جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « epistemology of ethics » در نشریات گروه « فلسفه و کلام »

The impact of non-epistemological factors on the process of knowledge formation is a fundamental question that has captivated the attention of epistemologists. These factors, encompassing psychological, sociological, and other influences, play a significant role in shaping the knowledge formation process. Can we discuss the influence of non-epistemological factors on knowledge in Avicenna’s psychology? According to Avicenna, knowledge is primarily under the sway of psychological factors. He advocates for a psychological-ontological epistemology by introducing the factor of passion in the knowledge formation process and endeavors to elucidate its connection with consciousness. Avicenna consistently engages in ontological analyses of psychological factors affecting knowledge. This paper employs a phenomenological approach to analyze Avicenna’s perspective on effective non-cognitive factors, yielding the following

(1) non-epistemological factors play a crucial role in directing consciousness and the knowledge formation process; (2) movement only occurred when passion arises or when we confront with the sensation of excitement, as every movement follows a passion. Passion possesses an independent ontological nature and cannot be defined solely under the perceiving or motivating powers. Passion imbues coherence to consciousness, determining and reinforcing the perceiving power to make judgments related to the good and the bad. Avicenna's epistemology is not devoid of natural aspects, but this research, putting the natural factors in parenthesis, considers the psychological factors solely from an ontological standpoint. A phenomenological interpretation is derived from Avicenna’s expressions, emphasizing the quality of knowledge emergence and its connection with psychological factors. By establishing the superiority of the motivating power over the perceiving power, a model of ontological-psychological epistemology in Avicenna's philosophy is deduced.

Moral cognitivism is one of the topics of moral philosophy and epistemology of ethics and Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī is among the moral cognitivists because: first, he refers to various ways for knowing the reality such as reason, fame, experience, revelation and intuition; second, he deals with the middle term as a criterion for knowledge; third, he accepts the demonstrability of the rational moral statements; and fourth, he adheres to moral absolutist. Since he is a moral cognitivist and given that all moral cognitivists are considered moral monists, Ṭūsī is also considered a moral monist; it seems, however, that Ṭūsī, in explaining the demonstrability of moral statements, has not proved the real relationship between the granting of divine blessings and the necessity of gratitude, and has come to the conclusion by claiming that this relationship can be considered the result of a causal relationship between moral act and its result; that is, every moral act, such as thanksgiving, causes happiness and perfection of human beings, and the obligation of thanking God shows the causal relationship between gratitude and the resulting happiness for the grateful person. Therefore, if it is asked why thanksgiving is obligatory, the answer is that this thanksgiving is obligatory because it can lead to happiness and perfection.

The Famous thinkers, explains Īji's view of ethics, like other Ash'arites, as one of divine command theory, But he does not consider moral good and evil to be limited to the meaning of the merit of praising the Shari'a and blame, sometimes also means perfection and imperfection or expediency and corruption. According to Īji's moral ontology, it can be attributed to him that he is realist based on the promise to reason good and evil and he is subjectivist based on the promise to religious good and evil. Although he does not make a logical connection between good and evil moral meanings, he accepts Argument ability for meaning of reason good and evil. his reason for not communicating logically between these meanings, which is God's compulsion, seems invalid because, if explained logically, God's legislative will is based on God's creative will, and it will not be forced by a non-god.

The epistemology of ethics is one of the foundations of morality. and cognitivism and moral non-cognition as one of the most important views of moral epistemology. Ethical cognition refers to a theory that believes in the recognition of some fixed and external moral sentences in the epistemology of ethics. Moral sentences are fixed when they have either objective or definite facts or are based on objective and stable reality. To determine the value of recognition, the type of recognition path is determined in epistemology. This research seeks to provide the epistemology of al-Farabi’s ethics with a new regularity, interstitial way. Moral cognitivism includes Farabi because he Introduces recognition ways and introduces several ways to understand moral judgments. Farabi believes in the Argument of ethical sentences and the existence of moral self-evident judgments and Rejects ethical relativism.

The aim of this study is specify the ethics of belief prerequisites. For this purpose, used from the conceptual analysis method for analyze the ethics of belief Prerequisites. The findings of this study show that the idea of the ethics of belief necessary to Prerequisites. In other words, for claim of the ethics of belief must belief that formation of believes is voluntary (Volitionalism) and anybody’s believes with others his believes and with another people believes is connect(Believes network connection) and moreover, belief with action to be related and its impact on the subsequent action(The action subsequent conviction), So before the formation of a belief should investigation about it (Deontology), and result of this study should be provide necessary and sufficient reasons and evidence for formation or reject a belief (Evidentialism), and these reasons and evidence must be in the domains of knowledge, and he be able to explain his reasons (Internalism).

Khajeh Nasiroddin Tusi’s ethical theory is one of the most important and noteworthy theories about Islamic philosophical ethics. In this paper we analyze his ethical theory from an ethical epistemology perspective−which is itself one of the main branches of meta-ethics. The primary issue in his theory is the possibility of ethical epistemology. According to the fact that he believes the good and evil actions are rational¡ it can be concluded that knowledge will make the ethical precepts possible correctly or incorrectly. The second issue is the method of justifying ethical precepts. According to the findings of the study¡ about justifying the ethical propositions¡ he is a naturalist in terms of definition. At the end¡ due to the significance of relativism in epistemology of ethics¡ absoluteness or relativity of Tusi’s ethical theory will be evaluated. Based on the main principles of his ethical theory it could be concluded that he rejects ethical relativism and accepts the generality and universality of ethical precepts.