جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « metaphysics » در نشریات گروه « فلسفه و کلام »

According to ontological naturalism, the existence of an incorporeal cause for the world is in conflict with science, and basically the world does not need such a cause. According to methodological naturalism, too, scientific method is the most successful method for understanding the structure of the world and the causal relationships governing it. Looking at the issue from the perspective of theoretical philosophy, which does not belong to anything other than the outer world, we find that science has a limited share in the explanation of nature in terms of its method, and if the empirical findings arising from it are not in interaction with the metaphysical foundations of science, then it cannot have decisive theories in the explanation of the world and has nothing to say in the ontological issues. It seems that by considering the link between science and metaphysics, one can use philosophical theology in order to defend the belief in God as a complementary element in the explanation of the world of existence, and the use of science in the realm of ontology is considered unscientific and fallacious. Regarding essentialism in science, Ellis believes realistically that instead of lacking properties, creatures have powers and capacities that make up their essence and inherent properties and make their nature active and full of properties. It can be concluded that naturalism is valuable as a way of understanding material nature, without being in conflict with the transcendental and incorporeal cause. Methodological naturalism does not necessarily correlate with ontological naturalism, and what brings these two closer together is the metaphysical foundations of science, which alone is efficient in theology and the ontological explanation of nature. In sum, new essentialism establishes a connection between the inherent properties and the existence of things, and builds an objective and real foundation on the proof of the metaphysical foundations of science, from which theology can open a way to prove the belief in God.

There is a controversy in Islamic philosophy over the relationship between something’s being something and something’s being. Two theses are well-known: assumption and entailment. Notoriously, Mirdamad is considered to be among the adherents of the entailment thesis. It is argued here that Mirdamad’s thesis is neither assumption nor entailment. Actually, his thesis includes a collection of different propositions that combine assumption and entailment variously. I interpret his thesis on the basis of his theory of subsistence and existence. Furthermore, I distinguish between semantical and metaphysical aspects of Mirdamad’s thesis. I abstract some logical consequences from these semantical aspects. I explain then why these logical consequences do not follow from a bunch of the alternative theses at issue.

Kant argued that in order to bring about validity for knowledge we have to make a paradigm shift. The paradigm shift which was well known as copernican revolution was based on this assumption that the one who observing could be able to determinate objects. For Kant subject as observer has the ability to determine the world transcendentally. For Hegel the Kantian paradigm shift count as subjetivising the objectivity. He blames Kant for not seeing this basic fact that, subject himself become in the objectivity and the relation could not be as Kant was assuming. Hegel by replacing the transcendental I with Giest attempts to instead of making objectivity, subjective, do the reverse. In this article we argue that by objectivizing the subjectivity, Hegel not inly became able to overcome the problems posed by Kantian philosophy but also assumes subjectivity as intrinsically intersubjective

logotherapy was invented by Viktor Frankl as one of the existentialist psychotherapy schools. The main mission of this school is to emphasize the importance of the meaning of life and its unique role in getting rid of existential emptiness and aimlessness in life. The three main beliefs of this school are: belief in the existence of God, religion and immortality. The present research, which was carried out by descriptive-analytical method and through library sources, after carefully reading the metaphysical beliefs of Frankel's school, evaluates them based on the intellectual foundations of Allameh Tabatabayi (r). The main research question is what are the most important metaphysical beliefs of Frankel's logotherapy school? And what are their similarities and differences with respect to Islamic teaching, based on the opinions of Allameh Tabatabayi? The research findings show: the incorrect and superficial explanation of the concept of God and its degradation from the level of necessary position to the pure level of a meaning-giver, a minimal definition of religion and a pluralistic and instrumentalist view of it, and not paying attention to the reality of happiness and vague interpretations of immortality are the most important points of difference between Frankel and Allameh Tabatabai is in the field of metaphysical beliefs.

Despite Wittgenstein's philosophical activities in Britain and his strong inclination towards analytic philosophy, there are also non-analytic elements in his thought which are rooted in classical German thought, especially in Kant's critical philosophy. We can, therefore, detect Kantian elements in Wittgenstein's thought. Concerning the main aim of this research, i.e., to show the Kantian veins of Wittgenstein’s thought, the following elements can be enumerated: critique of Metaphysics, delimitation of expression of thought, transcendentality of logic and ethics, problem of Metaphysics and science, refutation of private language. Given the evolution of Wittgenstein's though, this paper aims to show that, first, these similarities and parallels can be drawn not only from the Tractatus but also from the Philosophical Investigations. Second, there are fundamental differences between Wittgenstein's commentators, for instance, P.M.S Hacker argues against the transcendental reading of both the Tractatus and the Philosophical Investigations, and claims that the two philosophers do not share the same concept of the term transcendental. Finally, the question arises as to whether these Kantian veins can be considered as a proof of the unity of Wittgenstein's thought.

Substance is one of the fundamental concepts in the history of philosophy that has a history as long as the history of philosophy itself. Although this concept has underwent profound developments and assumed different layers during the centuries, because of its firm linkage with common-sense, never lost its significance. Since the birthplace of the concept of substance is ancient Greece and Greek philosophy, this essay intends to narrate an analytical history of the genesis of the concept in ancient Greece; then to trace its course of development in Christian and Islamic middle age; and finally, to investigate its remnants in modern philosophy. The purpose of this essay, however, is not merely a philosophy-historical narrative, but its secondary purpose is to place the concept of substance under a critical light and to report its fundamental critiques. Hence, we will consider the most important critiques, mostly proposed by Anglo-Saxon philosophers, and will conclude that this concept in order to have a legitimate presence in philosophy, must submit a fundamental reformulation.

Distinguishing empirical knowledge from non-empirical knowledge is one of the important issues of epistemology.The criterion for distinguishing "science" from non-empirical knowledge actually goes back to determining the role of experience in science. The traditional and inductive view considers the role of experience to confirm scientific statements.From this point of view, a scientific theorem is a theorem that can be confirmed and finally proved by an experimental method.  The famous philosopher of science, Karl Popper, at the beginning of the 20th century, proposed the criterion of "falsifiability" as a criterion for distinguishing "science" from other types of knowledge.In the present article, the author tries to reveal the epistemological result of his opinion by referring to some of the criticisms that have been made to Popper's theory, that in experimental science, neither definite proof nor definite refutation is possible. This important point is an emphasis on the hypothetical nature of experimental science.

Heidegger holds that, although Western philosophy begins with an inquisition of the meaning of Being as the purpose of Metaphysics, at the time, perverted by Plato, and the history of forgetting Being begins from that time. According to Heidegger, the crisis of European sciences and the death of meaning is caused by ontological nihilism. It initiates from the metaphysical dualism that has occurred during centuries of philosophizing due to the disregard of the concept of Being and the obfuscation of this most fundamental thing. Heidegger conceives that with hermeneutical and phenomenological analysis of Dasein as the primary habitat in which the first and most fundamental problem of philosophy, What is Metaphysics?, has become a new way of philosophizing, before the thinkers of the epoch to get rid of this "great desert that Every day expands" (Nietzsche's famous expression, which Heidegger analyzed in the book What is Metaphysics?). This inquiry attempts to examine the characteristics and goals of Heidegger's hermeneutical phenomenology in the criticism of previous philosophies and in line with fundamental ontology, which is a drawing for understanding Being.

Surveying the problem of emanation in Farabi's view, has some difficulties like that does for Farabi this problem is a fundamental problem in metaphysics or a secondary one? In this issue we are confronted with two main difficulties: one is that some scholars doubted to two Farabi's works that he discussed there the problem of emanation, mean Fosus Al-hekam and Ouoon Al-masael. They cannot say that these two books certainly are Farabi's books. But the more difficult problem is that Farabi's views on the problem of emanation are different in his works. It seem that some of Farabi's books are basically written in the Aristotelian context and some of his books are from his personally views. In addition, there is another difficulty: Farabi discussed the problem of emanation in some of his books that are not basically metaphysical but are psychological. In the present article, we try to survey these difficulties in Farabi's works.

Morganti and Tahko advocate a kind of metaphysics that they call "moderate naturalized metaphysics." This moderate naturalism concerning metaphysics differs crucially with, on the one hand, Ladyman & Ross's radical project of naturalizing metaphysics and, on the other hand, proposals aiming to defend the autonomy of metaphysics, such as those of Larry Paul and Jonathan Lowe. Morganti and Tahko hold that metaphysics overlaps with natural sciences in terms of subject matter and has a sufficient degree of independence from it in terms of method. In this article, I will outline this naturalistic project, mainly in contrast with the meta-metaphysical views of Ladyman & Ross, Lowe, and Paul. Then I attempt to examine and criticize it, arguing that their project faces two main challenges. First, it cannot suitably address the overlap between metaphysics and science regarding the subject matter. Second, it cannot provide a criterion for limiting and constraining the metaphysical activity based on naturalism.

The concept of free will is one of the fundamental concepts in Western metaphysical tradition. Although there are some important signs regarding the origination of this concept in Greek classical philosophy and Middle Age philosophy, it was just at the beginning of the modern period that the role of free will in the interpretation of the world was more highlighted in the thoughts of each philosopher more than those of the previous one. It seems as if the role of rational knowledge has become gradually less important in this process while the role of free will has become more significant. Inspired by Heidegger, the author has tried to strengthen his standpoint by yielding more proofs than he has offered in order to examine the development of the concept of free will. In doing so, he starts with Descartes and, by investigating the views of Espinoza, Leibniz, Rousseau, Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche, aims to analyze the quality of the development of this concept, particularly the relationship between the free will and knowledge in the modern period. The purpose is to show that the significance of free will for Schopenhauer and Nietzsche is not accidental, and the preliminary contexts of such a development had been previously and gradually paved by modern philosophers. The findings of this study indicate that, unlike the previous comments and interpretations, Nietzsche’s “will to power” is not a complement to a Schopenhaurian project but, rather, a complement to German idealism.

One of the three constituent elements of all classical metaphysics is the theory of Soul. Along with the soul, Kant also introduced the world and God as other pillars of transcendental metaphysics, and explained their relation to each other as the outlines of the "science of philosophy" in the third critique. In order to achieve this, he believes that each of these three pillars needs to be analyzed in the context of critical philosophy so that the historical knots of traditional metaphysics can be opened and philosophy can move forward and progress like basic sciences such as mathematics and physics. In the transcendental dialectic of the Critique of Pure Reason, he examines the claims of the metaphysical's counterfeiters in four well-known fallacies, and shows why they are barren. In addition to describing the approach of traditional metaphysicians during this two Kant's serious discussions of the soul- one as a condition of cognition and the other as part of traditional metaphysics and its implicit fallacies- this paper seeks to show how the soul as one of the pillars of the Science of Philosophy and the "complete philosophical system" is formulated in Kant's critical philosophy, and for this formulation how to reject Cartesian psychology.

This article shifts from doubt about the meaning of a commonly neglected phrase in Aristotle’s Metaphysics about the relation between metaphysics and myth into a fundamental question about the relation between metaphysics and emotions. The contemporary philosophical trend of reviving emotions, with all of its advantages in different felids of philosophy, has been almost silent in the field of metaphysics. The historical cliché of reason/emotion (also, reason/body) separation, among other things, has overshadowed the possibility of revising/ re-reading metaphysical texts through the lenses of constitutional emotions. This article develops a different narrative about the nature of metaphysics in Aristotel’s thought through re-reading some of his works. According to this narrative, certain emotions, including wonder (thauma), praise, pleasure, and desire, alongside the “nous”, play a constitutional role in the construction of the Aristotelian structure of metaphysics. I will discuss that the concept of “nous/ reason” cannot suffice for giving a comprehensive explanation for the tools and methods of metaphysics. According to the constitutional role of emotions, reductive interpretations of Metaphysics should be radically challenged in that they have ignored the emotional foundations of metaphysics during the history of philosophy. Moreover, I will suggest that the new narrative of metaphysics can provide some material to revise the traditional understanding of the soul’s parts, the soul’s unity, and relation between soul and body in Aristotle’s thought.

 Before the emergence of modern science ,Philosophy was dominant over all sciences, including the empirical ones. But with the advent ofpositivistic school of philosophy during the first half of the nineteenth century  and its dominance until 1960’s, both religion and philosophy were put aside  formally , and scientists sought the answer to all human questions from empirical science.But, during the second half of the twentieth century ,it be came clear that science per se Cannot account for moral values and cannot answer humanity’s ultimate questions and is full of metaphysical assumptions. Therefore ,philosophy (especially  metaphysics ) has been revived by some eminent scientists, and they  are looking for a comprehensive worldview which can take care of scientists’ questions, and some of them have proposed a religious worldview for this purpose.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the place of metaphysics of light in the thought of Saint Bonaventure. Bonaventure is one of the mystical philosophers of the thirteenth century who had many influences on later thinkers. How man achieves fixed and common truths is a fundamental issue that Saint Bonaventure has faced in epistemological discussions. He uses the theory of light to explain this issue. In this article, while proposing different views and approaches to Bonaventure's theory of light, an attempt has been made to examine issues related to the metaphysics of light. The results show that Saint Bonaventure uses light as an analogy to communicate with God and enjoy Him in life. A God-centered view that seeks to reconcile the philosophical search for truth with the ultimate truth of Christian revelation. Despite his influence on Aristotle's thought in the form of the physics of light, in the general synthesis of his thought, the use of Neoplatonic and Augustine's ideas and the metaphysics of light is evident. "Lux" and "lumen" are terms used by Bonaventure to describe the metaphysics of light. In his metaphysical thought, light is the most original form on which all other forms depend, and whatever it is, it is formed through the basic form of light.

In order to find a way to analyze metaphysics, Kant introduced four types of theorems in his philosophy. After analyzing these theorems, only post-analytic theorems can be considered as a general title for all theorems and a more accurate way to measure external truth and falsehood. Presented theorems. Since metaphysical theorems are also present in post-analytic theorems, the truth of metaphysical theorems does not need to be referred to the outside world, and the rest of the theorems are determined to be true or false, depending on whether their predicate is sensory or inductive. .The fruit of a posteriori analytic theorems in proving metaphysics is due to the need for a posteriori perception of "existence", followed by the provability of God with metaphysical theorems that are certain and in accordance with reality in which there is no possibility of inaccuracy.This study has an analytical and critical view of Kant's philosophy and has tried to start in a chain of its theorems and defects in order to find the serious flaw in Kant's philosophy that has prevented the presentation of proof to prove God, and not only metaphysics. Introduce something supernatural but also scientifically provable and certain and without the need to measure truth and falsehood.

At the beginning of the fourth book of metaphysics, Aristotle speaks of knowledge as "existing as existing and its inherent effects" and in other places he refers to this book as "the first philosophy" or "the first philosophy", "wisdom" and "theology". Which is later called metaphysics. As he has given different names to this science, he has also raised various topics for this science. The most fundamental subject in metaphysics of Aristotle is existence. In metaphysic, Aristotle has expressed the knowledge of existent in different ways and it is displayed various matter on this scale in a proper position. In the beginning of forth book of metaphysics, it is said that metaphysics is a knowledge of being as such, but metaphysics is a divine science in other parts so that its subject is an immovable and spiritual being. Also, it is a science to discuss the highest principle and elements and it is described as the knowledge of substance or primary substance too. So, the commentators of Aristotle encountered with some contradictions to identify the exact subject of metaphysics from the earlier of time.

Kripke's method in be suspected on the sameness of metaphysics and epistemology is to introduce examples of violations; Introduction of a priori possible beside necessary experimental propositions. It is disputed in these counterexamples. What follows is an attempt to revive metaphysics through natural language semantics parallel to Prof. Kripke's suggestion. In the body of the article, I try to show the concomitance of Frege's logic and his proper names semantics with the Copernican revolution. At first, from showing the inefficiency of Frege's (descriptive) proposal in the semantics of proper names, I conclude that there is no escape except the John Stuart Mill’s proper names semantics and the direct connection of the name and named. In the second step, I will try to demonstrate the inadequacy of descriptions for separating actual and fictional names also the Noncompliance of existence and determination, and from there show the otherness of metaphysics and epistemology. When the descriptive referencing to proper name implicitly root in Copernican revolution, uncertainty on descriptive referencing will result uncertainty on conformity of metaphysics and epistemology.