جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه "معقولات ثانی" در نشریات گروه "فلسفه و کلام"

The principle of the primacy of existence leads to a shift and reclassification of primary and secondary philosophical Intelligibles. According to the principle of the primacy of existence, existence must have individuals or concrete counterparts and cannot be considered a secondary Intelligible without a concrete external counterpart. Additionally, based on this principle, the attributes of existence are aspects of the essence of existence and will have concreteness and externality similar to existence itself, whereas essences only have conceptual identities and lack externality. This issue is examined through a descriptive-analytical approach, revealing that neither can the claim of reclassifying all intelligibles be fully accepted, nor can one assert the lack of externality of existence and its true attributes. Based on the effects of the principle of the primacy of existence on the nature of intelligibles and considering the ontological and epistemological explanations of intelligibles, as well as the differentiation between true attributes of existence and other intelligibles, the findings of this paper lead to the conclusion that the principle of the primacy of existence results in existence and its true attributes being primary intelligibles in both epistemological and ontological explanations. Essences are considered secondary philosophical intelligibles from an ontological perspective but primary from an epistemological perspective. Intrinsic attributes of existence, relative, additional, and negational intelligibles will be secondary philosophical intelligibles according to both epistemological and ontological explanations. The reclassification of intelligibles also leads to a new classification based on the principle of the primacy of existence.

Analysis and study of philosophical concepts has long been discussed among philosophers. The main question of this research is whether Sheikh Ishraq’s interpretation of philosophical concepts is correct? Through this research, it becomes clear through descriptive analytical method. And he has considered them as mere mental matters and in the shadow of it, he has proposed the theory of the originality of the nature and validity of existence. The source of Sheikh Ishraq’s mistake lies in the fact that external realization equates concepts with concrete realization and neglects the realization of integration. Is. While this argument is based on the said egalitarianism, and by denying this egalitarianism, the above rule has not been current in philosophical concepts, and at the same time the philosophical concepts will have external realization, whether abstract external realization according to the famous view of philosophers or Realization of the image that is accepted by Sadr al-Mutachr('39')allehin.

The present article tries to provide a new classification of intelligibles (primary and secondary intelligibles) in Avicenna’s philosophical system and tries to show the real place of philosophical concepts like existence, unity, necessity and etc. in his thought based on this classification. In current scholarship the intelligibles are divided into primary and secondary intelligibles. The second intelligibles are divided into philosophical and logical. This division is widely accepted after Nasir al-Din Tusi. In current scholarship usually this theory is attributed to Avicenna as if he also divided the second intelligibles into philosophical and logical intelligibles. The present research tries to show that Avicenna does not consider the philosophical concepts as second intelligibles but more primary than any other primary concepts. According to him, among the concepts there must be primary concepts on which all other concepts rely. These concepts are present in the mind from childhood and in the level of the intellect in habitu (al-‘aql bi’l malakah). So the first intelligibles, for Avicenna, are divided into two categories: the essential ones or the intelligibles from quiddities and the philosophical ones like existence, unity and necessity which are present for us primarily. The second intelligibles for Avicenna are just logical ones.

Analysis and investigation of secondary intelligibles has been focus of attention among philosophers since long ago. Epistemology of philosophical concepts deals with an investigation of these concepts, and in the present article, we have explored the epistemology of philosophical concepts in the minds of Allama Tabataba’i and Ayatollah Mesbah. In this study, it is clarified that Allama Tabataba’i was the first philosopher who put forward the mode of abstraction of the philosophical concepts including the concept of existence and non-existence. He believes that philosophical concepts are abstracted by using intuitive knowledge. Ayatollah Mesbah, unlike Allama, does not consider intuitive knowledge and internal experience as sufficient for abstraction of each of the primary philosophical concepts; rather, he maintains in addition to that, they must be compared with one another, and one must regard a certain relation among them. In his view, Allama’s method in abstracting philosophical concepts cannot be generalized

Interpretation of “secondary intelligibles” is inextricably associated with ‘principality of existence’; this mutual relation is more visible in the philosophical system of Sheikh Ishraq and transcendental philosophy. In this inquiry, it is clarified that Suhrawardi regards logical and philosophical secondary intelligibles as lacking inconsistent external existence, and absolutely negates their external realization, considers them as mental affairs, and – on this very foundation – puts forward the idea of principality of quiddity and conventionality of existence. This is while Mulla Sadra believes that since container of realization of relation is the very container of realization of the two sides of relation, both sides are realized in one container which is the very container of characterizing the subject by the judgment. Therefore, since characterizing in philosophical concepts is organized in the external container, philosophical concepts must have external realization as well. In the light of this fact, Mulla Sadra has reviewed and criticized Sheikh Ishraq’s argument on conventionality of existence and has interpreted the mode of realization of existential concepts in the light of arguments for the theory of principality of existence.

According to Allama Tabatabaie, concepts are created in the mind just through quiddities; thus, philosophical concepts are formed from quiddities or primary intelligibles. In his theory of reasoning, he distinguishes between two groups of concepts: factual concepts and conventional ones. These two groups of intelligibles are the same as primary and secondary logical and philosophical intelligibels, dealt with by Allama Tabatabaie with a special view, explaining the way they are formed in the mind. He divides the conventional concepts into three groups: a) mental concepts, created from other mental concepts, b) conventional concepts, formed through a comparison between the soul and its actions and faculties, and c) conventional concepts, created through independently positing the judgment in propositions.
Conventional concepts created from judgment in propositions are more important than the other two types, because they include basic philosophical concepts such as existence, non-existence, unity, plurality, potentiality and actuality. The strong point of this theory is clarifying the way conventional concepts are formed and the way the conformity between the concept created in the mind and its true instance in real world –regarding those concepts which are created in the mind while having external instances– is preserved. Although Allama's attempt in explaining how those concepts are formed is a basic and creative one, his theory must be reviewed in some aspects; the most important among them are: mixing up the judgment in an affirmation and connective existence in propositions, introduced as the origin of the concept of existence.

In Islamic philosophy various interpretations are offered with respect to the concept “Nafs al-Amr”. These have resulted from the way different philosophers have tried to resolve the difficulties concerning the correspondence theory of truth in connection with various kinds of propositions. More complications are added when the theory of “Principality of Existence”, propounded by Mulla-Sadra, has found wide-spread acceptance. The complications result from the existential presuppositions of the theory. In these circumstances Allameh-Tabatabei has offered his own interpretation of “Nafs al-Amr”. In this article we offer a detailed description of delicacies in Allameh’s theory, with a careful attention paid to his words when he discusses the theory of Pricipality-of-Existence. In this connection of special interest would be his discussion of correspondence theory of truth with regard to some special kinds of propositions. We shall discuss also some of the criticism made of his analysis.

The article examines the division of concepts into axiomatic and speculative ones as the epistemologically most useful division of concepts. Although this division is questioned form an ontological point of view, but there is no doubt, according to the author, about their epistemological realization.Having defined the terms “axiomatic” and “speculative”, the author appraises such doubts. Then he enumerates axiomatic and speculative concepts, and analyzes their relation to thought. The problem of “the criterion of self-evidence” shapes the core of the article, in which, the author evaluates, in detail, major Muslim ideas about conceptual foundationalism.