جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه "معد" در نشریات گروه "فلسفه و کلام"

Preparatory cause or the preparator is known in Islamic philosophy as an unreal cause on which the existence of the effect is not dependent, rather, it prepares the ground for the appearance of the effect. The nature and characteristics of the preparatory cause are not quite clear, as Muslim philosophers have addressed it very briefly and intermittently, rather than thoroughly and systematically. Consulting the primary sources of the Islamic philosophy, this article tries to provide a systematized account of the subject, in which the role of preparatory cause in the genesis of material beings is explained. According to the findings of this research, the preparator, as commonly understood, prepares the way for the emergence of the effect through making the matter prepared to take on a new form. Despite the differences between preparatory and real causes, such as the necessity of simultaneity and homogeneity between cause and effect in the latter and the unnecessity of these characteristics in the former, the emergence of any natural being is inevitably contingent on a prior process of preparation. Without this process of preparation, no material thing is preferred for turning into a new thing. This means that creating without the prior preparation amounts to preferring without any preference. Knowing that the nature of preparation is moving the matter toward the dispositional contingency, preparators are to be either material or souls that are in some relation to matter.

Common idea of partial causes is Aristotelian four causes. Yet, some thinkers have known other causes such as preparer, mu`idd, condition and lack of obstacle to be partial causes. Philosophers of the common Aristotelian idea have given some arguments against this view. In the paper, it is argued that the preparer may not be counted a cause; since contrary to cause and effect, it is separate from cause. Again, those of common idea have known the condition and the lack of obstacle as parts of the agent or the material cause; since they complete either the former or the latter and, therefore, they may not be considered as free causes. In other words, one may not agree with the principle, for freedom of causality is not possible in the case of partial causes. As for the cause of purpose as one of the four, there cannot be found any other effect for it except completing the causality of the agent and, therefore, it may not be counted as partial cause. Again, one can argue against causality of the lack of obstacle as it is nonexistential and, therefore, it is of no existential effect. Yet, as we know, by lack of obstacle is meant an existential thing and with this consideration, it can be counted as a partial cause.