جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « previous necessity » در نشریات گروه « فلسفه و کلام »

Philosophical predestination” states determinism in the light of philosophical issues such as “succession of wills”, the “rule of previous necessity”, and the “relation of divine will to the man’s volitional actions”. Muhaqqiq Isfahani has dealt with an analysis and evaluation of these issues with scrutiny and has proved the consistency of these philosophical issues with the agent’s free will. Through this study, it is clarified that in his thought, the criterion for an action’s being volitional is its being preceded by a will and not a will being preceded by another will, so that the succession of wills is necessary. The rule of previous necessity is not inconsistent with the agent’s free will; rather, it supports and confirms his free will. Similarly, the divine will is related to the man’s volitional actions limited by his will. In this article, Muhaqqiq Isfahani’s view regarding the philosophical predestination has been categorized, adjusted, explained and evaluated with a descriptive-analytical method

The law of 'previous necessity' known among Muslim philosophers as 'that which is not made necessary will not be brought into existence' is a sort of 'necessity by something else'. According to Muslim philosophers an effect will not be brought into existence unless it is made necessary. In other words, when a complete cause comes the effect will be firstly made necessary and then brought into existence. This law is also known as philosophical determinism. To safeguard an agent's free will, theologians have negated the necessity by something else suggesting that 'priority' is enough. They assume that with the coming into being of a complete cause the priority will lie with the existence of its effect, though its existence is not yet a must. They believe that free will will be void if the effect is necessitated by its complete cause. In other words, theologians are of the view that the law 'that which is not made necessary will not be brought into existence' implies the negation of free will. Distinguishing between a free and compelled agent, some scholars of the principles of Shiite jurisprudence have suggested that the law is applicable only to compelled agents. From among the contemporaries, it is professor Fayyazi who being strongly opposed to causal necessity presents arguments against it. Following a comprehensive approach, this article tries to find out the origin of the belief in this law through evaluating the arguments presented for it.