جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « principality of existence » در نشریات گروه « فلسفه و کلام »

The principality of existence or quiddity has been considered one of the important and influential problems in the tradition of Islamic philosophy since the time of Mīrdāmād until this day. Most philosophers have accepted the principality of existence and rejected its opposite view, and some have accepted the principality of quiddity. In this paper by examining the conceptual foundations and analysing the subject in dispute, we have reached to the conclusion that the principality of existence or quiddity is not really a philosophical problem, and the dispute between the two parties is a verbal dispute and the disputants are talking past each other. The proponents and the opponents of the principality of existence do not mean the same thing by “existence”. Similarly, the proponents and the opponents of the principality of quiddity do not mean the same thing by “quiddity”. Quiddity for the proponents of the principality of quiddity is the existent quiddity, not quiddity qua quiddity. And the existent quiddity for them is the external reality, not the quiddity which has been unified with existence. Likewise, the existence deemed fictitious by the proponents of the principality of quiddity is the general self-evident concept of existence, not existence in the sense that is the external reality which is a cause of an effect or an effect of a cause. After explaining the claim and providing proof that the dispute is verbal, some objections have been raised and answered.

One of the issues under the subject of principality of existence has been the pluralities of the universe for whose explanation the theory of gradation of existence was proposed. In the transcendental philosophy, in addition to the three types of plurality (part of essence, out of essence, and the whole essence), a fourth criterion was proposed for justification of some pluralities: difference in the whole essence while sharing the whole essence, or difference in strength and weakness. Sadraʾid thinkers (followers of Mulla Sadra) disagreed in explaining this criterion. Allameh Tabataba’i believes that some pluralities of the real universe is not justifiable with this criterion. By proposing the new criterion of ‘objectivity of distinguishing factor and common factor’, he believes if the difference of beings returns to the difference in their orders and their strength and weakness, the gradation is longitudinal; otherwise, it is transverse. Master Mesbah rejects Allameh’s statements and believes if instances of a concept have a cause-effect relationship, then that concept is attributed to them in gradational form; otherwise, there is no transverse gradation and such pluralities are different by all their existence.

Among philosophers, figures like Sheikh Ishrāq, Allamah Ḥillī, and their followers believed in the principality of quiddity (māhiyyah) and naturally considered existence to be a secondary intelligible. However, with the emergence of transcendent philosophy and the endorsement of the principality of existence, it was expected that proponents of this perspective would not categorize existence as a secondary intelligible. Nevertheless, we observe that Mullā Ṣadrā and his followers in transcendent philosophy still consider existence as a secondary intelligible. The aim of this research is to answer whether these two perspectives are conflicting and contradicting each other or not. In case of a contradiction, how does Mullā Ṣadrā reconcile and justify his statements. Naturally, our method in this research is descriptive and analytical. Based on Mullā Ṣadrā's statements and making a final conclusion of his viewpoint, we could say that, firstly, there is no doubt that he endorses the principality of existence and concurrently consider existence as a secondary intelligible. Secondly, from the perspective of the writers, based on the fact that Mullā Ṣadrā not only acknowledges the attribution of the secondary philosophical intelligibles to be external, but also considers their occurrence as external, there is essentially no fallacy or contradiction remaining. Hence, there is no need to reject any one of Mullā Ṣadrā's ideas.

Mullā Ṣadrā in the issue of principality of existence with the negation of the conceptual part of existence considers the nonconditioned as a source of division to have extensional unity and individual plurality. The truth of existence has collective and expansionary unity and it is the basis of the principality of existence and the subject of philosophy for this reason. He has two different attitudes towards the existence of the positive condition in the discussion of the validity of the nature of his own. The separation of the principality of existence in two meanings is the result of this discussion In the first sense, the root of external realties and what fills the external world is the existence of the nonconditioned as a source of division, and the nature or the ranges of the truth of the unconditioned of existence are consequently realized. Ṣadrā in the second and final view considers the validity of nature as a mere mentality by rejecting any external distinction of existence and nature and considers the existence of nature as a function of the existence of the soul and its human minds and its mental aspects.

Allameh Hassan-zada’s skill in resolving scientific disputes and reconciling the views of scientific schools in the way to achieve truth can assist us greatly in understanding and rightly interpreting the principality of existence and the meaning of conventionality of quiddity and its extension in the present time. The present article explores Allameh’s works in a descriptive-analytical way, adjust the important preliminaries in understanding the meaning of conventionality and predication of existence on quiddity, and regards two overall meaning for existence and non-existence of nature. First, predicating existence on quiddity is through medium of accidents and judging non-existence due to the rightness of its negation. Second, quiddity is non-existence in terms of relational existence, and is existent in terms of the existence of relation, i.e. the imperfect ‘to be’ (kāna nāqiṣa). Finally, we have explained the figurative existence of quiddity or its mystical judgment in Allameh Hassan-zada’s view.

The authors of this article believe that the conflict between the Principality of existence or Essence is not only verbal but also an important metaphysical challenge between the Originality of Unity and the Originality of Plurality, each of which can have different theological consequences. Regarding the attribution of the the Principality of Essence to Suhrawardi among contemporary scholars, three important views can be distinguished: First, a view that denies the attribution of the Principality of Essence to Sheikh Ishraq and even considers him the originator of the Principality of Existence. Second, a view that does not explicitly deny this attribution, but based on evidence of the Principality of Existence in his words, concludes that the Principality of Existence is the basis of Suhrawardi''s philosophy. Third, the view of Ayatollah Javadi Amoli and some other scholars who consider the system of Suhrawardi''s philosophy based on the Principality of Essence and plurality and therefore contrast it with Mulla Sadra''s philosophical system, which is based on the unity of existence. In this article, the authors use a critical analytical method, based on the study of the works of Suhrawardi and his researchers, while criticizing the three views, to explain the superiority of Ayatollah Javadi Amoli''s point of view and to present their arguments for rejecting other views.

Principality of existence serves as the backbone of Mulla Sadra’s philosophy. The transcendental philosophy is distinctive from other philosophical schools for the fact that it is consciously an ontological philosophy. What manages the structure of Mulla Sadra’s philosophy and is manifested all throughout the transcendental philosophy is the existential thought and principality of existence. Thus, it makes a difference whether the essential thought governs the life or the existential thought, because the essential thought cut from the existence leads the man towards rivalry in wealth. But the existential thought nurtures the man as a divine and abundance-centered being. Thus, it is an obligation both for individuals and for society to return to the ‘existence’. In spite of ample writings about the principality of existence, there is not enough discussion on the individual and social life and the importance of returning to existence. Therefore, it is worth discussing separately on existential thought.

Principality of existence and conventionality of quiddity can be considered as the main pillars of transcendental philosophy. This term has various interpretations each of which can be regarded as related to one dimension of that meaning. Thus, in the present article, we have attempted to review one of these interpretations (that of Master Gholam-Reza Fayyazi), and offer an explanation that seems to be closer to reality. Accordingly, in this article, we have stated Master Fayyazi’s foundations and offered a summary of his opinions regarding this principle to explain eight foundations and critiques about them, while explaining some part of semantic foundations that seems to be more correct. Besides, we have also investigated and reviewed the reason he has offered for his opinion on conventionality of quiddity with his special statement. We have continued with explaining and reviewing the most essential consequence of that statement, which seems not to be right. Therefore, in this article, we have attempted, while offering critiques of that statement, to present points for researchers in the transcendental philosophy to enable them to gain more of that philosophical school and come closer to the ontological depth of transcendental philosophy.

Explaining the relationship between the divine essence and the divine attributes has always been one of the concerns of Islamic theologians and philosophers. In the meantime, Dawani considers the attributes of perfection inseparable from the essence and tries to prove the objectivity of the divine essence and attributes with many reasons. As for this issue, he emphasizes that all the attributes of the necessary being should be referred to the divine knowledge, and he explicitly maintains that all the divine attributes are interpreted in the light of the necessary being's knowledge. On the other hand, Sadr al-Din Shirazi also believes in the objectivity of attributes and essence and has explained and studied the principles of objectivity of essence and attributes through rules such as the principality of existence and the simplicity of truth. What distinguishes Dawani and Sadra Shirazi's views on this issue, and based on which their explanations and reasons differ, is Dawani's belief in the principality of quiddity and Sadra's belief in the principality of existence. This can be considered as the basis and presupposition of the issue of the relationship between the essence and attributes of the necessary being in the thought of Dawani and Sadr al-Din Shirazi. This article examines the views of Dawani and Sadra Shirazi by studying and reflecting on their various works. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the views of Dawani and Sadr al-Din Shirazi and to compare their principles.

sometimes, imagination of philosophy issue is more important and more difficult than its judgment, and principality of existence issue is from these issues. in this article, we have surveyed to some of imagination meanings of this issue.also we have surveyed to two explanation of disputable point; and we have surveyed with reasons of principality of existence to some of imagination meanings. explanation of disputable point, which is an important issue in this field, is not mentioned in Mullah Sadra's books. But people like Sabzevari, Tabatabai and others have paid it. In the meantime, modares Zunuzi has written a comprehensive and precise explanation of disputable point on the issue. Some have criticized this and we have responded to them. In this article, the meanings of the quiddity, existence, imagination meanings, and limitation of the dispute are discussed. It addresses issues such as whether there are personal or some kind of phenomena in this issue.

Mulla Sadra has experienced, in his works, three stages of philosophical journey: principality of quiddity, the principality of existence of gradational unity, and the principality of existence of personal unity. There must have been changes in the dependent discussions in proportion to these three stages of journey. Considering this change would resolve many issues related to Mulla Sadra's true view and the consistency or inconsistency of the doctrines inside Mulla Sadra's system. According to the present study, some views have been offered on 'time' based on the three journeys of Mulla Sadra, and in line with each journey, some evolutions have occurred regarding the time and the related discussions. These evolutions have been studied in the following spheres in three stages in the form of an intra-system comparative study. These spheres are as follows: definition of time; the essential or existential being of the time; the argument for proving the existence of time; the univocal or gradational nature of time; the direct cause of time; the running sphere of time, and their common and different points.

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In addition to a study of the major interpretations of the "principality of existence", (ʾIṣāla al-wujūd) this article studies Mullā Ṣadrā's view through the third person narration method. According to this method, the main point in "principality of existence" is the distinction, the rules and the relation of existence and quiddity. Mullā Ṣadrā describes his view in the form of the proposition, "Existence exists", and he claims that this proposition is a "common technical Predication." This proposition can be interpreted as follows: 1. Quiddity has instantiations in the external world. 2. Quiddity does not have any instantiation in the external world. 3. Quiddity, primarily, does not have any instantiation in the external world, but it has instantiations through existence. There are many explanations for each of the three interpretations. The major point of this article is that it is not possible for quiddity in-itself to exist in the external world.

Some of the contemporary philosophers have commented on two subjects: (1) the principality of existence and the conventionality of quiddity; and (2) various types of intelligibles. However, the consistency between these two discussions needs to be scrutinized in the array of their views. Among those persons, we may name Allama Tabataba’i and Martyr Mutahhari. In the present article, we have shortly expounded the concluding views of those two philosophers and investigated the relationship between the two views for them. Generally, the separation of ‘veracity’ from ‘objective realization’ is resulted from the inconsistency between those theories; and ignoring this would result in separation of epistemology from ontology. In this article, in addition to investigating the opinions of the abovementioned philosophers, we have explained the relationship between the two discussions of ‘veracity’ and ‘objective realization’, and have used this in making the theory of principality of existence consistent with the discussion of types of intelligibles. At the end, we have presented a new classification of the types of intelligibles.

Islamic philosophy, with its foundations of ontology (ontological), has established the most basic foundations of rational theology. Uncertainty and gradation in these principles inflicts irreparable damage on theology in a special (more peculiar) sense and transforms it into another path with transformative consequences. Principality of existence has a prominent, visible and irreplaceable role among all the central principles of ontology. Transcendent Wisdom has established this principle by recognizing its effective role. Opponents of it have, as a result of some inconsistencies results with their presuppositions, such as the unity of existence, distorted and induced doubt in its proofs. The main doubt is the accusation of circle doubt and circular reasoning by a seemingly heterogeneous spectrum, including anti-philosophers and some separatists (gradationists) in a polemical method. In this opportunity, attention will be paid to four reasons that are in this doubt. These reasons are: the argument of the goodness of existence, the argument based on the difference between the effects of external existence and the mental existence, the argument based on the refusal (impossibility) of doubt in gradation the quiddity and the argument of intensified (intensifying) motion. By presenting the contents of these arguments, the content of the doubt will also be tested against them. The analysis shows that the skepticism is due to insufficient attention to the principles of these arguments.

Mulla Sadra's view of the principality of existence has been interpreted in various ways. In the prevailing interpretation of the theory of the principality of existence, the quiddity is purely subjective, and since it is not present in external reality, it cannot literally represent external reality. The interpretation of Obudiyyat - which is the explanation of the interpretation of Agha Ali Modarres Zenozi - while at the same time emphasizing the subjectivity of quiddity and recognizing quiddity as an image, introduces quiddity's representation as a true indication. This paper, with a descriptive-analytic approach, examines Mulla Sadra's statements and shows that this interpretation cannot be a proper explanation of Mulla Sadra's view of the principality of existence. Mulla Sadra, influenced by the mystics, depicted the relationship between God and the creatures between existence and quiddity and used the mystic's words to depict the relationship, including image, fantasy and Representing the creatures from God. Contrary to Zenozi and Obudiyyat's understanding, such words have been used in the ontological rather than the epistemological sense; hence, they cannot be interpreted as a purely mental object in Sadra's view.

How the philosophical meanings are realized in transcendental philosophy is subsidiary to the principality of existence and conventionality of meaning. By posing the ideas of principality of existence and conventionality of meaning, Mulla Sadra proved that external identities are of the type of truth of existence and that the meaning is impossible to be found in external world. Therefore, he maintains that the existence of meanings, including the philosophical meanings, in the external world is their verifying external quiddities. Considering the fact that Mulla Sadra does not know the external quiddities to be of the meaning type, he thus believes that the contrast of concepts and meanings would not necessarily lead to multiplicity of instances and it is possible that multiple concepts and meanings refer to one single quiddity. It is necessary to mention that although Mulla Sadra regards it possible for multiple concepts and meanings to refer to one single quiddity, by putting forward the idea that accident is separable from what it belongs to, he could prove that the accidents are externally supper added to what they belong to.

Gradation means distinction in the level of enjoying a single truth and return of ‘sharing mode’ to ‘distinctive mode’. The criterion for unity is longitudinal gradation of truth of existence, and the criterion for its distinction is the orders of existence in intensity and weakness. Transverse gradation is applied in truths with an existential rank that are equal in intensity and weakness, but are distinguished. Here, distinction means individuals’ nature and distinction. Since existence has principality, all types of distinction must return to existence. Thus, transverse gradation returns to existence, and this article explains how it returns according to various tenets of conventionality. In longitudinal gradation, the criterion for distinction is orders of existence, and in transverse gradation, the criterion is the limits of existence (in typical distinction) and individuation of existence (in individuals’ distinction). Both of them, in effect, return to existence. Of course, this criterion must be adjusted on the basis of various views on gradations, i.e. general gradation, specific gradation and specific of specific gradation, so that they are not confused.
 

One of the basic issues in philosophy is the principality of existence or quiddity. It has been regarded as a breakthrough in the philosophy. The proponents of Mulla Sadra (Sadraids) believe in principality of existence and conventionality of quiddity. Mulla Sadra was the first philosopher who put this issue at the top of the discussions on ontology, making it the foundation for resolving other issues. To prove their claim, his proponents have adduced some reasons, the most important of which is based on the axis of ‘attribution’. That is, with a reliance on attribution, they have offered arguments that denote the principality of existence and conventionality of quiddity. In this regard, some of the effects they claim for the belief in principality of existence and conventionality of quiddity are related to ‘attribution’. In the present article, we study both the arguments presented and the effects related to the attribution. For the author, there are serious critics regarding both parts of the discussion.

Dilthey is one of the philosophers of life who has examined the text of life. His view of the "experience of life" has many similarities with the thoughts of life in Mulla Sadra's transcendentalist wisdom. The term "life experience" is not meant by the term "lived experience" in the Diltian philosophy, but the purpose of any kind of time-to-life perspective that examines human activity over time. The study of the goals and the general course of these two philosophers and the characteristics of the experience of life illustrates a kind of affiliation in this matter that one can think of between these two thinkers. The date and time, feeling, experience and perception are the things that are discussed in this article. The flood of life, the active, common, and immediate understanding of life, is also recognized as the most important points of the two philosophers; That is, the self during the movement and the flood in life with a kind of exaltation of values, is associated with its volitional act, for the purpose of its evolution, and the body defines its own example.

Proving the principality of existence in Mulla Sadra’s philosophy, which regards both the principality of existence and that of quiddity as invalid, is equal to conventionality of quiddity. However, Mulla Sadra’s arguments in proving the principality of existence go on just up to proving the existence of quiddity in respect of conditional mood of existence, and Mulla Sadra’s statements on the quiddity’s existence are various and sometimes contradictory, which leads to a variety of accounts of conventionality of quiddity for the expositors of Mulla Sadra’s philosophy. Nevertheless, scrutiny of the bases of transcendental philosophy and accepting those bases as the conceptual and affirmative bases effective in the discussion leads to the fact that by conditional mood in subsistence of quiddity for Mulla Sadra, we mean subsistence in the conditional annihilation mood of the existence which enjoys somewhat realization, although non-original realization; and never means absolute mentality of quiddity or existence of quiddity in the inclusive mood of existence.