جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « حدوث جسمانی نفس » در نشریات گروه « فلسفه و کلام »

Philosophers have presented different views about the whatness and truth of the soul based on dualism (immateriality of the soul based on the pre-eternity and origination of the soul before the existence of the body or along with it) or monism (corporeal origination of the soul). Mullā Ṣadrā believes that the soul is corporeally originated. The principles of the Transcendent Philosophy, including the trans-substantial motion, the principiality and gradedness of being, and the corporeal origination of the soul, have made it possible to demonstrate corporeal resurrection. Aristotle also believes that the origination of the soul is corporeal. However, the extent to which Mullā Ṣadrā is influenced by Aristotle’s ideas in this regard has never been studied so far. This paper is intended to explain the Aristotelean roots of Mullā Ṣadrā’s discussion of corporeal origination following a comparative-analytic method. The findings of this study indicate that in defining the soul as a “natural and organic body” and, following it, considering the soul as a formal substance and a primary perfection of the body, as well as believing in the unitary synthesis of the body and the soul and the unity of the faculties of the soul, all indicating the corporeal origination of the soul, Mullā Ṣadrā is under the influence of Aristotle. Nevertheless, Aristotle’s approach suffers from some ambiguity because of the existing implicitness in some of his words and not referring to an explicit standpoint regarding the principiality of existence or quiddity, presence of motion in substance, and gradedness of existence.

This paper - in order to make a comparative study between Sadra ,s theory and a new western theory about soul s occurrence - first focus on studying and explaining the new theory in philosophy of mind; which called “Emergentism” by contemporary philosophers. The author distinguishes between two version of Emergentism: strong and weak, and describes two challenges against the strong version which have adduced by physicalists.He, then, makes a brief review of Sadra ,s theory about soul ,s occurrence and its ranks, and thus considers the similarity and difference between Sadra ,s view and strong emergentism. The paper by referring to the common aspects of these two theories, believes that most challenges which have made against strong emergentism are reformable versus Sadraism. He, finally, implicates some explications of Sadraist philosophers about mind – body connection, and shows their inefficiency to meet the objections and ambiguities of physicalist philosophers. He believes that Sadra ,s philosophy of mind needs further completion to satisfy this requirement. The main contribution of this paper is explaining the intersections and dissociations of these two theory, and some deficiencies and ambiguities of Sadra ,s view in deal with physicalism.

Mullā Sadrā presented a theory regarding “Self” that based on, the origin source of change and development of the self is the physical mater which undergoes various changes based on “the movement of Essence” and its developments that finally change to spiritual existence. Mullā sadra’s view presents a challenge to a view partly supported by some hadiths which believe in the pre-existence of souls before the bodies. Appealing to rational reasons, Mulla Sadrā refutes the existence of souls before bodies and begins to interpret the creation of souls prior to bodies. He believes that these statements only make clear the existence of reasoning “selves” before emerging the material world.
This article by descriptive-analytical method attempts to present the concept of “Soul” and “self” in the Qurān and in the Hadiths, and to state that soul is an abstract entity related to the domain of commandment; therefore, it can have existence before the creation of body. Where as, “Self” is a representation of “Soul” in the material world. Accordingly, the controversy between the theory of the occurance of “self” and the existence of the souls before bodies is solved

The subsistence of the soul after its parting with the body is one of the most challenging problems in the field of philosophy. This problem has been discussed by both philosophers who consider the soul to be pre-eternal and immaterial and philosophers who believe in the spiritual origination of the soul, and both groups have adduced various arguments in this regard. Khwajah Nasir al-Din Tusi, who is a Peripatetic philosopher, has posed the following question: Why, in the view of philosophers, are the body and bodily preparedness concomitant at the beginning of the origination of the soul but not at the stage of subsistence and separation? He has probed the response to this question in a treatise which he wrote about the subsistence of the soul. At the same time, he asked this question from his contemporary philosopher, Shams al-Din Khusrawshahi, but he did not receive a response. Mulla Muzaffar Hossein Kashani, who was contemporary with Mulla Sadra, asked him the same question, since it seems that the problem of the subsistence of the soul is apparently inconsistent with Mulla Sadra’s theory of corporeal origination. He provided a response to the question of Khwajah Nasir al-Din Tusi and Mulla Muzaffar on the basis of the fundamental principles of his own philosophy and defended the problem of the subsistence of the soul after its separation from the body.

The principles of the Transcendent Philosophy as well as empirical observations indicate that people are different from each other in their primary nature. This explains why they are different in terms of their free will and voluntary acts. The present paper investigates Mulla Sadra’s view of the effects of human nature on their voluntary acts and examines its role in accepting responsibility. The formation of human nature in Mulla Sadra’s philosophy is different from that in other schools of philosophy. In the Transcendent Philosophy, the human nature originates in the material mode of the soul, and the differences among the natures of different human beings are rooted in the differences among corporeal substances. The attachment of this affair to the necessity of the cause-effect relation is the reason why moral responsibility is not explainable in Mulla Sadra’s philosophy. This problem poses certain challenges to Sadrian practical wisdom, the most important of which is the challenge of explaining the system of duty and recompense.

According to Mulla Sadra, motion is passing from potentiality to actuality gradually. He has not meant of substantial movement, the substance is moving, but the movement has been devoted to the being, not to the quiddity, because the essence unified with the being externally. According to Mulla Sadra’s philosophy all originated things are moving in a manner such as covering after covering. Approving the corporeal origination of soul, unity of the soul with its faculties and regarding human beings as the comprehensive being, is the results of substantial motion. He, on the basis of corporeal generation of the soul and substantial gradational motion, regards the human as a corporeal substance at the beginning which then can elevate from matter to quantitative ideas and then to intellectual truths. Accordingly, human souls have many gradations which the lowest is the body, so the souls are changing from one stage to the other.

The expression “corporeality of Soul” in Sadra’s works can be interpreted on the basis of two different views: that of corporeality origination of soul according to which the soul in its initial stages of existence is “imprinted’’ and immanent in matter. In the second view, however, the soul is of “essential relatedness” in virtue of which it has a relative being and thus is existentially related to matter. It seems that without distinguishing between these two views one cannot have a clear understanding of the term “corporeality” as it is used in Mulla Sadra. Moreover, with this distinction one can reach two different interpretations of corporeal origination and spiritual immortality of soul of Sadra both of which seem to have been emphasized by him.

Molla Sadra and Descartes are two contemporary philosophers who emphasize on the fact that soul and body are substances and believe that human being is constituted from both substances – yet one is abstract and the other is materialistic. But the way they distinguish between the soul and the body makes their ideas converse. Descartes believes soul and body are intrinsically different and Molla Sadra believes their difference is not intrinsic – unlike the difference between other beings in the universe - rather they are different in their degrees; he believes that the soul and the body are both a degree of one another. Comparing the two perspectives, the author has named Descarte's view regarding the duality of soul and body 'intrinsic duality' and Molla Sadra's view in this regard 'graded duality'. Finally the author concludes that according to Molla Sadra's view, the duality of the soul and the body as pictured by Descartes is conceptual and hypostatized not real and external.

There are two major theories, in the Islamic philosophy, regarding the reality of the soul and its origination. On the one hand, the Peripatetics believe in its incorporeal origination and survival, while the Sadraians consider it as being corporeal in its origination, and incorporeal in its survival. Normally, people think of Farabi, as a Peripatetic, to belong in the first camp, but it is not true. The authors of is article tries to show that Farabi considers human being as one of the bodies, comprised of matter and form. It remains corporeal before reaching the state of intellect. Only those who can comprehend rational concepts and intelligibles, attain immateriality and posses incorporeal souls. They resemble immortal intellects. Other souls, however, will perish with the corruption of their bodies and annihilate like other animals (and therefore, have no heaven or hell).