جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه "dialetheism" در نشریات گروه "فلسفه و کلام"

Although the problem of motion has created various challenges in the history of philosophy by itself, the trans-substantial motion as the turning point of the Transcendent philosophy is prone to some additional challenges that can be followed in the manifest of dialetheism. One of these challenges is the loss of the identity of subject in the context of motion and, following this, the realization of borderline-states and the appearance of a paradox known as the problem of ambiguity in philosophical literature. Such debates themselves lead to paradoxes that contemporary dialetheists consider as evidence for the existence of contradiction in the outside world. The manifestation of such challenges and their relationship with the trans-substantial motion is the focal problem of the present paper. Since any change in archetypal forms in the cradle of trans-substantial motion is of the gradual and continuous type rather than the sudden type, the absence of a borderline at various stages of motion paves the way for the truth of two different quiddities at the same time for one subject, which necessitates contradiction by itself. Following a critical descriptive analytic method, this study reveals that Mullā Ṣadrā has responded to both challenges. He has answered the identity challenge based on the idea of “matter with form” and referred the challenge of ambiguity to our perception’s negligence in matching quiddity to all modes of being.

In this paper, we will try to reconstruct Hegel’s logic and metaphysics through the modern logic. Graham Priest has claimed that we can read Hegel’s logic with the paraconsistent approach to logic, specially Dialetheism; he calls Hegel a Dialetheist. At first, we report Priest’s account on Hegel’s dialectic and his notion of dialectical contradiction; also, we try to analyze Priest’s argument for calling Hegel a Dialetheist. To achieve the proper comparison between Hegel’s logic and Dialetic one, we explain, non-technically, the simple semantics of a Dialetic logic. And finally, we establish a criticism of Priest’s account in order to reopening the question about Hegel’s being Dialetheist.

Dialetheism is the view that some (and not all) contradictions are true. Since in classical logic the principle of impossibility of contradiction (the Law of Non-Contradiction, i.e., LNC) is widely accepted, the challenge between dialetheism and classical logic surely occurs. In this paper we have tried to explain the main problem of dialetheim and also examined Graham Priest’s arguments against LNC and his advocating to paraconsistent logic. Accordingly, Priest’s examples of dialetheic propositions in some systems such as Law, Natual and Formal Languages and Actual world are examined and criticized. The result is that if Priest’s argument be sound dialetheism may be acceptable. Dialetheism is the view that some (and not all) contradictions are true. Since in classical logic the principle of impossibility of contradiction (the Law of Non-Contradiction, i.e., LNC) is widely accepted, the challenge between dialetheism and classical logic surely occurs. In this paper we have tried to explain the main problem of dialetheim and also examined Graham Priest’s arguments against LNC and his advocating to paraconsistent logic. Accordingly, Priest’s examples of dialetheic propositions in some systems such as Law, Natual and Formal Languages and Actual world are examined and criticized. The result is that if Priest’s argument be sound dialetheism may be acceptable.

This article examines the concept of contradiction، law of non-contradiction and dialetheism in non-classical logic. The main purpose of this paper is examining different definitions of the concept of contradiction and the influence of such differences in accepting or rejecting the low of non-contradiction. Here I try to show، by appealing to an especial conception of contradiction، that how it is possible to make dialetheism plausible. In section 1، basic terms are introduced. Section 2 covers different definitions of contradiction. This section shows that according to diverse conceptions of contradiction، we could have different notions of dialetheism. In section 3، I review most important arguments of the proponents of the low of non-contradiction and try to refute them on the basis of the definitions of section 2. Finally it will be showed that new approaches to dialetheism is due to using semantic instead of ontology، multi-valued logic، vagueness and alternates theory of truth.