جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « scientific knowledge » در نشریات گروه « فلسفه و کلام »

In this study, we shall assess the claim concerning the negative effect of sin and positive effect of grace on proper function of reason and cognitive faculties through the lens of the Calvinist tradition and the Reformed Epistemology. Although the noetic effect of sin has already been discussed probably by tracing the role of the non-epistemic factors in acquiring knowledge in general, approaching the issue by focusing on ‘scientific knowledge’ is novel and, to the best of my knowledge, has not been attempted before. This study will be developed by means of an evaluation of Stephen Moroney’s project. Through a critical survey of the views of a number of prominent Christian theologian, he tries to develop a model for the cognitive influence of sin. In our review of his work from the canons of Critical Rationalism, we shall try to show that Moroney's conclusions are inconsistent with his explanation of the effect of sin on the natural sciences. Our main arguments are as follows: what Moroney describes as scientific knowledge from a Christian point of view is more a technological awareness rather than scientific knowledge proper. Furthermore, it is the scientist who is affected by sin and not his scientific claim.

Moritz Schlick divides our knowledge of reality and independent external world into two domains of conventional knowledge needed in everyday life, and scientific knowledge. Relying on this division, he shows how logical positivism is not in need of metaphysical confrontation with reality and external world in either of these realms.
The present article studies Moritz Schlick’s academic trend and the turning points of his scientific life, from the tradition of philosophical physicists to succession of Ernst Mach, and to his association with Vienna Cycle; and meanwhile attempts to answer the question of what has been his image of reality and independent world as ontological issues? What always has been taken into consideration about logical positivists is limited to their epistemological and methodological aspects. Here we intent to reproduce the ontological aspect of Schlick’s thoughts, taking into account the challenge that he and the Vienna cycle pose to metaphysics

Corresponding to the division of the scientific knowledge to demonstrable and indemonstrable knowledge in Aristotle’s philosophy، the concept of nous has two interwoven senses. Besides nous as the demonstrable scientific knowledge، it is also regarded as the hexis of the soul. There are three specific functions of this latter sense: i) acquiring principles on which the scientific knowledge is based; ii) understanding universals in actual sense perception and iii) conceiving universal propositions during induction (epagoge). Nous as the origin of acquiring demonstrative knowledgeis، thus، both the process of acquiring demonstrable knowledge and its final result. The illumination of this point، it seems، can throw light on some of the common ambiguities about nous.