisdom.

All beings in the world according to Ṣadr al Muta'allihīn, benefit from awareness (consciousness) in accordance with their existential order. Therefore, material bodies such as elements, inanimate bodies and vegetable, which are generally considered to be devoid of consciousness even have knowledge and awareness in general usage (custom). Ṣadrā has tried by two different approaches to justify the diffusion of the knowledge to material objects philosophically. He has attributed knowledge to objects with the same material identity by proving the absolute objectivity of existence with knowledge in the first way, and he considered knowledge to be proved for them through the union of objects by intellectual principles (masters of species) in the second way. The main issue in this article is whether the same results can be obtained from these two approaches or not. And which of these two ways is stronger and superior than the other? Both approaches have been studied by analytical and comparative method in this article and it has been firstly proved that the results of these two approaches are not the same, and the awareness that is proved for material objects according to the first approach is different from the knowledge that is proved according to the second approach, secondly, the second approach is stronger and superior for some reason.

A knower’s intuitive knowledge (whether the exalted necessary being, or sublime abstract beings, or human beings) of the material thing is among the difficult issues in philosophy, about which thinkers disagree and some believe that knowledge does not belong to material things and some believe contrary to that. Various reasons have been stated for non-intuition, some of which return to the material thing itself, some others return to the features of knowledge, and still some others return to the knower’s characteristics. In this article, we seek to deal with this issue from three angles using the method of explanation and description to investigate how each of them is an obstacle. The result of the study is that the feature of extension and dispersal of material things as well as the feature of abstraction of knowledge and existential relation between the knower and the known does not hinder the attribution of knowledge to material things. This is because, firstly, if material things are extended from one aspect, they are non-extended from another aspect. Secondly, abstraction is not the condition for being known. Thirdly, another type of relationship, such as status, can cause intuition.

Preparatory cause or the preparator is known in Islamic philosophy as an unreal cause on which the existence of the effect is not dependent, rather, it prepares the ground for the appearance of the effect. The nature and characteristics of the preparatory cause are not quite clear, as Muslim philosophers have addressed it very briefly and intermittently, rather than thoroughly and systematically. Consulting the primary sources of the Islamic philosophy, this article tries to provide a systematized account of the subject, in which the role of preparatory cause in the genesis of material beings is explained. According to the findings of this research, the preparator, as commonly understood, prepares the way for the emergence of the effect through making the matter prepared to take on a new form. Despite the differences between preparatory and real causes, such as the necessity of simultaneity and homogeneity between cause and effect in the latter and the unnecessity of these characteristics in the former, the emergence of any natural being is inevitably contingent on a prior process of preparation. Without this process of preparation, no material thing is preferred for turning into a new thing. This means that creating without the prior preparation amounts to preferring without any preference. Knowing that the nature of preparation is moving the matter toward the dispositional contingency, preparators are to be either material or souls that are in some relation to matter.

Dividing the creatures into abstract and material in philosophy and expressing their characteristics, some thinkers believe that in some cases there are conflicts between philosophical views and some religious texts (Quranic verses and narrations) on the characteristics of the incorporeal creatures. But is it fundamentally acceptable to divide creatures into abstract and material from the point of view of religious texts, so that it can be said that there is a conflict between religious texts and philosophical views in expressing their characteristics? To understand the view of religious texts about this division, it seems that we can examine three cases of verses and narrations, I) The cases in which the creation of the first creature of God Almighty has been discussed, II) The cases in which the existence and attributes of angels have been discussed, III) The cases that deal with the divisions of the universe and the types of creatures. It seems that the division of creatures into abstract and material can be obtained from the Quranic verses and narrations.

One of the important philosophical issues is the discussion of the “immaterial and material” (existence) being. Providing a precise definition of “immaterial” and “material”, proving their existence, expressing their species, and the relationship between immaterial and material are among the important concerns of philosophers. It has been tried in this article to define and analyze the quiddity and characteristics of immaterial and material beings and also has been tried to examine Mullā Ṣadrā's special opinion precisely on the manner of immaterial and material relation. The author by referring (citing) the doctrine of existential separation in the transcendent theosophy has tried to prove that in Ṣadrā's thought, it is not possible and should not be believed in a clear and definite boundary like the peripatetic, between the immaterial and the material, because the immaterial and the material and the rules and characteristics of existence each of them have a return to the degree of intensity and weakness in the fact of the unity of existence, and as in the system of existential separation, existential discontinuity that is not assumed, neither can be believed a definite and bold existential boundary between the immaterial and the material despite the essential distinction.

A great number of contemporary & traditional philosophers, used the principle of the “impossibility of the impression of the big things in small places” to prove the immateriality of the soul. Also, they have used this principle for other purposes. These thinkers have not provided an argument to prove this principle. they seem to have taken this principle as a self-evident principle. Today, because of the variety of reasons, including recent scientific advances, especially in two branches of science, biology and physics, the materialists have presented a materialistic explanation about the “process of obtaining perceptions”. If we accept it, it means: the traditional philosophers, because of the lack of advanced knowledge, thought that: “the impression of the Big things in small places” is impossible in the “world of perceptions”, in addition to the “material universe”; But today, scientific researches has clarified that “impossibility of the impression of the Big things in small places in the world of sense perception” not only isn’t impossible, but also quite possible and it is scientifically justifiable. This paper prove that the Materialists’ argument is wrong. We do this by comparing these two principles with together: “impossibility of the impression of the Big things in small places in the world of sense perception” and “materialistic process of obtaining perceptions”; we want to prove that the principle of “impossibility of the impression of the Big things in small places” not only is happened in the real world (material word), but also in the “world of sense perceptions”.

The subject of evil and good is the most difficult problem in philosophy and divine religion and all religions acknowledge this, and no one has ever denied it. Hence, at first glance, the existence of evil appears in the figure of the order of being, and shows his filthiness; because evil is actually the opposite of goodness, and with the formation of evil among human beings, the structure of their lives becomes disoriented, and it damages human society. Philosophers and scholars have addressed this issue in two general terms. A group of scientists believe that this is a matter of the laws of nature, therefore, it must be studied according to the laws of nature, in this case, it must be seen as a material case. Another group interprets the phenomenon of evil in the universe with a religious and metaphysical view. In fact, they give a metaphysical reading of the existence of evil and link it somehow to the act of God. This article aims to, (incomplete)

To ask about the arche or first element of the world has been one of the questions of Greek philosophy received different answers. It was called hyle by Aristotle. During Graeco-Arabic translation movement, some translators rendered arche into madatu al-mawad (the matter of matters, prime matter) and hyle into matter; coining such wrong terms gave rise to many misunderstandings and philosophical complications. From the very beginning, the division of beings into corporeal and incorporeal was proposed by Muslim Philosophers. Later however, the term Jismani (bodily) was substituted for maddi (material); while the Aristotelian so-called hyle had been integrated in the meaning of material then most philosophers unknowingly made use of material instead of Jismani (bodily) even those who did not embrace hyle (the very matter) at all. In their essay and through semantic analysis of the related philosophical terms, the authors have tried to shed light on the philosophical consequences of coining such terms (such as that potentiality is confined to bodily things and that there is no time or motion in incorporeal beings); they managed to avoid verbal controversy which is far from philosophical discussion. Finally, they have suggested their adequate definitions of corporeal and incorporeal beings.

The contemporary companions of Sadraean philosophy consider the problem of the materiality and immateriality as a gradational one; so, they have determined no other criterion of distinction between the materiality and immateriality than the perceptibility. This paper is aimed to show that, in Sadraean philosophy, to be material or immaterial is dependent on the existential levels of the existents. Thus, we attribute the materiality and immateriality simultaneously to the existents. Therefore, there is no external border between the two. The agent of attributing materiality and immateriality to the existents is the mind and our perspective. To be abstract or material are subjective as well as a priori categories of the mind to understand the realm of reality (or existence). The aforementioned conception of materiality and immateriality affects other problems, including the relation of the accident to the eternal, the relation between the soul and body, the immortality of the soul and eschatology.

Mulla Sadra has adopted different standpoints regarding the acceptance of material forms as a level of divine knowledge in his various works. He has sometimes explicitly agreed with this idea, sometimes remained neutral, and sometimes denied it. This paper is intended to shed some light on Mulla Sadra’s final view in this regard based on his different standpoints in his works. In doing so, the author has investigated his various descriptions of God’s knowledge of material things and his justifications and arguments for each of them. One of the justifications for such a variety of ideas is rooted in his shift from the divine Ishraqi knowledge to transcendent knowledge, while another one sees the root of this diversity in separating the receptacles of perpetual duration and time from each other. Here, the author demonstrates that both of the justifications are defective and argues that the only acceptable explanation for Mulla Sadra’s final view of the knowledge of material things is the relative nature of the division of beings into material and immaterial ones. This solution conforms to the two fundamental approaches which Mulla Sadra has adopted regarding the necessity of gradation in existence and its perfections as well as the same-as-relation identity of possible things.

The existing division [of things] into ‘immaterial’ and ‘material’ is one of the important and vital divisions in philosophy. Paying attention to it will answer many philosophical problems. Muslim thinkers have discussed material and immaterial beings in their works and have presented definitions for them. In their definitions, they have stated features of the immaterial and material beings and the criteria for distinguishing them. Scrutinizing those criteria and their foundations would reveal challenges. In the present article, by reviewing and investigating criteria such as matter, quantity, form, state, length, width, volume, color, being in the matter  and being with the matter, potentiality, change, motion, capability of being externally divided, time, place, personality and particularity, put forward by Muslim thinkers, a new criterion for distinguishing material beings from immaterial ones is established based on which a material being is a being that is perceived through senses or is dependent on it. An immaterial being, however, is a being neither sensible through senses nor dependent on it.

Various spheres such as religious beliefs, natural and cosmological opinions, and the intellectual sphere regarding ontological and epistemological issues can be regarded as the historical background for dividing the being into immaterial and material. Although the philosophers of Milesian and Eleatic schools were the pioneers of this philosophical division, Plato and Aristotle were prominent philosophers who highlighted such a division with specified criteria. This trend went on in an evolutionary form during the history of philosophy, and changes appeared in standards of separating immaterial beings from material beings along with changes in other philosophical subjects. In the course of history, the philosophers have suggested various criteria and features for separating immaterial beings from material beings, features such as extension, spatiality, having location and position, being dividable, being perceptible and sensible, and having matter and knowledge. Some of these criteria refer to the difference between material being and the world of intellects, not between material and immaterial beings. Some of them have drawback, but some can be accepted with modifications or without them.

Ethos are considered as qualities of the soul innate qualities. Since man's behavior and actions are due to of his ethos, and human’s ethics have a great influence on his felicity and perfection, so it is important to discuss about the appearance of ethos. In this article, firstly, explains what of ethos and its varieties and then have been explained the emergence of ethos's quality according to the viewpoint of Avicenna and Mulla Sadra. According to Avicenna's view, some kinds of ethics are immaterial and some material, but from the point of Mulla Sadra's view, all kinds of ethics are divested of body and material. According to the viewpoint of both scholar, physical affairs such as temperament, body nature, and repetition of action have an effect on the emergence of ethos. However, the different principles that these two philosophers have concerning the materiality and abstractedness of animal faculties and hence the varieties of disposition, has caused their disagreement on the quality of the appearance of disposition.. In the perspective of physicalism, ethos has been reduced to brain functions, and there is no immaterial explanation for the ethos.

Undoubtedly, Kant is one of the most effective figures in the history of western philosophy because he created a great evolution in this history by his so-called Copernican revolution and the interwoven relation of subject and object. As is acknowledged by many scholars, Critique of Pure Reason is one of the most important epistemological works in the new era that has set the boundaries of knowledge and has offered a new and unmatched description of how knowledge is gained by subject. Accordingly, most released commentaries of Kant’s philosophical outlook are epistemological. But Alain Badiou, contemporary French philosopher, contrary to common interpretation, presents an ontological one. He himself offers a kind of ontology named subtractive ontology, and believes that we can recognize it, due to how Kant formulates transcendental subject and object, forms of sensible intuition, and categories of understanding. As a result, he describes the features of Kantian ontology in his works Briefings on Existence and Theoretical Writings. The authors of this article see his claim notable and realizable. So, we will try to introduce the specifications of subtractive ontology and then check Badiou’s claim of Kant’s ontology. Finally, we will explain some reasons to criticize his belief.
Key Words: Badiou, Kant, Subtractive Ontology, Transcendental Subject, Transcendental Object The authors of this article try to read Badiou’s interpretation of Kant’s philosophy. In doing so, first we see two of his most famous books about Kant: Briefings on Existence and Theoretical Writings. In them, he claims that Kant should be read as an ontologist, because of some main notions as subject and object. Then, he tries to compare ontology in Kant with the one he names subtractive ontology and which is based on mathematics. So, we read his book, Being and Event, and review some of Badiou’s important ontological foundations as situation, set theory, void set, presentation, power set etc. in order to study his claim.
According to Badiou, the existence of transcendental subject and transcendental object, which he names proto-transcendental subject and proto- transcendental object, proves that we can consider Kant as an ontologist, and therefore an ontological interpretation of him is inevitable. In spite of this claim, Badiou also remember that, because of relational character of subject and object, we essentially describe them as epistemological entities.
Finally, we conclude that ontological and epistemological interpretation of Kant seems inseparable. For this reason, we have to pay attention to key role of void in Badiou's ontology, i.e. subtractive ontology, and show its differences with Heidegger's fundamental ontology. Ontology in Kant, according to Heidegger, is preceded by epistemology and, according to Badiou, they are implicit in Kant's thought; hence, according to Heidegger, Kant's ontology is complete and more important than epistemology. In contrast, Badiou says that Kant cannot never completely rid himself of epistemological strains. Heidegger even talks about Kant's ability to better understand. He believes that if we consider Kant to be an ontologist, we can understand him better than himself. Badiou believes that by relying more on a number of categories, instead of relying on the connection between the subject and the object, the Kantian can be seen deeper than conventional and epistemological believers. Kant is an ontologist.
However, Badiou's insistence on the existence of Kant's ontological dimensions is significant. On the one hand, he himself cannot ignore the great and inevitable role of epistemology in Kant, because the characteristics of the subject and object in his view, moreover, of the form of formation Recognizing the human being from the real world through the certainty and necessity of the past elements, and drawing the focus of past writing theorems. Therefore, the relationship between the whole and the whole subject with the object makes it impossible for each other to exist, because, in Kant's opinion, the subject creates the universe; therefore, the existence of the subject and object serves their epistemological function. Whereas the distinction Kant between Neumann and Phenomenon confines his ontological view to phenomena, while he does not directly associate the existence with such a distinction, he basically dismisses it. Counts On the other hand, the elements of Kant's philosophy, as the ontological foundations, cannot be fully coherent with the definition of a person from the ontology of introspection, because the recognition of concepts such as subject, object, sensory intuition, and categories Understanding their epistemological functions in Kant's view of one and the other, and the reasons for their explanation, namely, the need to respond to the circumstances of Kant's time on the other. Consequently, even if we want to accept the ontology of the discourse in Kant, we must rightly affirm that the ontology of discourse in Kant is on epistemology. - Badiou, A. (2006) a. Being and Event, translated by Oliver Feltham, London: Continuum.
- Badio, A. (2006) b. Briefings on Existence: A Short Treatise on Transitory Ontology, translated by Norman Madarasz, New York: SUNY Press.
- Badiou, A. (2009) Logics of Worlds, translated by Alberto Toscano, London: Continuum.
- Badiou, A. (1991) "On a Finally Objectless Subject", in Who Comes after the Subject, translated by B.Fink, 24-32, New York: Routledge.
- Badiou, A. (2004) Theoretical Writings, translated by Ray Brassier and Alberto Toscano, New York: Continuum.
- Forster, Michael N. (2008) Kant and skepticism, Prinston University Press.
- Heidegger, M. (1990) Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, Forth edition enlarged, translated by Richard Taft, Bloomington: Indian University Press.
- Kant, I. (1998) Critique of Pure Reason, translated by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kullman, O. (2011) Some Remarks on the Philosophy of Alain Badiou: Mathematics, Ontology, Politics, available in http://cs.swan.ac.uk/~csoliver/ Sun Yat-sen University, Institute of Logic and Cognition.
- Wolf, R. P. (1963) Kant`s Theory of Mental Activity, A Commentary on the Transcendental Analytic of the Critique…, United States: Harvard University Press.

Memory is a potency which makes man to be able to fix and to deposit those data which are being grasped through senses, and to use them whenever are needed. That is why our data remain unchanged and we can clearly remember our past. For Mulla Sadra the memory is unchanged because it is an abstract entity. Based upon his theory, all corporeal entities are constantly moving. Therefore if the memory is corporeal, it has to be subject to the change. But neuroscientists do not consider all motions as change. So for them the motions at the level of subatomic or atomic world do not make any change in the biological world. Even if it is considered to be a change by transcendent theosophy, but for neuroscientists only those changes at the level of neuron sells can change the memory, thus they attribute the fixity of the memory to the fixity of coding the genes and accordingly coding the neurons, and if any kind of confusion occurs in this function, we will lose our memory. Therefore for them the memory is corporeal, and in spite of being so, in normal conditions no change occurs in its deposited data. Thus to prove the abstractness of the memory we have to utilize other reasons.

Knowing man as the noblest creature of God depends on knowing his existential truth, which can be achieved through various epistemological means such as reason tradition, intuition, experience, and so on. "Valid tradition" is narrated by the infallible Imams who have scientific command of the whole world of existence, including mankind; therefore, it has always been the best way of acquiring knowledge. This paper deals with the narrative data derived from library-based information collected through the analytical and descriptive method, and investigates the narrations about the truth of the soul. The paper mentions eight categories of hadiths ranging from narratives that are supposedly for the spirituality of the soul to the narratives that are consistent only with the immaterial soul. The result of this paper is the expression of the harmony between reason and tradition in the two dimensions of humanity and the immaterialness of his/her spiritual dimension.

The first level in acquired knowledge which is achieved by human beings, is sensory knowledge. By sensual knowledge, the imaginary and rational knowledge are made. Hence, discussion on the quality of sensual perception is important. Since the sensory knowledge is provided by external senses, the question arises about the process of emergence of perceptions, what role does the body and its faculties play? Do the body and its faculties have played a role in itself or by accident? Ibn Sina and Mulla Sadra's discussion on psychology and knowledge and perception has certain principles which lead to the different views on this issue. first of all, in this paper Mulla Sadra and Avicenna’s elements on the question have been explained and then their approach to the body role in appearance of sensual knowledge has been taken into consideration. As a result, according to Avicenna’s sensual perception is material and done by the brain, therefore, the body and its faculties have the main role in emergence of the perception, but according to Mulla Sadra, sensual perception is immaterial entirely, and body and its faculties are regarded as an instrument and preparatory cause.

Most of definitions presented for material/immaterial thing have a common form: first they define material thing, then they define immaterial thing as a thing that is not material. There is a common objection to these kind of definitions: all of them are such that we cannot define something between material thing and immaterial thing. In this research we try to investigate common definitions of material/immaterial thing, then web prove that according to Mulla Sadra's viewpoint about Substantial Motion of human soul, we should define some levels between pure material and pure immaterial, In fact there should be a spectrum beginning from pure material thing and ending to pure immaterial thing. Then we show that this new viewpoint to definition of material/immaterial thing (spectrum view) is not compatible with traditional definition system that uses Alhasr alAghi. Finally we propose a new approach toward definition of immaterial (and material) thing using fuzzy logic.