جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « religious induction » در نشریات گروه « فلسفه و کلام »

In the field of philosophy of religion, the issue of the existence of world after death and the doctrine of rewards and punishments in the hereafter is one of the important and confusing issues as persuades theologians and philosophers of religion to present various and contradictory views about it. Meanwhile, despite David Hume's considerable reputation as one of the most important philosophical critics of religion, the secular irreligious significance of this philosopher's views, especially on the issue of induction and probable reasoning, has not attracted the attention and energy of Hume's researchers in recent decades. The main objectives of this paper, on the basis of methodical research, are to identify the relevance of induction and probable reasoning to the problem of belief in a future state and to the doctrine of rewards and punishments of human acts in philosophy of religion, and to show that the goal of Hume's critical analysis of the credibility and practical significance of religious inductive arguments, by providing an account of the foundation of probable reasoning, is to reject the principal aims of defenders of Christian orthodoxy. It was orthodoxy defender’s aim to show, on the basis of our experience of this world, that there is a future state of rewards and punishments, and that prudence requires that we guide our conduct in this life with a view to our expectations of happiness or misery in the next. We will show that Hume provides a naturalistic account of the psychological mechanisms for the foundations of probable reasoning that generate our beliefs concerning the future, and this account serves to explain why religious arguments concerning the doctrine of a future state inevitably fail to persuade us or influence our conduct, so the doctrine of state of rewards and punishments is of little or no practical consequence for human.