جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « probable syllogism » در نشریات گروه « فلسفه و کلام »

In Priori Analytics, II. 25, Aristotle proposes a sort of reasoning called apagpge. Scholars differ about its translation, definition, and formulation. Ross believes that it is a semi-demonstrative, semi-dialectical first-figure syllogism, with a probable conclusion derived from a more probable minor premise and apodictic major premise, which is applicable as a method of discovery. Peirce holds that it is same as Abduction, or an anticipation of it. But Farabi, without any discussion about apagoge, put the Arabic translation of epagoge, i.e. induction, in the place of apagoge, which inspire the hypothesis that apagoge in Priori Analytics, II. 25 is distortion of epagoge. On my analysis, Peirce and Farabi’s interpretations both are abductions that, assuming strangeness of Priori Analytics, II. 25, propose explanatory hypotheses apposite to economy and consistency, while Ross rejects the assumption at all. Peirce’s theory on the Aristotelian origin of abduction, with its problems and alternatives, would be questionable; and this result may be important for the Histories of Logic and science.