جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « Conditionals » در نشریات گروه « فلسفه و کلام »

One of the most perplexing issues in Arabic Logic is the particular quantifier for conditionals. Before discussing particular quantifier at cogent conditionals, Ibn-Sina deals with particular quantifier at categorical propositions and its divisions. But, as we shall see, his explanation at categorical propositions is inconsistent with his discussion at conditionals; and his analogy between the two realms is more confusing than explaining! Despite this, in this paper, I’ll show that by using some branches in Modern Logic, such as second-order logic, modal logic and temporal logic, many of the ambiguities and the objections can be replied. Also, I’ll glance at the reflection of the discussion in some of Ibn-Sina’s great followers: Fakhr Al-Din Al-Razi, Afdal Al-Din Al-Khunaji, Athir Al-Din Al-Abhari, Khaje Nasir Al-Tusi, Shams Al-Din Al-Samaqandi and Qutb Al-Din Al-Razi. I shall show haw far they are from Ibn-Sina. Besides, it will be clear that their distinctions between contingent conditional and particular cogent conditional are very weak and, indeed, cannot help any way to understand the distinction.

Sentential connectives in classical propositional logic, according to their definition, are truth function. Contemporary philosophers of logic and language propose two main theories regarding truth functionality of counterparts of the sentential connectives in natural language. Some (including Strawson 1952; Mitchel 2008; Young 1972; Read 1995) have argued that counterparts of the sentential connectives in natural language are not truth function; on the other hand, others (including Grice 1975; Clark 1971; Jackson 1979) propose arguments for their truth functionality. Grice's (1975) defense of truth functionality of conditionals ("if…then…") in natural language which is formulated on the basis of the ideas of assertability and implicature has had a central role in the literature of recent decades. The main goal of this paper is to consider and criticize Grice's defense of truth functionality of conditionals in natural language.

In this paper, Avicenna’s disjunctive propositions are treated from multiple aspects. In the first section of this paper, disjunction propositions are considered in Shifā, and it shown that there are differences between Avicenna’s and later interpretations, e.g Rāzī interpretation, in this point. In the next section, two general interpretations about Avicenna’s disjunctive propositions are studied and we reveal deficiencies of them. Based on “Confilict” concept as the main core of Avicenna’s view on disjunction propositions, this paper specifies Relevent-Modal interpretation more precise than others but it doesn’t precisely coincide with Avicenna’s view. Finally an alternative interpretation is suggested with respect to Stopper view on Stoic conditional and we show that this interpretation also has deficiency but it formulates Avicenna’s disjunctive propostions better than others.