جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « وجود خاص » در نشریات گروه « فلسفه و کلام »

Philosophers and theologians before Mullā Ṣadrā had diverse views about the ontological status of existence. Paying attention to their opinions is very important to understand Mullā Ṣadrā's doctrine of ontological priority of existence. On the other hand, philosophers and theologians have dealt with this issue in different positions, and in some cases, there seems to be an apparent inconsistency. In contemporary works, there is no comprehensive examination about these diverse views. This article seeks to shed light on this issue. Peripatetic philosophers considered existence to exist and most likely considered it to be an accident. Suhrawardī and his followers criticized this opinion and considered existence as a secondary intelligible and non-existent. Many later philosophers and theologians also preferred Suhrawardī's viewpoint. While denying that existence is an accident, some theologians considered it to exist outside but to be identical with quiddity. They thought that their view is immune to Suhrawardī's criticisms. According to this opinion, for existence to exist, it does not need to be an accident to quiddity. Another related problem was that philosophers maintained that the universal concept of existence has external instances called particular beings. This is incompatible with existence being a secondary intelligible. ʿAbd-al-Razzāq Lāhījī tried to resolve the inconsistency. According to Lāhījī's solution, existence is external, but does not exist in external reality. This solution can be criticized.

One of the most important debates between a mystic and a philosopher is on the essence of "necessary being on itself"; they both believe the essence of the necessary being is its existence and believe a necessary being, unlike possible beings, does not have two aspects of existence and essence; rather they say the essence of a necessary being is exactly the same as its existence. But mystics and philosophers disagree on the existence which is identical with the essence of necessary. Mystics say the existence which is identical with the essence of the necessary on itself is a "labeshart" (non_conditioned) existence which has no determination and philosophers believe the existence which is identical with the essence of the necessary on itself is a special being which is, because of the characteristics of a necessary being, distinctive from other realities. The idea of philosophers seems to be false and the view of mystics is logical and acceptable and it has – or may have - some proofs.

As we take it for granted, regardless of some taken presuppositions and with respect to bringing the “exclusive or” into play, three modes are perceivable for the philosophical question of “the principality of existence or quiddity”. Some Muslim thinkers have sorted out a theory in this regard and others have argued for their own adopted view; while the mode thinkers have taken to stride in the debate at hand shows their disagreement lied based on a priori principles. Naturally, the concept of “existence” and “quiddity” can be considered as the most fundamental conceptual origins of the debate in question. In this article, adopting the method related to history of philosophy and on the basis of ascriptions of “existence” –to which some thinkers have given meticulous thought-, some outstanding analyses and comparisons in terms of thinkers’ exchanges have been accomplished. This research findings are as follows: Firstly, the concept of “existence” should not be called the most known thing per se as it does possess various ascriptions.
Secondly, as the dispute concerning the principality or abstractedness of existence is not a matter of demonstration, one cannot argue merely for one theory so to simultaneously undermine other ones. However, this question entirely relies upon the primary perception each thinker has taken for “existence”.
Thirdly, since some ascriptions of “existence” imply its concrete composition with quiddity, it’s no longer intelligible to simultaneously speak of the abstractedness and principality of the two sides.

Existence is the first recognition and the first issue in metaphysics. Avicenna also follows Aristotle in Ontology and uses of "being" (Maujud). The Subject of metaphysics is, “being as is being”. The concept of "being" is common sense. Speaks the absolute truth. It is a concept that encompasses all things. Thus can be thought of "Being" outside, that is, Ipsum Being, and isn’t Quiddity (God). Can be thought of "Being" outside, that is, Component of Existence and Quiddity. Thus, Avicenna’s concept of "being" is dealing with the reality of the story, and can be substantive and non-substantive. About God’s "mere presence", and creation, is the component of quiddity and of being. Therefore, Being as used by Avicenna has five different meanings: the particular existence, the general existence, act of existence, act of being, and conjunction of being. Existence is either used as a noun, a meaning that refers to the Nature of Things, or refers to the general or common attribute of creatures, or implies an "act of existence" which infers of the existence of God's creatures, or used to mean the "act of being", which is considered origin (Manshayt) and of foreign root, or in terms of transport between subject and predicate is an interface. In this paper, with the passing of existence to being, we consider the five senses

Ibn Sina speaks repeatedly of the distinction between the specific (khas) being and the positive (ijabi) being; a distinction on the basis of which is his distinction of being and essence. Thence, the famous problem of the distinction of being and essence is applicable to this distinction too. The difficulty is this: if the specific being is 'being'? This is indeed a problem about essence: is there any sense of being present in Ibn Sina’s understanding of essence? Based on the relation of the specific being to positive being, possible being, thingness, and essence, this paper is trying to explain that the distinction between specific and positive being in Ibn Sina is, indeed, a distinction between two aspects of being in its Greek sense; a distinction on the basis of which is the famous distinction of being and essence and has not been focused on in Greek philosophy.

Being is the First Principle of knowledge which is the subject of metaphysics. Avicenna also follows Aristotle in his Ontology and using of "existent" (Maujud). Avicenna, contrary to Aristotle, has not regarded the being as a category or accident. Accordingly, being has been applied in five senses: being in particular, being in general, act of effusion of being, act of being and as a copula in the propositions. Thomas Aquinas has used (esse) for the "existence". In his books, he has explained the various meaning of being. They can be classified in seven senses: being in itself, act of being, as a copula in propositions, as the quiddity, as a category, as essential and accidental being and as the being in potentiality and actuality. The definitions of "act of being" of Avicenna and Aquinas’" act of being" are the same, but with two different expressions. Avicenna’s being in particular can be overlapped with Aquinas’ being as the quiddity and a category. Then, in this paper we attempt to compare the meanings of being between two great thinkers finding their similarities and differences.

Jalal al-Din Dawani is one of the prominent Islamic scholars of the school of Shiraz whose thoughts can greatly help our acquaintance with this school and its impact on Islamic philosophy. No doubt Dawani’s most important thoughts can be sought out in his anthological theories. He sets forth two approaches in this respect which are as follows:1.With regard to the unity of being, he ascribes existence to the essence of God and believes that all other beings acquire existence through ascription to that particular existence. On this basis, he considers communion of beings as relative communion which means communion in entity. With regard to the mental being, his belief is that the scientific form is different from the true being and with regard to causality he defines effect as dignity and manifestation of the cause.2.With regard to outside beings, he bases his philosophy on contingent beings whose existence cannot be distinguished from their essence. On this basis, he rejects the applicability of the incidental rule to the relation between existence and essence.