جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه "secondary intelligibles" در نشریات گروه "فلسفه و کلام"

"External or subjective propositions and adjectives" is a well-known criterion for dividing rationalities into "logical primary and secondary and philosophical secondary". In addition to the lack of semantic clarity, this criterion implies a two-way meaning, that is, it relies on "object-object" or "adjective-object", while in the concept of "reasonable" and especially "reasonable" there is no such two-sidedness. . The division of intellects into the first and the second has another more ancient criterion, this criterion is the precedence and lag in reason. In this criterion, the first rationals refer to the essential concepts and the external attachment, and the second rationals refer to the logical concepts and the mental attachment, but the philosophical concepts do not have a specific place in this category. Sheikh Ishraq, by considering philosophical concepts mentally, put them under a rational second.Others after him objected to the mere mental enumeration of philosophical rationalities, but the thinking of the originalism caused them to be placed in a purgatory of externality and mentality (= mental propositions and external aspirations), and to deviate from the old criterion. Mulla Sadra ruled out mental propositions and external aspirations, and proved the foreignness of philosophical concepts. Of course, according to the various meanings of "existence", its position in the first and second senses will be different. Existence does not mean "truth of existence". But since externality is equivalent to existence and the "general and abstract concept of existence" cannot be considered the same as external existence,

The principle of the primacy of existence leads to a shift and reclassification of primary and secondary philosophical Intelligibles. According to the principle of the primacy of existence, existence must have individuals or concrete counterparts and cannot be considered a secondary Intelligible without a concrete external counterpart. Additionally, based on this principle, the attributes of existence are aspects of the essence of existence and will have concreteness and externality similar to existence itself, whereas essences only have conceptual identities and lack externality. This issue is examined through a descriptive-analytical approach, revealing that neither can the claim of reclassifying all intelligibles be fully accepted, nor can one assert the lack of externality of existence and its true attributes. Based on the effects of the principle of the primacy of existence on the nature of intelligibles and considering the ontological and epistemological explanations of intelligibles, as well as the differentiation between true attributes of existence and other intelligibles, the findings of this paper lead to the conclusion that the principle of the primacy of existence results in existence and its true attributes being primary intelligibles in both epistemological and ontological explanations. Essences are considered secondary philosophical intelligibles from an ontological perspective but primary from an epistemological perspective. Intrinsic attributes of existence, relative, additional, and negational intelligibles will be secondary philosophical intelligibles according to both epistemological and ontological explanations. The reclassification of intelligibles also leads to a new classification based on the principle of the primacy of existence.

One of the criteria that has been used for distinguishing and compiling sciences since long ago is the criterion of “essential accident”. By having this criterion, scientists will be able to put together propositions specific to a certain subject correctly and in a logical order, and draw a specific boundary for their desired science. However, Ayatollah Mesbah introduces problems to this criterion, which makes this criterion invalid in the Philosophy. This article tries to explain with a descriptive-analytical method and according to the available references, first explain a summary of the criterion of “essential accident”, then discuss Ayatollah Mesbah's problems with this criterion in compiling the Philosophy.       The “essential accident” nature of the predicate for the subject depends on the achievement of two major conditions, namely "inherence" and "priority", and the problems of Ayatollah Mesbah are also related to these two; However, it is possible to answer these problems by paying attention to the problem of the participation of term and proof and also comparing the conditions of philosophical secondary intelligibles to the predicates of the subject the Philosophy.

The present article tries to provide a new classification of intelligibles (primary and secondary intelligibles) in Avicenna’s philosophical system and tries to show the real place of philosophical concepts like existence, unity, necessity and etc. in his thought based on this classification. In current scholarship the intelligibles are divided into primary and secondary intelligibles. The second intelligibles are divided into philosophical and logical. This division is widely accepted after Nasir al-Din Tusi. In current scholarship usually this theory is attributed to Avicenna as if he also divided the second intelligibles into philosophical and logical intelligibles. The present research tries to show that Avicenna does not consider the philosophical concepts as second intelligibles but more primary than any other primary concepts. According to him, among the concepts there must be primary concepts on which all other concepts rely. These concepts are present in the mind from childhood and in the level of the intellect in habitu (al-‘aql bi’l malakah). So the first intelligibles, for Avicenna, are divided into two categories: the essential ones or the intelligibles from quiddities and the philosophical ones like existence, unity and necessity which are present for us primarily. The second intelligibles for Avicenna are just logical ones.

Philosophical concepts, which are a variety of general concepts, are considered as one of the most important philosophical issues in a way that, many scholars consider it the key to knowing and discovering reality and the adaptation of scientific forms to objective objects. The term philosophical concepts is a common term in Islamic philosophy especially Sadra’s philosophical school, but neglecting this type of concepts in the West, especially in epistemological issues, has caused many intellectual deviations. In contemporary times, some of the Sadr al-Muta’allehin’s views have been criticized, so despite the great importance of philosophical concepts, it is worthwhile for scholars to pay more attention to them. Using a descriptive-analytical method and strengthening the Islamic foundations of philosophy and epistemology this paper seeks to study the most important requirements of research in philosophical concepts by explaining their realism.

Analysis and investigation of secondary intelligibles has been focus of attention among philosophers since long ago. Epistemology of philosophical concepts deals with an investigation of these concepts, and in the present article, we have explored the epistemology of philosophical concepts in the minds of Allama Tabataba’i and Ayatollah Mesbah. In this study, it is clarified that Allama Tabataba’i was the first philosopher who put forward the mode of abstraction of the philosophical concepts including the concept of existence and non-existence. He believes that philosophical concepts are abstracted by using intuitive knowledge. Ayatollah Mesbah, unlike Allama, does not consider intuitive knowledge and internal experience as sufficient for abstraction of each of the primary philosophical concepts; rather, he maintains in addition to that, they must be compared with one another, and one must regard a certain relation among them. In his view, Allama’s method in abstracting philosophical concepts cannot be generalized

Interpretation of “secondary intelligibles” is inextricably associated with ‘principality of existence’; this mutual relation is more visible in the philosophical system of Sheikh Ishraq and transcendental philosophy. In this inquiry, it is clarified that Suhrawardi regards logical and philosophical secondary intelligibles as lacking inconsistent external existence, and absolutely negates their external realization, considers them as mental affairs, and – on this very foundation – puts forward the idea of principality of quiddity and conventionality of existence. This is while Mulla Sadra believes that since container of realization of relation is the very container of realization of the two sides of relation, both sides are realized in one container which is the very container of characterizing the subject by the judgment. Therefore, since characterizing in philosophical concepts is organized in the external container, philosophical concepts must have external realization as well. In the light of this fact, Mulla Sadra has reviewed and criticized Sheikh Ishraq’s argument on conventionality of existence and has interpreted the mode of realization of existential concepts in the light of arguments for the theory of principality of existence.

It is important to explain the concept of Aristotelian matter. First, since Aristotle appears to be the first philosopher to use the term Hule in its philosophical sense, and through Aristotle, this concept has been incorporated into philosophy. Secondly, the concept of prime matter is challenged because prime matter, according to Aristotle, has no determining. The concept of matter in general in Aristotle's philosophy, like the concept of the form, seems to be a philosophical one, which we must consider as the secondary intelligibles. Aristotelian material takes precedence over any external physical matter. So is Aristotle's translation of matter into physical matter not a confusion? This article explains these important issues that play an important role in understanding the concept of matter. It seems that some of the challenges raised in the new period around Aristotle's prime matter are not paying attention to the fact that Aristotle's hule is of the philosophical concpets of secondary intelligibles, not an external physical object.

According to Allama Tabatabaie, concepts are created in the mind just through quiddities; thus, philosophical concepts are formed from quiddities or primary intelligibles. In his theory of reasoning, he distinguishes between two groups of concepts: factual concepts and conventional ones. These two groups of intelligibles are the same as primary and secondary logical and philosophical intelligibels, dealt with by Allama Tabatabaie with a special view, explaining the way they are formed in the mind. He divides the conventional concepts into three groups: a) mental concepts, created from other mental concepts, b) conventional concepts, formed through a comparison between the soul and its actions and faculties, and c) conventional concepts, created through independently positing the judgment in propositions.
Conventional concepts created from judgment in propositions are more important than the other two types, because they include basic philosophical concepts such as existence, non-existence, unity, plurality, potentiality and actuality. The strong point of this theory is clarifying the way conventional concepts are formed and the way the conformity between the concept created in the mind and its true instance in real world –regarding those concepts which are created in the mind while having external instances– is preserved. Although Allama's attempt in explaining how those concepts are formed is a basic and creative one, his theory must be reviewed in some aspects; the most important among them are: mixing up the judgment in an affirmation and connective existence in propositions, introduced as the origin of the concept of existence.

The place of concepts and the quality of the interaction between the mind and the object are two of the important issues in the fields of epistemology and ontology. The problems of primary and secondary intelligibles and their distinction from each other also enjoy equal significance. The common view regarding the difference between primary and secondary intelligibles is that, unlike the logical and philosophical secondary intelligibles, primary intelligibles have some external referents. In this paper, the writer maintains that this criterion is not enough for distinguishing them from each other. To justify his position, he argues that the theory of the principiality of existence plays an influential role in clarifying the distinction between these two types of intelligibles.

Most of the researches who have thought on Time from the Islamic، Peripatetic، and Sadraian point of view، have concentrated on the relationship between motion and Time. This concentration perhaps caused the other faces of this sophisticated and ancient metaphysical problem be neglected. One of the most important of them is the subjectivity or objectivity of the time. This paper wants to review the answer of Mulla Sadra’s philosophical thought to this important question. So at first I try to explain the distinction between ‘Date’ and ‘Tense’ as two separated concepts of the time. Then، I will show that the Ibn Sina and his Muslim followers’ understanding of time، is based on the first concept (Date)، and on the other side، the Muslim theologians (like Ash’arites) have a similar concept. So in The Final Step of this research، it will be shown that on the principles of Mulla Sadra’s thaught we can consider Time as a completely mental factor، so it has not been derived from any objective matter، like the ‘motion’. But we accept that this conclusion would be denied by the most followers of Mulla Sadra.

Since olden times, causality has been one of the fundamental notions of philosophical thought. In the present writing, the author tries to explain development of the notion of causality in the West, as it has been presented by empiricist schools of thought. This development is as a matter of fact development of the way that interpretation of causality has become subjective. Then, causality in the Islamic thought in the field of Peripatetic philosophy and in particular Transcendent Philosophy will be explained. In the Islamic philosophy, causality is of an objective characteristic. The origin of objectivity of causality in Islamic philosophy, i.e. secondary intelligibles, provides a basis to criticize subjective interpretation of causality in the Western Empiricism.