جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « Avicenna » در نشریات گروه « فلسفه و کلام »

Divine love stands as a pivotal aspect of the intricate relationship between humans and God. Despite its multifaceted presence in theological and mystical traditions, achieving consensus on its nature remains challenging. The inherently personal essence of divine love introduces a level of ambiguity when considering it in the context of an impersonal God, as exemplified by Avicenna's Necessary Existent Deity. Avicenna portrays God as a metaphysical entity characterized by pure transcendence, devoid of personal emotions and passions. In contrast, he positions love as the pinnacle of the human-God connection. This article seeks to elucidate the significance and realization of this love through a semantical lens. While Avicenna provides a comprehensive definition of love as a "propensity for goodness," constructing a cohesive semantic system, the culmination suggests that human love for The Pure Good ultimately sheds any personal attributes. Instead, it transforms into a form of inner metamorphosis, encompassing rational-practical perfection. Hence, articulating divine love in a literal sense seems implausible for The Necessary Existent. Avicenna, in his elimination of dialectics, metaphorically applies divine love to convey a metaphysical rationality and an inner transformative process.

Two general perspectives have been proposed regarding the existential realms of human beings. Proponents of the first perspective believe in two existential realms: the immaterial essence (soul) and the material body, attributing human actions primarily to the immaterial essence. Followers of the second perspective consider humans to be unidimensional and confined to physical existence, reducing all human actions to their physicality, especially the brain, and denying any immaterial essence. The present study aims to elucidate the first perspective by examining Avicenna's notion of the soul's immateriality in the context of critiquing the second perspective. The research method is descriptive-analytical. The findings and results indicate that Avicenna, by presenting elements of proof and various arguments, has endeavored to substantiate the immateriality of the soul through an explanation of the soul's actions. Accordingly, in Avicenna's paradigm, the immateriality of the soul is based on three pillars: intellect, immanence, and independence. Physicalists believe that the belief in an essence independent of the body to explain and understand human perceptions arises from a lack of sufficient awareness regarding the brain's and nervous system's functions and complexities. Furthermore, the claim that bodily changes are due to the body's instrumental relationship with the soul is unprovable. Thus, the denial and critiques of physicalists are formed around three axes: the capability of the brain and nervous system, the ambiguity of philosophy in logically explaining the soul-body relationship, and cognitive ignorance. Avicenna, with seven arguments in proving the immateriality of the soul, responds to the corresponding physicalist critiques. However, two physicalist objections remain ambiguous in Avicenna's paradigm: the inexplicability of the soul-body connection and the objection based on the premise of intuitive understanding.

What role did Avicenna play in the evolution of philosophical thought regarding the recognition of presential knowledge? The clearest example of presential knowledge is human awareness of their own essence (self-awareness), and Avicenna used this self-awareness as the basis for his argument to prove the soul in the "suspended man" argument. However, what type of knowledge is this self-awareness: presential or acquired? Avicenna's statements about this self-awareness sometimes suggest it is presential knowledge and sometimes align with it being acquired knowledge. This article, using a descriptive, analytical, and critical method, examines and analyzes his statements, especially in the book "Mubahathat," where he defends the suspended man argument and addresses questions related to self-awareness. The aim is to clarify the connection between his concept of self-awareness and presential knowledge and to determine the position of his teachings on self-awareness in the development of the division of knowledge into presential and acquired in Islamic philosophy. The result of this research is that Avicenna's concept of self-awareness should be considered presential knowledge, even though he did not use this term and sometimes explained it using terms and concepts related to acquired knowledge. Therefore, he can be regarded as the pioneer in drawing philosophers' attention to this type of knowledge in the history of Islamic philosophy.

Understanding the reality of entities can be approached through two methods a) positively, to discern the essence of the object, and b) negatively, to delineate what the object is not. This study investigates Avicenna's perspective on the essence of the soul. While previous research has extensively explored the positive attributes, this study delves into the less organized negative attributes, shedding light on the soul's distinctions from nature, the Spirit of vapor, temperament, body, corporeality, intellect, and vitality. The significance of the soul's divergence from corporeality lies in its implicit deviation from temperament, the Spirit of vapor, the physical body, and other material elements. Notably, disassociating the soul from intellect is essential to prevent misunderstandings, avoiding the misconception of the human soul as a purely abstract concept. Furthermore, examining the soul's connection with vitality elucidates shared attributes and encompasses a diverse spectrum of entities characterized as living.

Some of Avicenna’s expressions about the rational soul and its relationship with intelligibles specify the union of the intelligent and the intelligible, while others clearly show the invalidity of this theory. This has caused a difference among philosophers after him regarding his final opinion on this issue. Some considered Avicenna's explanation contradictory and took a critical approach toward it, while another group has tried to resolve this contradiction. However, apparently, neither of the two groups has followed the right path. In this article, after evaluating the opinions raised, we have expressed three things: (1) the meanings of important terms in the issue of “union”; (2) the relationship between the soul and intellectual faculties; (3) the semantics of the “union” theory in Avicenna's view and, at the same time, the quality of the union of the soul and the intelligibles in the presence of the body and in separation from it. In general, it seems that Avicenna's statements about the theory of “union” don’t contradict each other. The illusion of contradiction arises from not paying attention to the different meanings of "union" in his works and not distinguishing the various positions that Avicenna expressed regarding the relationship between the soul and the intelligibles. Avicenna proves the union of the soul with the intelligibles and believes that it is similar to the union of matter and form. In his opinion, this union with a special intelligible form exists in the soul together with the body as long as the soul does not turn away from it. However, the soul, by going through the stages of perfection and separation from the body, can become an intellectual world in accordance with the objective world by instantaneously receiving all intelligibles and uniting with them.

In this research, by examining the views of Avicenna and Mulla Sadra, the role of action in the completion of theoretical reason, in two major schools of Islamic philosophy, namely Hikmat al-Masha and al-Taaliyyah, has been considered. The importance of this issue is due to the explanation of the relationship between science and practice in the opinions of these two schools and the evolution of this discussion from the Peripatetic school to the transcendental wisdom. This is important among the metaphysical and moral issues related to the gap between opinion and action. The purpose of the research is to examine the relationship between practical reason - such as ethics and Sharia - and human worldly happiness and its alignment with the perfection of theoretical reason. The results of the research show that according to Ibn Sina, the perfection of the human intellect from the beastly to the useful is through the active intellect, but after the human intellect is actualized, it needs actions in order to connect to a higher intensity and level, through which it is freed from material and physical affairs. And it can be understood and united with general forms, which is the completion of theoretical reason. This theory in Mulla Sadra's opinion, since it considers the soul as the physicality of occurrence, it is also valid in the levels of potential intellect to the actual, that is, there is a two-way relationship between opinion and action in the levels of the soul in the physical, exemplary and rational world. The explanation of Avicenna's and Mulla Sadra's opinions in the field of Islamic philosophy shows the evolution and approach of this theory more clearly, which is analyzed in this research based on the method of dialogue between their opinions.

One of the fundamental topics in the history of philosophy and theology is the issue of the personal identity of human beings during their lifetime in this world and hereafter. Philosophers have studied this issue from different perspectives and have raised conflicting opinions. This question has been raised to some extent by Avicenna and Mulla Sadra, and both philosophers have examined and answered the problem within their philosophical framework. Avicenna believes that mankind is one species whose immaterial soul is personalized and individualized by accidents, and with its survival, the identity and individuation of a human person are still preserved, even though his body has changed or completely destroyed. Mulla Sadra, according to his philosophical foundations, especially the substantial motion, believes that a person's identity is subject to existential change, and this continuous motion coincides with individual unity. Therefore, with the survival of this continuous and comprehensive being, the individual's identity is preserved in this world and hereafter. Accordingly, it can be said that the person in his/her life after death is the same as the worldly one, and in fact, an evolving person goes through sensory, imaginary, and in some cases intellectual stages. Although both opinions, based on their philosophical foundations, have significant and defensible points, they face challenges from the epistemological aspect. In other words, since both philosophers believe that the body –with its terrestrial features- is absent hereafter, how an observer can identify the other-worldly individuals with the worldly ones?

Belief in the substantiality of the human soul is a fundamental point of view for Ibn Sina and is considered one of the foundations of Ibn Sina’s anthropology. The issue of the substantiality of the soul is fundamental for Ibn Sina, because it justify the issue of the immortality of the human soul, and for this reason, he defends this doctrine in detail and citing several types of reasons. Instead, most of the contemporary views in the philosophy of mind deny the substantiality of the soul and consider it as a property derived from physiological and brain processes. Although Avicenna's main reason for the separation of the soul is based on the distinction of intellectual perception from other bodily processes, at the same time, by utilizing other proofs and by using the phenomenological approaches of perceptions and reflection on the relationship between the soul and the body, he also defend the separation and substantiality of the soul and uses this in the construction of the famous proof of the man suspended in space and has benefited from this kind of experimental evidence. In this article, while introducing Ibn Sina's point of view, his arguments are examined from a comparative point of view, taking into account the contemporary views of philosophy of mind and advances in biological and neuroscience, and this teaching will be critically examined.

The metaphysical concept of love in Sinawi philosophy examines the three axes of the essence, reason, and manner of love in Avicenna’s intellectual system, resulting in Avicenna’s theory of love. By examining Avicenna’s views on love, particularly in his treatise on love, it can be understood that he has presented two definitions of love (essence), and in the seven chapters of the treatise on love, he admits that love is a pervasive essential substance throughout existence, and no creature is devoid of this substance. It can, therefore, be argued that love is the cause of the existence of creatures (reason). On the other hand, Avicenna has also explained the flow and dependence of creatures on love under each chapter (manner). The result of understanding and examining these three axes in Avicenna’s views, which is the goal of this research, has led to the theory of Sinawi love, which shows Avicenna’s worldview on love.IntroductionAvicenna is one of the philosophers who has discussed love in various contexts, and it must be claimed that his views on this matter are exemplary. We can extract Avicenna’s theory of love from his opinions. What emerges from Avicenna’s ontology of love is the same theory of love that can be placed alongside erotic love and Platonic love. In other phrases, just as erotic love and Platonic love are recognized as two approaches and theories in the discussion of love, Avicenna’s love will also be a worldview about love and can be recognized as an independent approach in the world of thought. The love found in Avicenna’s intellectual system is a gem that flows and permeates throughout the universe, and the existence and survival of all beings depend on this substance. Our intention in using the term "metaphysics of love" or, in other words, the ontology of love, is precisely this: why and how the existence and survival of beings are dependent on love, and why and how love flows through all existence. The sum of these questions constitutes the main issue of our research. Therefore, the fundamental problem of our research is the metaphysics or ontology of love, which consists of the following four questions as the elements of this issue: 1. Why are the existence of beings dependent on love? 2. How is the existence of beings dependent on love? 3. Why does love flow and permeate throughout all existence? 4. How does love flow and permeate throughout all existence? MethodThe answer to the questions present in our issue is essentially the expression of the metaphysics of love, which we have referred to as "sinawi love" or "Avicennian love" as a concise term for the metaphysics of love in the philosophical system of Avicenna. FindingsBased on this, the metaphysics of love in the philosophy of Avicenna is established on three axes: essence, causality, and modality. In the axis of essence, we express what love is and perform a sort of ontology of love. In causality, we must answer the question of why love is the cause of existence and the survival of beings, flowing throughout the entire universe (i.e., the first and third questions). In modality, we need to examine how the existence of beings is dependent on love and how love flows and permeates throughout the entire world. The ontology of love and the expression of the definition of love according to Avicenna can be approached from both a direct and an indirect perspective, and in both approaches, it can be argued that love is a pervasive essence throughout the universe and present in all beings, and the existence of all beings is dependent on love. In regards to the causality of the existence of love, it must be stated that the reason for the existence and survival of beings is possibly rooted in love. In the first chapter of the treatise, it is mentioned that all possibilities have love because they have an inclination to preserve their perfection and also have a desire to acquire other perfections. Thus, they all possess love, and this love flows throughout all possibilities. In the second to sixth chapters of the treatise, the love of possibilities is specifically discussed, and by examining these chapters, we find that love exists among all vegetative and animal powers (both theoretical and practical), and even divine souls, as they recognize goodness and benefit, are inclined towards love for their own benefit. In the seventh chapter, it is also stated that all beings naturally have love for their own good and benefit, and they also love the manifestation of the Necessary of Existence as they recognize it through their own perfection. ConclusionIt becomes evident that the causality of the existence of love among possibilities is for their existence and survival, and the causality of the existence of love in the Necessary Being is the love for the manifestation of itself. The causality of the flow and permeation of love is such that all possibilities have a tendency towards the perfection of love, and this love, as we participate in it, has become universal among possibilities. The Necessary existence also desires its own manifestation; hence the flow of love is not limited to possibilities alone but encompasses the entirety of existence. The existence of love is described as follows: all beings, including contingent and necessary existences, are in love, and love flows throughout all of existence. Contingent beings have love for the preservation of perfection or the desire to acquire perfection. Vegetative and animal powers are always in love with their desired objects. The love of vegetative powers is natural, while the love of animal powers is voluntary in terms of action but considered natural in terms of purpose. On the other hand, human love and divine souls are considered voluntary in action and ultimate purpose. High and divine souls, due to their perception of the three mentioned elements, are in love with the necessary existence. Furthermore, all contingent beings, in addition to their love for perfection, naturally love the transcendent necessary existence. By examining Avicenna’s perspective on the nature of love and the reasons and ways of its existence in beings, as well as its flow throughout the entire universe, it can be claimed that the metaphysics of love, which encompasses these three aspects, is the theory of love according to Avicenna. In doing so, Avicenna’s conception of love, both in terms of definition and existence, aligns with the theory of love proposed by Avicenna, and further exploration of the elements of this theory will lead to its expansion.

One of Avicenna's renowned intuitive arguments that emphasizes the individuality or distinct existence of the soul is the thought experiment of the 'flying' or 'suspended' man. This argument takes various forms in Avicenna’s works. The central concept across all versions is the imperative nature of cessation or detachment from the soul's faculties to attain self-awareness and confirm the inniyyah (particular existence) of the self. In other words, a focus on particular existence is only achievable through detachment from both external and internal faculties. This detachment unfolds in three stages: withdrawal of attention from the external world, turning attention inward to the internal sphere, and ultimately confirming the Inniyyah, representing the deepest layer of the self in Avicenna’s perspective. Avicenna employs the same approach in his treatise Hayy Ibn Yaqzan, framing it as a journey to acquire knowledge about God. In this treatise, we witness the rational soul's journey, guided by the active intellect, towards higher principles. This journey is predicated on the detachment from faculties. Avicenna consistently adopts this approach in the pursuit of self-awareness and knowledge of God. This methodology is rooted in the interference of the soul's faculties in its path and the necessity of detachment from these faculties for the fulfillment and completion of this journey. The rationale behind this lies in Avicenna's distinctive perspective on the faculties and their relationship to the soul.

The necessity of a prophet's presence in the leadership of Medina and the intricate relationship between prophecy and politics have long captivated scholars in Islamic philosophy. Avicenna, recognizing this connection, linked the prophet to the active intellect as a singular entity independent of the self. He established this relationship in developing a theoretical framework for the leadership of the citizens of Medina. Consequently, Avicenna's exploration of the nexus between politics and prophecy, grounded in religious sources and Avicennan philosophy, stands as a noteworthy achievement in political philosophy. This study endeavors to answer a pivotal question: On what basis did Avicenna validate the connection between prophecy and politics, and which theoretical framework did he rely on to deem the prophet fit for leadership in Medina? Employing a descriptive-analytical case study, this paper delves into a specific facet of Avicenna's political views. Applying Wilhelm Dilthey’s methodological hermeneutics in an interpretive approach, it concludes that the prophet's connection to the active intellect, serving as a link between the perceptible and rational worlds, justifies his political and religious leadership in Medina. Avicenna posited that, with strong intellectual, imaginative, and creative powers—the sources of miraculous acts—the prophet becomes indispensable for guiding Medina toward salvation in both the worldly and the hereafter. The prophet's leadership reaches its pinnacle by aligning his imaginative power and intellective soul (acquired intellect) with the active intellect, along with the realization of the revelation phenomenon, ultimately leading the people to happiness. According to Avicenna, the prophet's intellectual power is inclined to receive the light of the active intellect, attaining a level akin to the holy intellect. This connection prompts people to recognize its absence within themselves, compelling them to adhere to the laws of Sharia. Avicenna thus demonstrated that for citizens to attain salvation, the prophet's leadership is imperative due to his profound connection to the active intellect.

Perception and issues related to the quality of its attainment are crucial in Avicenna's philosophical discussions. He stands as the lone Muslim philosopher attempting to present a coherent theory on forgetting and recalling. Examining the possibility of forgetting and recalling in any scientific subject, and their occurrence for all people, is of utmost importance from the standpoint of epistemology in Avicennan philosophy. This aspect has been investigated in the present research in an analytical-descriptive manner. The questions addressed in this research include: What is the truth behind recalling and forgetting, the degrees of each, and the distinction between recalling and learning? Avicenna's discussions in this field are grounded in his theory about obtaining forms and their entrance into the mind from the outside world, as well as his categorization of different types of sensory, imaginary, apprehensive, and intellectual perceptions. Forgetting is a common attribute among humans and some animals, while recalling scientific forms is unique to humans. The non-materiality of imagination power and its perceptions, coupled with sensory evidence, fundamentally challenges Avicenna's perspective in this field. Learning is the acquisition of a new scientific form, marking a transition from the unknown to the known. On the other hand, recalling involves re-perceiving the scientific form that was previously apprehended.

Avicenna is a political philosopher with a coherent intellectual system. Utilizing this intellectual framework, he analyzed the issues prevalent in his society and subsequently prescribed an ideal order. The key question is: what type of state does his philosophical system deem efficient, and what mechanisms does he advocate for it? It is asserted that, in Avicenna's political philosophy, the state thrives on the governance of the just and prophetic leadership. On one hand, measures grounded in Sharia laws and civic participation are instituted to prevent societal members from the perils of deviation, oppression, and injustice, serving as a deterrent. On the other hand, moderation and equilibrium in society are established through the application of justice. This article employs a philosophical method, both probative and argumentative, to demonstrate Avicenna's intellectual prowess concerning the efficacy of government based on the tenets of his political philosophy. The research findings highlight that the efficiency of the state hinges on preventing corruption in society, the state, and the political system. Moreover, state effectiveness results from the implementation of strategic policies fostering justice and balance, along with the enforcement of laws that contribute to prosperity in both the present world and the hereafter. Lastly, the efficiency of the state is contingent upon contemporary management practices rooted in experiences, expert opinions, and current requirements.

The aim of the present study is to organize Avicenna’s meta-ethical thought, providing a foundation for understanding the ethical system derived from his opinions. The primary focus is on determining Avicenna's overarching approach to the existence of moral attributes and propositions. In response to this inquiry, the author seeks to articulate three models of reductionism rooted in Avicenna's perspectives. These reductionist models could be crafted at the levels of conventional attitude, philosophical attitude, as well as Avicenna's mystical and monotheistic stance towards moral truths, so that it could be possible to establish coherence among them. This article begins by examining Avicenna’s viewpoint in accordance with his logical principles, introducing his constructivist approach – aimed at fame and intellectual agreement – as a model of reductionism at a conventional level. Subsequently, Avicenna's attitude is explored through the philosophical science of the soul and the truth of the happiness of the human soul, leading to the introduction of a form of moral reductionism based on Avicenna's philosophical opinions. Finally, attention is given to his mystical and monotheistic perspective, presenting yet another model of reductionism. The research concludes that, based on Avicenna's discussions in the field of ontology, it is not feasible to adopt a true realist position, as there is no independent truth for moral attributes.

One of the important topics in Avicenna's psychology is the question of whether imagination is material or immaterial. The prevailing view in Avicenna's expressions leans towards its materiality. However, there are instances where he expresses doubts about the materiality of imagination or necessitate the immateriality of imagination. Therefore, Avicenna's perspective on this matter can be categorized into three positions. Firstly, there are instances that affirm his belief in the materiality of imagination, as seen in his book Al-Nafs min Kitab al-Shafa, where Avicenna provides arguments for the material nature of imagination. Secondly, there are instances such as those found in his work Al-Mobahasat, where he introduces the issue of the materiality of imagination and imaginary perceptions with an accompanying sense of doubt. Thirdly, there are positions like the final section of his Al-Isharat wa Tanbihat, where he advocates for the non-materiality of imagination and imaginary perceptions. In this paper, considering "transcendence” as a foundation in Avicenna's thought, these three approaches will be elucidated, and emphasis will be placed on the perspective advocating the immateriality of imagination in Avicenna's thought. It is posited that, in line with Avicenna's transition from peripatetic philosophy to transcendental wisdom, his ultimate stance leans towards the immateriality of imagination. Although he may not have had the opportunity to thoroughly explain it, this aspect of his thinking can serve as inspiration for philosophers like Mulla Sadra in their inclination towards the immateriality of imagination.

The primary focus of this research is the critical analysis of Avicenna's argument for demonstrating the existence of the soul in living beings. The objective is to reconstruct this argument and expose its inadequacy in proving the presence of a soul in plants. Avicenna's argument, as presented in the opening sections of the 'Book of Soul' in his al-Shifa, revolves around establishing the existence of souls in all living entities, equating it with proving the form of the species in all bodies. Avicenna asserts that the five essential characteristics—sense, voluntary movement, nutrition, growth, and reproduction—do not originate from the physical form of objects. Therefore, he posits the existence of a source, referred to as the soul, in certain bodies. This soul is considered the form of their species or similar to it, serving as the origin of these five characteristics. However, Avicenna's argument, grounded in inference through the best explanation, remains incomplete due to a lack of comprehensive exploration of all possible avenues and neglecting potential objections. The authors initially reconstruct Avicenna's argument by drawing on interpretations by Nasir al-Din al-Tūsi and Sadr al-Mutallahin. Subsequently, after highlighting the limitations of these two interpretations, they offer their independent reconstruction, considering all possible divisions. Nevertheless, this argument falls short in proving the existence of a soul in plants, primarily due to objections regarding certain invalidated physical foundations that reject temperament as the source of movement.

In Avicenna's epistemological model, the human soul is likened to a mirror that accepts perceptions, which consist of accidental qualities. So, perception is a kind of representation. The soul has two perceptual domains: the intellectual immaterial domain, which represents universals and essences, and the sensory and imaginal material domain, which represents the characteristics of present and past perceived things. In this model, the appearance of sensory, imaginal, and intellectual perceptions is explained by the theory of impression and abstraction. Explaining how this epistemological model is shaped, it could be imagined that the philosopher introspectively considers phenomenal states of perception, identifies their characteristics, and then seeks to explain them based on his ontological foundations, ultimately proposing a theory of knowledge informed by this consideration. Avicenna recognizes phenomenal characteristics such as subjectivity, accidentality, universality, and particularity among perceptions, and based on his ontological grounds, he establishes an essentialist epistemological model that implies the unity of the perceiver and the object of perception.

In his book on resurrection (Risala al-Adhawiyah) Avicenna has submitted a reasoning revealing the truth of Man and entailing the core concept of the argument of Floating Man. The current research is an attempt to analyze and criticize this reasoning and examine in relation with the notable argument of Floating Man. Besides, this reasoning is compared with the argument of Floating Man in other scripts of Avicenna. In addition to that the progression of the argument is traced back in all writing of the Avicenna and finally one analysis of the argument is criticized. It was discussed that the discussed reasoning entails the critical preliminaries of the Floating Man argument but stands in the need of further development and modification. Thus, in the subsequent works of Avicenna some components are added to and some are removed from the argument through a maturational progress. The evolution of the argument of Floating Man in works of Avicenna submits proofs on his maturational advancement in knowledge from youth to the later stages of life.

In his book "al-Shifā" (The Healing), Avicenna distinguishes between the concepts of possibility and probability and presents three approaches to differentiate these two concepts, although it is evident from the conducted studies that he did not specifically and independently address the issue of probability. In this study, we investigate the distinction between possibility and probability based on the Avicenna's works. The findings suggest that the distinctions which Avicenna made between possibility and probability are rooted in their specific historical contexts. Although most logicians maintain that probability is subjective and possibility is objective, they cannot draw a precise distinction between the two concepts. The second distinction is, in fact, between the future-possibility and the probability of occurrence of an event in the future, which reflects the difference between Avicenna's future-possibility and Al-Fārābī's future-possibility. The third distinction also seems to be a confusion between the meanings of the words 'probability' and 'narrowest-possibility', which has its roots in the translation of Aristotle's works.