جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « and materialism » در نشریات گروه « فلسفه و کلام »

Arguments in favor of dualism (and against materialism) typically seek to move from the epistemological distinction of physical facts and the facts of consciousness (conscious mental states) to the metaphysical distinction of physical processes and consciousness. These arguments often accept that epistemological premise requires ontological results. The idea of conceivability is one of these types of arguments. According to this argument, it is conceivable that there is an organ called a zombie that is the same as the conscious being in all physical matters, but is completely devoid of conscious mental states. In this article, I intend to compare Kripke's (1980) conceivability argument with Chalmers' (1997; 2010)'s conceivability argument. According to Kripke's argument, if "pain" and " the firing of cfibers" are the same, then this identity must be necessary. But this identity is possible, so one can imagine a possible world in which pain occurs without any brain state at all (the world of pain apart from the body), and one can imagine a possible world in which " the firing of cfibers" occurs without any pain (zombie world). As a result, in those possible worlds, " the firing of c-fibers" is not. One of the objections to Kripke's argument is that the principle of conceivability is incompatible with the phenomenon of Kripke's posterior necessity. According to the objection through a posteriori necessity, there is a difference between the conceivable (logical possibility) and the (metaphysical) possibility. The conceivability argument merely shows that the zombie world is logically possible, but the logical possibility of the zombie world is quite different from its metaphysical possibility; For conceptual possibility, mere conceptual coherence (or impossibility) suffices, but we need something more to show that the zombie world has a metaphysical possibility. Chalmers seeks to respond to this objection with the idea of twodimensional semantics. Chalmers, of course, tries to formulate the same Kripke's conceivability argument against materialism based on the idea of two-dimensional semantics. He argues that we can go from epistemological premise (logical possibility) to ontological conclusions (metaphysical possibility). To do this, we need an intermediary. We must first infer justified epistemologies (ideas of conceivable things) from epistemological premise (ideas of necessary and possible things), and then arrive at ontological conclusions from justified premise. He clings to the idea of two-dimensional semantics for the connection between epistemological and modal premise.

In this article, first-hand and original sources have been used and an attempt has been made to obtain the desired results by using the method of conceptual analysis and the conventional method of philosophical reasoning.

In this article I have shown that 1) Chalmers formulates Kripke's argument based on the idea of two-dimensionalism. 2) Kripke's argument was based entirely on the identity of conscious states and physical states, while Chalmers relied on the concept of supervenience of facts about consciousness on physical facts. 3) Chalmers, unlike Kripke, does not rely on essentialism about phenomena. 4) Chalmers argues that Kripke's arguments against token identity are not conclusive, but that arguments against type identity work. 5) Chalmers, unlike Kripke, tries to justify the transition from the primary conceivability to the primary possibility. But Kripke takes this transfer for granted.

Both Kripke (1980) and Chalmers (1997; 2010)'s argument are based on the assumption that conceivability requires possibility. In other words, both resort to the logical possibility of separating physical states from phenomenal states. Keywords: Kripke, Chalmers, The Idea of Two-Dimensional Semantics, conceivability Argument, Dualism, and Materialism.

Ibn Khaldun is pioneer of modern economic thought in the fourteenth century AD. A number of researchers have claimed that his economic ideas has no associations with later economic thoughts. They also claimed that his economic ideas are economic thought of Islam and he is the originator of the labor theory of value and historical materialism before Marx. In this article the mentioned claims are investigated and shown that according to the evidences, it seems that the economic ideas of Ibn Khaldun transferred to Scottish (classical) thinkers through school of Salamanca . Ibn Khaldun's economic ideas is not economic thoughts of Islam, but an analysis of the economy of Muslims. Ibn Khaldun also is not the originator of labor theory of value and historical materialism.

The eliminative materialism does not accept behavior explanation based on mental states and puts emphasis that human behavior should be explained just based nervous events. The supporter of this view, for the rejection of belief in mental states, call folk view which is against neuroscience. The following article, through the analysis of the epistemological basics of eliminative materialism, shown that this view is somehow an unreasonable monopoly of ontology. It will also be arguing that with defying the existence of mental state, not only there will be no space for psychology as a scientific and practical section, there is also no place for the key concepts of social sciences. Scientific psychology goes forward with assuming the existence of individuals in the social world of life and assumption which is the formation of psychology is scientific cannot interpreted in a physicalist way.Theaffirmative claim of this article is the fact that human nature can be understood deeply just through the interaction of psychology and neuroscience. Belief in immaterial mental states is not against neuroscience or other experiments sciences and definition based onimmaterial soul is an unmatchedand coherent ontological basis to defend scientific psychology.

The modern age is known as the age of the emergence and prominence of human being, in the modern sense, in the realm of knowledge. The human knowledge and thought determines the epistemic makeup of this era, and all the categories of modern science somehow pivot on human. Besides ontological foundations, Marx's theory of historical materialism has a strong anthropological foundation, and is based on a particular conception of mankind. Marx regards a form of man’s social existence, i.e. "work", as the basis of his dialectical analysis, which is both material and social-historical. According to Marx, the human world, that is, all symbols and manifestations, forms of consciousness and historical- social institutions, in all their various forms and shapes, are merely a product and a function of human’s action and work; they are manifested at any stage of history in a way and have shaped the coordinates of each historical and social period. While presenting a brief review of Marx's theory of historical materialism, this paper tries to study analytically and critically the most important anthropological assumptions

Developing the concept of space and dialectical materialism, Henri Lefebvre brings up triadic dialectic. He suggests that, in the past as in the present, our knowledge has been constrained by the limitation of the content and the social form. Hence, pinpointing the pitfalls of Hegelian-Marxian dialectics and formal logic, Lefebvre argues for the role of space in limiting our knowledge. In principle, his insistence on dialectics brings forth the third term as being the result of the dialectic and its product, relinquishing the binarism of the two in favor of a tripartite schema. Comprehending the notion of the third term proves to be central in understanding Lefebvre’s work. By this approach, Lefebvre tries to link dialectics to social material reality in and with the space. He supplements the space with history and time in traditional dialectics to seek the material contexts of the production of space in between three-dimensional dialectic of space. In this paper, I give a critique of formal logic and Hegelian dialectics first, and then I try to demonstrate the necessity of limitation of content by virtue of the “space”. Then, through proposing the theory of triadic dialectic, I illustrate “the production of space” on the basis of the three-dimensional dialectic of space. It is by this invention that Lefebvre is able to talk about the dialectics of space-time, to centralize the concept of space in the contemporary social political theory.