جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه "hume's law" در نشریات گروه "فلسفه و کلام"

Undoubtedly, the problem of “fact-value” gap should be considered as one of the most important issues in moral philosophy. Drawing the problem of “fact-value” gap has been ascribed to the skeptic empiricist Scottish philosopher, David Hume. Hume claimed that it is impossible to derive the ethical propositions containing “ought/ought not” from the ethical propositions containing “is/is not”. The moral philosophers have regarded the Humean doctrine as the "is/ought” fallacy. After Hume, the English analytic philosopher, George Edward Moore, revived the Humean doctrine. Moore claimed that the concept of “Good” cannot be defined in terms of non-moral concepts/natural properties. He challenged the philosophers who defined this concept in terms of the non-moral concepts/natural properties to committing the “Naturalistic Fallacy”. Some of the moral philosophers have tried to confirm the fallacies proposed by Hume and Moore, while some others have attempted to refute those fallacies. The American neo-Aristotelian philosopher, Alasdair MacIntyre is among those who have tried to offer a specific explanation of how the theories of disseminating the “fact-value” gap have emerged. He has made some arguments to show the invalidity of that gap. In this paper, we will consider the doctrines of Hume and Moore on the “fact-value” gap, and then will examine MacIntyre’s considerations on the gap.