جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه "corporeal origination of the soul" در نشریات گروه "فلسفه و کلام"

Undoubtedly, one of the most important philosophical discussions among the majority of philosophers is the problem of the existence of the soul, its essence, the quality of its appearance, its immateriality, and its subsistence. This problem is also one of the most fundamental and crucial issues for Muslim philosophers, and its kālāmī and philosophical outcomes cannot be ignored. This is because several religious beliefs can be explained depending on accepting this main element in Man’s existence. Without the soul, Man is not responsible for any obligation issued on the part of the holy legislator and, naturally, resurrection and the related problems become pointless. The importance of the soul for philosophers who are not committed to kālāmī and religious views indicates that this problem, irrespective of its religious nature, holds an important place in philosophy. Ibn Sīnā and Mullā Ṣadrā, as two philosophers who are also concerned about religious beliefs, have paid particular attention to the problem of the soul. Mullā Ṣadrā has discussed the existence of the soul, demonstrated its essential nature and subsistence, and explained the quality of its appearance in the form of corporeal origination, in fact, his new views in this regard are quite famous. However, this paper is intended to reveal that many of his discussions regarding the problem of the soul have been exactly borrowed from Ibn Sīnā. Referring to Avicennan views in Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy can greatly contribute to a correct understanding and justifiable interpretation of Mullā Ṣadrā’s ideas, particularly concerning the perception of the concept of the corporeality of the soul, which some wrongly equate with the corporeality of the soul at the beginning of its creation. Here, the author demonstrates that neither is this interpretation of Mullā Ṣadrā’s words correct, nor is this principle solely attributed to him. Rather, he has borrowed Ibn Sīnā’s philosophical views in this regard, as is the case in his other discussions in relation to the soul.

Philosophers have presented different views about the whatness and truth of the soul based on dualism (immateriality of the soul based on the pre-eternity and origination of the soul before the existence of the body or along with it) or monism (corporeal origination of the soul). Mullā Ṣadrā believes that the soul is corporeally originated. The principles of the Transcendent Philosophy, including the trans-substantial motion, the principiality and gradedness of being, and the corporeal origination of the soul, have made it possible to demonstrate corporeal resurrection. Aristotle also believes that the origination of the soul is corporeal. However, the extent to which Mullā Ṣadrā is influenced by Aristotle’s ideas in this regard has never been studied so far. This paper is intended to explain the Aristotelean roots of Mullā Ṣadrā’s discussion of corporeal origination following a comparative-analytic method. The findings of this study indicate that in defining the soul as a “natural and organic body” and, following it, considering the soul as a formal substance and a primary perfection of the body, as well as believing in the unitary synthesis of the body and the soul and the unity of the faculties of the soul, all indicating the corporeal origination of the soul, Mullā Ṣadrā is under the influence of Aristotle. Nevertheless, Aristotle’s approach suffers from some ambiguity because of the existing implicitness in some of his words and not referring to an explicit standpoint regarding the principiality of existence or quiddity, presence of motion in substance, and gradedness of existence.

The subsistence of the soul after its parting with the body is one of the most challenging problems in the field of philosophy. This problem has been discussed by both philosophers who consider the soul to be pre-eternal and immaterial and philosophers who believe in the spiritual origination of the soul, and both groups have adduced various arguments in this regard. Khwajah Nasir al-Din Tusi, who is a Peripatetic philosopher, has posed the following question: Why, in the view of philosophers, are the body and bodily preparedness concomitant at the beginning of the origination of the soul but not at the stage of subsistence and separation? He has probed the response to this question in a treatise which he wrote about the subsistence of the soul. At the same time, he asked this question from his contemporary philosopher, Shams al-Din Khusrawshahi, but he did not receive a response. Mulla Muzaffar Hossein Kashani, who was contemporary with Mulla Sadra, asked him the same question, since it seems that the problem of the subsistence of the soul is apparently inconsistent with Mulla Sadra’s theory of corporeal origination. He provided a response to the question of Khwajah Nasir al-Din Tusi and Mulla Muzaffar on the basis of the fundamental principles of his own philosophy and defended the problem of the subsistence of the soul after its separation from the body.

The principles of the Transcendent Philosophy as well as empirical observations indicate that people are different from each other in their primary nature. This explains why they are different in terms of their free will and voluntary acts. The present paper investigates Mulla Sadra’s view of the effects of human nature on their voluntary acts and examines its role in accepting responsibility. The formation of human nature in Mulla Sadra’s philosophy is different from that in other schools of philosophy. In the Transcendent Philosophy, the human nature originates in the material mode of the soul, and the differences among the natures of different human beings are rooted in the differences among corporeal substances. The attachment of this affair to the necessity of the cause-effect relation is the reason why moral responsibility is not explainable in Mulla Sadra’s philosophy. This problem poses certain challenges to Sadrian practical wisdom, the most important of which is the challenge of explaining the system of duty and recompense.