جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « شیئیت » در نشریات گروه « فلسفه و کلام »

One of the most complex and important issues in philosophy is its absence and rulings. This article tries to address one of the controversial questions in this chapter, that is, the realization and objectification of non-existence, from some philosophers’ point of views, and finally answer it with the foundations of Mulla Sadra. In Mulla Sadra's opinion, sometimes absence is opposite to existence and sometimes it is symmetrical to existence. The absence that stands in front of existence is nothingness and pure nullity, but the other means the lack of perfection, symmetrical and accompanied by existence; Therefore, among the early and late sages, both meanings have their own supporters, and the author believes that the dual fundamental theory of the existence and nature of Mulla Sadra can be considered as the chapter of the discourse of this conflict. Therefore, the author's new approach in this article aims to prove it by criticizing and reviewing the opinions of a number of supporters and opponents of the realization and objectivity of not focusing on Mulla Sadra's opinions, with a descriptive-analytical method.

According to Mulla Sadra and his Transcendental Wisdom which considers reality being equal to existence to be a self-evident matter, ontology means recognizing reality. However, Muhammad Baqir Sadr tries to show reality to be general and inclusive of existence by denying the self-evidence of this equality. Even though this claim has other advocates like the Muʿtazilites in Islamic thought; however, Sadr is distinguished from them in the purpose of declaring such a claim, its content, and in the arguments presented for it and has formed a well-established view in this regard. To recognize reality, Sadr designates an identifier and strives to discover instances of it based on that. The identifier of reality is that it is independent of the agent’s understanding and validation, and the mind is not active in perceiving it; rather, it is passive concerning the external world. Therefore, any true proposition that denotes the external for us and does not arise from the mind or validation shows us a part of reality. He concludes the actualization of another type of external reality by citing the truth of external theorems where either the subject or the predicate or both do not exist externally and suggests essential reality alongside reality actualized through existence. Although the matter of which theorems are true and essentially what is the criterion of the truth of theorems is an epistemological issue to which Islamic philosophers have responded with the “logical thing-in-itself” argument. However, Sadr pursues the discussion of philosophical thing-in-itself with an ontological approach. Based on the aforementioned identifier, the real world, according to Sadr, is formed of different and heterogeneous matters which are not necessarily present externally. The category of substance, quality, and quantity are realities externally existent; while the reality of connectives, philosophical intelligibles, the category of genitives, the requisites of quiddities, perceptible of the practical intellections and non-beings, are all realities that do not exist externally and are essential. In contrast, according to Mulla Sadra, reality is explained through the foundation of the principality of existence. Principal reality is the individual of existence and all else, like the ten categories of quiddity, philosophical intelligibles, and even … possess reality through existence. The present study strives to first explain reality’s relationship with the following three concepts: 1) existence; 2) quiddity and 3) secondary philosophical intelligibles and examine the way it is affirmed and its important instances. It then compares Sadr’s real world with Mulla Sadra’s ontology and after responding to some of the issues raised against Sadr’s view, concludes that despite the foundational differences in the self-evidence of some of the propositions, they have both utilized similar methods in recognizing reality and have paid attention to the difference between “lack of existence” and “the existence of non-being” in the conflict between argument and self-evidence and have advocated for argument by revising their view regarding an issue that manifests as self-evident. Mulla Sadra considers “the necessity of attribution of the existence of both sides in the context of attribution” to be an argument through which he shunts the self-evidence of the proposition that “non-being attributes do not exist externally” and does not see the inexistence of these attributes externally to be a proof that they do not exist. In contrast, Sadr rejects that “reality equals existence” by citing that “the truth of theorems which do not have a matching existence externally” and the lack of existence of a correspondent of such theorems externally Mulla Sadra,  does not mean that they are not real.

Al-kindi, the first muslim philosopher, has raised the problem of "existence" in the manner of his own. In Al-kindi's works, the term of existence is used infrequently, and instead of it, the term of "cawn" or "ays" in contradiction with "lays" or "enniah" often is employed.In Al-kindi's writings, of course, the term of existence sometimes means perception and conscience. He distinguishes between thing and its essence, and this distinction bear resemblance to the distinction which late-comers draws between existence and essence. According to the total of his writings, it seems that Al-kindi considers thingness and existence as the real and authentic, and that he regards the essence as the abstract, unreal, and mental construct. Although, during the time of Al-kindi, the problem of the reality of existence or essence, as a problem, yet had not become propounded.

Investigating the relationship between two basic notions of existence and thingness (or being and thing) is among the important issues in metaphysical systems. The relationship assumed by a philosopher between these two notions, based on special foundations is effective on his interpretation of the formation of world’s things and the metaphysical condition of non-existents. In the present article, two views of Ibn Sina and Nithin Soman on the relationship between existence and thingness are presented, and since Ibn Sina’s view is considered as a reaction to Muslim theologians’ view, we briefly mention their views as well. Centuries ago the Muslim theologians, and Soman in the contemporary times – each on different bases and with various motivations – believed that the relationship between existence and things is ‘absolute generality and peculiarity’, while Ibn Sina believes in the concomitance of this relationship. Considering the theoretical framework of the discussion, the present article seeks to benefit from the contemporary analytical philosophy’s explanation about the relationship between existence and thingness to better understand Avicenna’s view. More specifically, we are seeking, after comparing the similarities and differences of the views of the two philosophers, to clarify the status of Avicenna’s view. As a secondary goal, we mention one of the most important implications of the discussion (about the relationship between existence and thing), i.e. the metaphysical status of non-existents and the different solutions of the two philosophers for the problem of describing non-existents.

Avicenna believes that existence is either objective or subjective. Indeed، in his view، the existent and object are never separated from each other and their discrimination is analytical and intellectual; existent and object are Mosaveqat. In other words، what is thing exists and what exists is an object. In contrast to the Islamic Theologians، the objecthood is wider than existence، because Sabetat about which we have knowledge do not exist; so there should be a kind of realization and permanency beyond the existence. In the current century، in the tradition of analytical philosophy، Nathan Salmon with Non-serious actualism approach and by using free logic believes that the object is what has property; either existent or nonexistent. The objecthood of object is based on having property، rather than the existence.

In the relation of existence nad quiddity it is well – known that quiddity is subject to existence and is abstracted from it, and more strictly and more analytically it has no status but a shadowy and derivative status in relation to existence. Such an analysis and explanation of quiddity is compatible with the principle of principality of existence and unity of being but there is serious doubt in allowing the ascription of it to those theosophists who have not been in a position to determine one of these two (existence and quiddity) as a most original one, in particular Ibn Sina. In the books of Shaykh there are many phrases in which the quiddities have been considered to have an independent and thingness of their own and a bove it there are books in which Shaykh has dealt with the determination, origination and subsistence of quiddity before the occurance of existence (wether objective existence and intellectual existence or imaginary) and even has located a place and locus for this status of quiddity. On the other hand, searching in Mulla Sadra’s works shows us that although in his teaching method – that in early stage as far as possible he walks in with the ancients and agrees with them – sometimes he accepts a kind of status regardless of existence for quiddity but when he speaks from his own true position with an emphasis on his principles, he negates any thingness independent of existence for quiddity and accepts no status for it except as a shadow in relation to existence.Therefore, on the one hand according to texts of Shaykh which we have at our hand does not confirm the place and qualifications Mulla Sadra accords to quiddity, and on the other hand the fundamentals of Shaykh unlike that of Mulla Sadra does not demand such a necessity.