جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه "معنای اسمی" در نشریات گروه "فلسفه و کلام"

The personal unity of existence is the claim of mysticism and transcendental philosophy. In this claim, the existential multiplicity of the universe is denied and all except Allah (God) are accepted as manifestations and appearances of His Majesty Haqq (Truth). The mystics have an intuitive approach in claiming the personal unity of existence and invite the deniers to follow mystical and spiritual method. In theoretical mysticism, rational reasons are given to prove the personal unity of existence. In transcendental philosophy, after a certain doubt, Sadrul Motaalehin has become inclined towards the personal unity of existence and tried to prove it. In the philosophical approach, reasons are given to prove personal unity, the most important of which is the fact that the effect is the relation itself. This argument has two introductions a) the effect in relation to the creator cause is the relator existence. b) It is not possible to derive a nominal concept from the relator existence. The concept of existent is a nominal concept, and all except Allah (God), due to being a relator, they do not have the ability to abstract the nominal concept. Therefore, only Almighty God has the ability to be applied the title of existence, and this means personal unity of existence. The first premise of this argument is the case of agreement among the most philosophers of transcendental philosophy, and even some followers of transcendental philosophy, who deny the existence of personal unity, accept the first premise; But the second premise is false and this argument cannot prove the personal unity of existence.

The personal unity of existence is the claim of mysticism and transcendental wisdom. In this claim, the multiplicity of existence of the universe is denied and everything rather than God is accepted as manifestations of God the Almighty. In claiming the personal unity of existence, mystics have an intuitive approach and invite the deniers to the spiritual journey. In theoretical mysticism, rational arguments are put forward to prove the personal unity of existence. In transcendental wisdom, after raising analogism in a specialized sense, Sadr al-Mutallahin has tended to the personal unity of existence and has tried to prove it. In the philosophical approach, reasons are presented to prove personal unity, the most important of which is the copulative nature of the thing caused. This argument has two premises: a. in relation to cause, the thing caused is the essence of the copulative existence b. The copulative existence cannot be interpreted nominally. The existing concept is nominal, and because of being copulative, nothing other than God has the ability to abstract the nominal concept. Therefore, the title of existence can only be applied to the Almighty God, and this means the personal unity of existence. The first premise of this argument is common among most philosophers of transcendental wisdom, and even some followers of transcendental wisdom, who deny the personal unity of existence, accept the first premise; but the second premise is incorrect, and this argument cannot prove the personal unity of existence.

Mullā Ṣadrā pays due attention to linguistic issues in the phrasing of his ideas and discusses the difference between nominal and copulative meanings. His commentators have detected some incoherences in his views so that they have judged some of them to be more accurate and, thus, more favorable, than some others. Through propounding and comparing Mullā Ṣadrā’s views regarding the nominal and copulative meanings of being, the author presents a framework for posing some ontological, epistemological, and linguistic discussions in this paper. At the same time, relying on the linguistic discussions in jurisprudence (uṣūl-i fiqh), he introduces an analytic-linguistic approach in order to solve the problem of the existing incoherences. Mullā Ṣadrā believes that, on the one hand, one can reach the univocality of the nominal meaning of being (hast) through the univocality of the copulative meaning of being (ast). On the other hand, he argues that the difference between copulative being and predicative being pertains to their species. This view of Mullā Ṣadrā has raised different debates, interpretations, and questions among authorities in the field of philosophy. Some of these questions are as follows: Are these two views consistent with each other? Is this theory consistent with the gradation of existence and its univocal meanings? Are copulative and predicative existence commensurate with each other? Are the two classifications of being in the Transcendent Philosophy; i.e. the three-fold division of being into copula, copulative, and soulish and the two-fold division of being into copula and independent being, in contrast to each other? Are these two classifications consistent with Mullā Ṣadrā’s views in the field of nominal and copulative meanings?

Murtaḍā Mutahharī believes that ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī is the first philosopher in the history of Islamic philosophy who has addressed the quality of abstracting secondary intelligible. He does not mean that this issue has not been paid attention to before ‘Allāma; it can even be said that the main elements of ‘Allāma’s explanation are available in Ṣadr al-Muti’allihīn’s words. The elements inspired by Ṣadr al-Muti’allihīn’s doctrines in ‘Allāma’s explanation include: 1. Secondary ineligibles are acquired knowledge preceded by presential knowledge; 2. Self-mental knowledge, its faculties and actions as well as sensual perception, are presential knowledge; 3. Studying the process of abstracting secondary ineligibles should be started with one of these presential knowledge; 4. The secondary ineligibles are the product of independent look at the relation between the found phenomena, mental or external.