جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « بدن » در نشریات گروه « فلسفه و کلام »

Belief in the resurrection is one of the principles of Islam and its physicality is one of the religious principles. The discussion of the physical resurrection is actually the discussion of the physicality of human thoughts and actions in the resurrection. This issue has been discussed since the beginning and descent of Islam, and in addition to the Holy Quran, religious leaders from the Prophet (PBUH) to imams, religious scholars and even some Islamic philosophers have emphasized on this issue. Among the Islamic scholars, Hakim Modares Zanouzi and Ayatollah Javadi Amoli, considering that they accept the principle of physical resurrection based on the Qur'an and hadiths, as well as the principles of transcendental wisdom, but they have their own unique point of view on this issue.Hakim Zanouzi believes that the body of every human after death is related to his soul and in the resurrection the body will reach the soul and will remain with him, but Professor Javadi Amoli believes that human actions have an inner existence in the higher levels that are with him. The soul remains in harmony with that world, and the body does not turn to the soul

The purpose of the present research is to understand the nature of reason and destiny and its end in resurrection and to present different meanings and interpretations about proving the survival of reason, which has been the subject of discussion since the past. Based on this, this research has been written by examining the verses of the Quran, especially the verses related to the creation and the definite destiny of man, and examining the sayings of scholars and philosophers. During the review of the sources, the certainty of reason in the existence of man in the second life (the Day of Resurrection) was proved with rational and narrative reasons by referring to the verses of the Holy Quran and inspiration from the descriptions of philosophers and scholars. One of the reasons cited in verse 27 of Surah S, and one of the convincing intellectual reasons is that God did not create man and the world in vain, and reason and logic do not accept that the oppressor and the oppressed are equal in judgment, so the resurrection and reckoning is a definite obligation for every human being; In this way, it is proved that reason is with man on the day of resurrection, because its absence removes responsibility and accountability from him, and by losing it, a person's humanity and identity are lost, and if this is the case, there will be no judgment and accountability, and this is impossible based on the sayings of the Most High, reason and logic. This is a deterrent answer to the words of the deniers who say that there is no resurrection and that man is destroyed by death and suffers eternal destruction. So, based on the general results, there is reason and resurrection, and reason does not disappear with death, and resurrection is for the realization of justice in the reward of the righteous and the punishment of the wicked.

Physicalist Philosophers of the mind in the 20th century put forward a long list of various theories in defense of a materialistic explanation of the mind and mental events and states. Identity theories were only a part of this list. Saul Kripke, by proposing several arguments, challenged the identity theories and the physicalist philosophers of the mind. In this article, I will examine separately Kripke’s criticisms on the person-body identity and the token-token identity. I will analyze and criticize Feldman’s detailed criticism of these two versions. Then I discuss Lewis’s alternative scheme and his counterpart theory against Kripke’s argument and Feldman’s critiques. I will try to show why Feldman’s materialistic claims in criticizing Kripke’s arguments are not correct. IntroductionKripke has argued against several versions of physicalist identity theories on the mind-body issue. In the last decades of the 20th century, many analytic philosophers have written various papers in defense of or in criticism of his arguments. Among the most famous criticisms are those of David Lewis (1971) and Fred Feldman (1974), which I will try to answer in this article.BodyFeldman, in defense of the person-body identity and also against Kripke’s modal arguments, claims that based on a reading of materialism, ‘the property of being alive is an accidental property of the things that have it. Something can have it for a while, and then cease to have it, without thereby ceasing to exist’ (1974, p. 667). So entities (bodies) that were persons can exist even after death. Or in simpler words, bodies are alive in a contingent and accidental (and not intrinsic) way. And of course, sometimes they would not be such. In my view, the requirement of this claim would be that just as there can be two types of living and non-living bodies, there must also be two types of persons: a living person and a dead person! And it is also assumed that these two, that is, the living body and the living person, are the same, just as the dead body and the dead person are considered to be the same. My claim is that we intuitively and from a commonsensical point of view, accept that the body can be alive or dead, and in both cases, we intuitively accept that the body exists. But we consider being alive or at least having a mental state (such as any kind of consciousness) necessary and essential for being a person (personhood). So a person is alive as long as he or she is a person.I will also try to reinforce this point by offering two counter-examples. In the first counter-example, I try to show that accepting the last bit as a criterion for a person’s survival is based on strange things or leads to non-intuitive ideas. In the second case, I explain that the last bit of a person’s body may be gone, but intuitively we can still consider him a person because his mental states still exist somehow.I also design an ontological test to criticize Feldman’s claim. Since Feldman claims that a person is identical with his body, then as a rule he must accept that as long as there is a dead body in a special place, for example, in a room, exactly in that place a person (a dead person) also exists. A rival view (in defense of Kripke) is opposed to such restrictions; that is, we need not accept that when a person dies, in the exact same place and as long as his dead body exists, a person also exists at the very location. Based on this criterion or the ontological test, the materialist theory gives rise to many limitations as well as unwarranted consequences.Then I explain that Feldman tries to present and criticize various formulations of Kripke’s first argument. But he does not explain in any way what the personhood of an entity, for example, Descartes, depends on. Is it solely dependent on his body and physical properties? Or just dependent on his mind and mental properties? Or a mixture of both types of properties? How long is Descartes the same person as before? How can we know that Descartes (as a person) at time B is the same person as the previous Descartes, for example, Descartes at time A? How long is Descartes the same person as before and since when does that person no longer exist? I think such questions can help us understand why Feldman’s criticisms against Kripke are not so clear and mature; he does not sufficiently explain what he means by the person, and to the necessary extent, he does not clarify why his materialistic conception is superior to Kripke’s or why Kripke’s view against the person-body identity is insufficient or unacceptable.In defense of Kripke’s position about the token identity, it seems that some properties are involved in the individuation of pain, and therefore are intrinsic to pain. The phenomenological position of a pain is intrinsic to that pain. For example, a toothache cannot be a leg pain (the phenomenological position refers to the position where the pain is felt phenomenologically, even though there is no such physical injury in such a bodily location/position). But many relevant aspects of pain are not intrinsic to pains. For example, the physical output of a pain is not essential for it. For example, in the actual world, pains may cause persons to cry only as a contingent fact. It even seems that pain can occur a little earlier or later, or its intensity can vary a little and be the same pain. Thus all properties of pain are not essential to it. Now, why is the coexistence and co-occurrence of pain with C neural firing intrinsic to it?ConclusionThe claim that pain is individuated by C firing is actually without any reason, and on the other hand, Kripke has a good reason to show that C neural firing is not intrinsic to pain because a separation between the two is easily conceivable. Overall, it seems that Feldman’s claims are not correct, and he has not well illustrated the options available to Kripke. Lewis has also criticized Kripke’s argument based on his own metaphysical and semantic foundations (in the counterpart theory), which are not intuitive and acceptable to many. The foundations are, per se, doubtful. Therefore, Kripke’s anti-physicalist modal arguments are still thought-provoking and interesting.

The fate of humans after death holds paramount significance, resonating deeply in both religious doctrines and philosophical discourse. Its intertwining with the concept of bodily resurrection adds to its importance. There are diverse perspectives regarding the nature of human postmortem existence, with some asserting the presence of a corporeal form in the afterlife. Advocates of this stance include Mullā Ṣadrā and Shaykh Aḥmad al-Aḥsāʾī. Employing a content analysis method using library data, this research conducts a comparative study of the works of Mullā Ṣadrā and al-Aḥsāʾī. Drawing upon his philosophical principles, such as the primacy of existence, individuation of existence, substantial movement, and soul-body relationship, Mullā Ṣadrā endeavors to furnish a plausible philosophical account of the nature of the human postmortem body. On the other hand, al-Aḥsāʾī posits a four-layered body for humans, utilizing the framework of multiple worlds and degrees that culminate in descending and ascending journeys. While both Mullā Ṣadrā and al-Aḥsāʾī affirm the presence of a body in the afterlife, they diverge in their explanations of its nature. Furthermore, both perspectives offer distinct interpretations of the afterlife body's identity in relation to the earthly body.

Fateme Sadat Ketabchi[1]
Ancient physical principles assert that all bodies are constituted of four fundamental elements, each possessing distinct qualities. The amalgamation of these elements engenders a unique attribute within bodies termed "temperament," divergent from the inherent qualities of the elemental components (Avicenna, 1383: 57; Suhrawardī, 1373: 198; Mulla Sadra, 1981, vol. 5: 320). Notably, the constitution of the "temperament" differs between living and non-living entities due to varying degrees of element combination, prompting a consideration: why not attribute the distinctive accomplishments of living beings to "temperament" rather than to the "soul"? In "De Anima," Aristotle recounts advocates of this notion and offers critique (Aristotle, 2011, 407b 25 - 408a 10). Aristotle distinguishes between the concepts of "soul" and "temperament," affirming their disparity (Ibid).
In Avicenna's works, he formulates seven arguments to establish the non-identity of temperament and soul, based on criteria such as non-identity of temperament with its collector and maintainer, its active and ultimate cause, the involvement in the movements of living things, the composition as the constituent substance of living entities, the perceiver of perception, the perceiver of rational cognitions, and the self-aware nature in humans. These arguments uniquely position temperament as distinct from the soul, as there is no other candidate for these seven criteria except the soul.
This research aims to critically examine and analyze Avicenna's seven arguments rejecting the identity of "soul" and "temperament," with the purpose of highlighting the limitations of these arguments in distinguishing temperament from the plant soul and the deficiencies in four of these proofs.
Methods and Material
The research methodology employed in this study is descriptive-analytical. This approach involves thoroughly referencing Avicenna's various works to furnish a comprehensive depiction of his arguments. Subsequently, a meticulous analysis of these arguments is conducted through logical formulation to assess their effectiveness in establishing the non-identity between soul and temperament.
The first argument posits that the opposition among the four elements leads to their repulsion and conflict, necessitating a factor beyond temperament for their combination and sustenance — namely, the soul (Tusi, 1375, Vol. 2: 302-301; Avicenna, 1404A, Vol. 2: 26). Similarly, the second argument identifies the purpose of elemental intermingling as the creation of temperament, raising questions about the cause behind this interaction. If temperament is the prime mover of elemental motion, it would imply self-creation, a logical impossibility (Avicenna, 1404B: 63). The third argument contends that living beings' temperament exists in two states: either at pure equilibrium or dominated by a single element's quality. However, it faces criticism due to flawed assumptions about nature's formation from four elements and their inherent locations (Avicenna, 1371: 150).
The credibility of the first and second arguments is questioned due to outdated premises. Modern scientific discoveries reveal that bodies comprise numerous fundamental particles, each with distinct characteristics. Additionally, these particles do not inherently conflict; instead, certain particles, like electrons and protons, naturally attract one another due to opposite charges (Munowitz, 2005: 182). The third argument's foundation on the formation of nature from four elements and the assignment of inherent places to each element is also flawed.
The fourth argument contends that the origin of life in living beings is essential because it is intrinsic to their essence, which is substance (Avicenna, 1404A, Vol. 2: 26; Bahmanyār, 1375: 728-725; Mulla Sadra, 1981, Vol. 8: 27). However, it falls prey to the fallacy of circular argument by assuming that living beings' species are inherently "substantive species."
The fifth argument posits that sensory perceptions are not within the realm of temperament. This assertion is rooted in the observation that temperament doesn't fall into two definitive situations when confronted with sensory forms. It is argued that either temperament does not exhibit any passivity when engaging with perceptual forms, which would imply a lack of foundational conditions for perception (since sensory perception inherently involves passivity). Alternatively, if temperament becomes passive upon perceiving forms, it transforms into another temperament, thereby losing its status as the perceiver of perceptible forms (Tusi, 1375, vol.2: 301-301). Avicenna's sixth argument focuses on human rational perceptions and knowledge. He asserts that neither temperament nor any physical entity possesses the capacity to perceive intellectual forms. This conclusion leads to the impossibility of perceiving rational things through any physical body (Avicenna, 1382: 141-142). The seventh argument employs "self-awareness" to delineate the non-identity between the soul and temperament (Avicenna, 1404 A, Vol. 2: 13). This argument underscores the distinction between the self-awareness associated with the soul and the functions or properties of temperament, aiming to establish their fundamental differences.
It appears that the fifth argument could be supported by accepting certain modifications, effectively demonstrating the discrepancy between temperament and the entity perceiving perceptions. However, Ibn Sina's assertion that plants lack sensory perceptions renders this argument ineffective in establishing the non-identity between the temperament of plants and the plant soul. Regarding the sixth and seventh arguments, if Ibn Sina's arguments for proving the separation of sensible forms from matter are comprehensive, these arguments might not only establish the separation of the human soul from matter but also highlight the distinction between the soul and temperament. However, these arguments primarily focus on demonstrating the variability of the human soul and temperament. As a result, the sixth and seventh arguments primarily just emphasize the non-identity between the human soul and temperament, rather than effectively addressing the non-identity between the animal and plant soul with temperament.
 
"The theory advocating the identity of soul and temperament found numerous proponents historically, gaining support from many theologians and scholars in the field of medicine. Avicenna aimed to refute the validity of this theory through his elaborate set of seven proofs, seeking to establish the distinction between the souls of plants, animals, and humans from the temperament of their respective bodies.
In this research, it was revealed that the first three proofs are incomplete in proving the non-identity of the soul and temperament due to the fact that the principle of physical issues has been invalidated. The fourth argument is subject to circular argument. The last three proofs prove non-identity between temperament and soul; but these three proofs only reveal the difference between animal and human soul with temperament, and they do not have the ability to show the difference between plant temperament and soul.
 
 

One of the common topics of Islamic theology and transcendent theosophy or al-ḥikmat al-muta’āliyah (Arabic: الحکمه المتعالیه) is the “physical creation of soul”. There are two incidental and original approaches in this regard In Islamic theology: the incidental approach considers the soul conditioned on moderate temperament in the body to be created (originated) and the original approach considers the soul like other bodies and considers it as an originated object in an absolute manner. The original view of the soul has also offered different interpretations about the mode of creation (origination): Being accident, sameness with perceptible (sensible) temple, being rarefied body (subtle body), the main part of the body and being indivisible part of soul. The main reason of theologians for creation based on the incompatibility of pre-eternity of the soul with attributes such as the Almighty and All-Powerful for God. In contrast, Mullā Ṣadrā believes in the incompatibility between the temporal contingency (temporal origin) of the soul and its innate immateriality and emphasizes the idea of “corporeality of creation and the spirituality of continuance” (Arabic: جسمانیه الحدوث و روحانیه البقاء). The research is a comparative study and analysis of Islamic theology and transcendent theosophy in the problem of createdness of the soul (temporality of the soul). The difference between theological and philosophical approaches goes back to the ontological and anthropological principles of them. The theory of the soul corporeality creation in theology and philosophy in addition to sharing in some essential concomitants has different consequences such as differences in the criterion of personal identity. The soul corporeality creation from the perspective of Islamic theology and transcendent theosophy by an analytical and comparative method has been analyzed in this article and the intersection points and their distinction are highlighted in the principles and essential concomitants.

Death as one of the most definite and certain events in human life has always attracted the attention of numerous thinkers. Modern philosophers have shown special attention to it particularly in their discussion of the meaning of life. Abul-ḥassan al-‘Āmirī is one of the thinkers in the Islamic tradition whose view of death is of great historical significance. ‘Āmirī mainly pays attention to death while focusing on sensory soul and defines death as the annihilation and separation of sensory soul from the body. He considers sensory soul as the link between the soul (as an immaterial thing) and body (as a material thing) that is annihilated along with the body at the time of death. However, the rational soul is not destroyed. It can be said that ‘Āmirī had a medical approach to the problem of death and was influenced by religious texts at the same time. From the philosophical and religious aspect, ‘Āmirī rejected the M‘utazilites’ view of death and used the term nuz’ (dying) in order to provide a more profound concept and understanding of death. He also presents some arguments for the immortality of the soul and, at the same time, benefits from the concept of “vision” and its different types for a better perception of death. He believes that fear of death is one of the obstacles to a deep understanding of death and maintains that the attention to the necessary joys of life and luminous world and a change of view of death are critical for a more accurate encounter with this issue. One of the weak points of ‘Āmirī’s discussion of death could be lack of a focus on different types of death, particularly voluntary death.

The exposition of the connection between the soul and the body has long attracted the attention of scholars. In a beautiful narration, Imam Ali (peace be upon him) likened the relationship between the soul and body to the connection between "meaning and word". In this writing, we aim to explore this analogy as a hypothesis concerning the relationship between the soul and body, utilizing prevalent linguistic and semiotic theories. An analytical, rational and comparative approach is employed. Hence, the primary question of this investigation is: What are the foundations and shared principles between these two connections (the connection between the soul and body on one hand, and the connection between meaning and word on the other)?This research aims to unveil the general principles shared between word and meaning, as well as soul and body. Principles that are explored include unreality and reality, immateriality and materiality, stability and change, inner and outer aspects, annihilation and subsistence, the originality of meaning and soul, and the subordination of word and body. Furthermore, the transfer of ugliness and beauty between each of word and body, meaning and soul to one another and the layered nature of meaning and soul are explored.

Mulla Sadra has categorized incorporeality into two types: imaginal incorporeality and intellectual incorporeality. Accordingly, he has differentiated the arguments for the incorporeality of the soul into two categories. In the context of proving intellectual incorporeality, Mulla Sadra relies on arguments grounded in the perception of universals. While these arguments are valid and acceptable, they do not apply universally to all human souls according to him.Another group of arguments for the intellectual incorporeality of the soul is presented by the previous philosophers. In these arguments, an attempt is made to prove the incorporeality of the faculty of reason through the independence of the intellect from the body and bodily faculties. This conclusion is made through different means such as: by negating the occurrence of cognitive disabilities concurrent with the aging process of the body, by relying on the unequal effects of thought on the soul and body, and by the independence of certain cognitive functions of the intellect from bodily faculties.The truth is that these arguments, apart from being inadequate in establishing the intellectual incorporeality of the soul, are rooted in the common understanding or experimental knowledge of previous centuries. Therefore, a final judgment regarding them depends on their reinterpretation based on the findings of cognitive sciences. However, some of these arguments can at least be applied in proving the imaginal incorporeality of the soul.

The problem of the soul and its relationship to the body has always been a central concern for mystics and doctors, leading to many debates in medicine. Mysticism is a school of thought rooted in discovery and intuition that arises from the refinement and purification of the soul. Its theoretical foundations are grounded in religious texts, as well as mystical and literary works. This research aims to explain the influence of the soul's health on the body's health from the perspective of Maulavi. The study employs a descriptive-analytical approach, gathering data through library research and content analysis to explore the components ot the soul that influence on body’s health. The findings reveal that Moulvi, drawing inspiration from religious teachings, posits a close tie between the soul's well-being and physical health. A minor shift in the state of either entity impacts the other’s health. Thus, caring for the soul inherently contributes to the body’s wellness, underscoring their interdependent nature. Mystics facilitate a balance and harmony between the soul and body's external and internal dimensions through self-cultivation. Accordingly, the purification of the inner self and soul refinement necessitates enduring physical hardships. This dual process lays the groundwork for the optimal health of both entities. The soul possesses a comprehensive and existential potency that exerts a commanding influence over the body. This dominance is attributed to several factors, including the state of substitution, the spiritual amalgamation of soul and body, the state of Oneness, and the soul’s constructive power.

Thinkers such as Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle and Plotinus have commented on the truth of man since the past. Ameri has also discussed this issue as a Muslim thinker. While expressing different views about the truth of man, he believes that there is nature in citrus fruits, which gives them form and creation, and in all material beings it is the origin of certain works and actions. We face these facts as long as we talk about the human body. After this, we encounter the sensual soul. The speaking breath is a matter of feeling body and soul. He explains the difference between the soul and the body through the difference in belongings, the difference in pleasures, and the difference in the state of old age. He also talks about the distinction between the sensual soul and the intellective soul through sensory and intellectual knowledge, experience. He believes that the body and soul of the senses and the intellective soul in man constitute his truth. He enumerates characteristics such as naturalness, dual dignity, divine, intellectual and inherent nature for the intellective soul.

The quality of soul’s origination in body is one of the most important issues in philosophy of mind. The theory of soul’s spiritual origination along with body, has been assigned to Avicenna in the official statement. Therefore, which soul will manage this imperfect body? Scholars such as Fakhr Razi, Mulla Sadra, and neo-Sadraian commentators such as Hassanzadeh Amoli believe that, according to Avicenna, father's soul was in charge of body at that stage.This study, by looking at this theory again, by considering important role of Avicenna’s body knowledge and using the same expressions quoted by these sages, in the Book of Healing, wants to prove how the origin of the embryo’s soul arises in the sperm. Also, in the justification of the quality of growth in humans, according to the Avicenna, the gradual movement called the concept of evolution has been used, which can be explained only by evolution in substance in the stages of growth. Using these principles, this article tries to prove the hypothesis of origination and substantial evolution in the embryo's soul and body, so that with this reading of the soul’s origination, to solve the problems affecting the way the embryo is managed by.

Understanding the connection between soul and body is one of the complex issues in psychology. Psychologists emphasize the two-way connection between the soul and the body. In this research, an attempt has been made to analyze three types of links between the two in the Holy Quran: 1) the effect of the mental state on the physical state (spiritual-physical), 2) the effect of the physical state on the mental state (physical-spiritual), and 3) the effect of the mental state on another mental state (spiritual-spiritual). The verses indicating the connection between cognition and tears, the effect of sin on the face and appearance, hearing the divine verses and the trembling of the skin, and the relationship between the piety of the heart and lowering the voice, are among the signs of spiritual-physical connection. And the verses that emphasize the connection between crime and hardness of heart, and sin and rust of the heart, are a sign of physical-spiritual connection. The verses that express the connection between divine mercy and the softness of the heart, thoughtfulness, and the opening of the locks of the heart, refer to the spiritual-spiritual connection. The philosophical basis of these three types of mutual influence between the mental and physical states should be sought in the two theories of the soul’s ‘Spiritual temporarily and endurance’ and its ‘Physical temporarily and endurance’. In the present study, using the method of rational analysis, the verses related to each of the three types of links have been re-examined and their psychological foundations have been explained.

One of the issues related to death is the relationship between the soul and the body after death. The question of the research is whether after death the connection between the soul and the body is cut off and the soul has no connection with the body? In this article, with the descriptive-analytical method, the problem of the relationship between the soul and the body after death has been investigated with a philosophical and theological approach. In this matter, while accepting the disconnection of the soul from the body, the author has put forward some points and considerations based on the philosophical and religious approach. The findings of the research show that the relationship between the soul and the body after death is not the same in different people. In perfect souls, because of the strength of the soul, the connection is stronger than in weaker souls and, on the other hand, regarding coexistence of the two during corporeal life,  in the initial time of disconnection of the soul interest from the body, this connection is stronger because of the connection between the soul and the body. In the early hours and days, the attention of the soul to the body is very intense.

Experimental sciences and Islamic philosophy have different explanations for pleasure and pain and the role of the soul and the body in perceiving them. Scientists’ explanation of pleasure and pain is completely physicalistic, and for this reason, they reduce sensual states to purely physical states. Regarding sensual pleasure and pain, Avicenna believes in the equal role of the soul and the body but considers illusory and imaginary pleasure and pain to be among the properties of the physical soul. From his point of view, only intellectual pleasure and pain are properties of the soul as such. On the other hand, according to Mulla Sadra, since pleasure and pain are kinds of perception, and all perceptive powers are abstracted from matter, pleasure and pain are also abstracted from matter. Therefore, what is said in the experimental sciences about the mechanism and physiology of pleasure and pain doesn’t have any relevance in the true explanation of pleasure and pain; they only provide requirements and occasional causes. Examining Avicenna and Mulla Sadra’s explanations of pleasure and pain, we will discuss the positive and negative roles of the soul and body in their formation.

The extreme dualism of soul and body in Descartes' philosophy raises the issue of the relationship between the two. One of the criticisms that opponents of dualism have made on the existence of the soul has been this issue. Gilbert Ryle also raised these issues in his book The Concept of Mind (1949), which he wrote in refuting Cartesian dualism. This issue has been raised and answered by Descartes himself and his contemporaries. But the solutions that Descartes offered to solve this problem were not convincing and finally, to solve (dissolution) this problem, he suggested not thinking about how this relationship is.By removing the gap between the soul and the body, and by using his own principles, such as the principality of existence, gradation of existence, substantial movement, etc., and also by propounding intermediaries such as steamy soul and the ideal body, Sadr al-Muti'allihīn sought an appropriate answer to this problem. In this view, the soul and the body are not separate two distinct entities; Rather, the two are levels of a single truth. Although, based on Sadra's point of view, a better answer can be given to the problem of interaction between soul and body, but this point of view also faces problems and ambiguities. It seems that philosophers, despite all their efforts, have not been able to give a proper answer to this problem, but this cannot be a reason to deny the existence of the soul.

In the ta’wīl (spiritual hermeneutic) of existence and text, facts that are hidden from the external view in the interpretation of the world and text are brought to the fore. As a philosopher, Mulla Sadra has well-founded foundations in ontology that have influenced his ta’wīl style, these foundations can be regulated and the purpose of this article is to deduce these rules and show their effect on the ta’wīl of text. The research method is Descriptive-analytical and based on Sadra's ontology and deals with the inference and investigation of five main rules and several sub-rules (which can be traced in the sub-branches of the main rules), and by mentioning examples of the ta’wīl of text, it shows the effect of ontological rules on the ta’wīl of text. The main rules extracted are the reference of essence to being, ta’wil capacities in being (levels of being), appearance, the ontological basis, compatibility of worlds in ta’wil and reference of plurality to unity. This article shows the philosophical logic of the ta’wil of text, it is considered a ta’wil theory of being, in the form of rules.

Gilbert Ryle, in his book, The Concept of Mind (1949) discussed about denial of mind, identity of mind and mental states, through his physicalism and reductionism approaches. On a basis of Descartes’ dualism, he argued that believing in the existence of mind alongside mental states, is a category mistake that has baffled philosophers. He believed we should not relate mental states to a substance called mind, as we relate physical states to the body; Mind is but a name for a series of applied mental states and has no existence beyond words.
            Ryle’s main issue is his inaccurate understanding of mind’s inception and its connection to the body. It would appear that we can present a different explanation of substantiality of mind and its contrast with mental states by referring to Sadra’s viewpoint of mind’s inception and its connection to the body, which Ryle's problems are not directed towards. According to this information, a substance named mind exists which mental states are based upon.

The current research was conducted with the aim of philosophical-psychological explanation of the relationship between the soul and the body based on Islamic thought, emphasizing the view of Allameh Tabatabai. The findings were analyzed using qualitative content analysis (descriptive-analytical). Investigations have shown that Allameh Tabataba'i has made the philosophical foundations the main support of discussions in Quranic debates, and in some cases he has distanced himself from the method of interpreting the Quran to the Quran. Allameh Tabatabai, following the transcendental wisdom, believes that the relationship between the soul and the body is intrinsic and real from the point of view of Allameh Tabatabai, in such a way that they can never be separated from each other. The soul and the body with all the nervous and hormonal structure are two essences of different nature. The soul is immaterial and the body is physical and has material interactions. The reality of a person is his ego, and the body is a tool for the ego. Interactions in the realm of human existence are sensual activities, and the activities of the body as tools and underlying causes are associated with the activities of the soul, not that there is an independent thing called the activity of the body. In the psychological analysis of the relationship between the soul and the body, many cases of the effects of the soul on the body and the body on the soul were mentioned. Correct understanding in this category helps to find causes in behavioral phenomena and control them. The correct interpretation and analysis of the relationship between the soul and the body and the examination of different theories can be the basis for establishing scientific principles in this field.