جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « Moral Responsibility » در نشریات گروه « فلسفه و کلام »

Justice is one of the oldest concepts that mankind has known since the beginning of its civilization and has tried to establish it. Justice has different forms, which can be referred to as social, political, economic, etc. In this, criminal justice is of special importance. Scientists and experts in social sciences have considered several factors effective on criminal justice, among which principles such as the principle of acquittal and the principle of legality of crimes and punishments, as well as the personal nature of criminal responsibility, are important, but criminal responsibility is of particular importance among them. It is necessary to carry out serious scrutiny in this regard and conduct ethical attitudes towards criminal justice, especially collaborative criminal justice, in a scientific manner. Ignoring the areas of moral responsibility in the field of criminal justice violates the right of those referring to the judicial system and causes injustice. Therefore, paying attention to the character and human dignity of people is a necessity of collaborative criminal justice. The present article deals with the ethical attitudes in the field of collaborative criminal justice with a library method and has answered many unknowns in this regard.

Using a descriptive-analytical method, this paper explains the psychological conditions of moral responsibility, analyzes Mûllā Ṣâdrā’s viewpoint in this regard, and expresses its similarities with the views of some contemporary compatibilists. The conditions of moral responsibility can be divided into two kins: 1. the cognitive conditions and 2. the controlling conditions, which include: a) the power and ability, and b) the will and freewill. In his emphasizing on the cognitive and controlling conditions of considering the agent as responsible, Mûllā Ṣâdrā uses both rational and philosophical principles and the religious texts such as the Qur’an and Hadith. By expressing the condition of mental maturity and health for the responsible agent, Mûllā Ṣâdrā has emphasized on the normative characteristics needed for responsibility, and his viewpoint is similar to Frankfurt’s view of “the true self” and Fischer’s and Wolff’s views of “normative desert”. Also, based on the foundations of Transcendent Philosophy, we should talk about the degrees of having normative desert, based on which responsibility will be a graded thing, and its scope, intensity and weakness will be different in human beings. Thus, the responsibility of human beings is not the same, and every human being has a moral responsibility according to his existential degree and his abilities and capacities.

"Responsibility" means asking someone for something and it is used in cases where the petitioner can follow up on his request from the respondent and question him about his behavior in accordance with or against his request and its consequences. Knowledge, authority and power are considered as conditions of moral responsibility. A group of determinists believe that there are laws that question a person's moral responsibility. Discoveries in the field of genetics have fueled these views in recent years. But in the past centuries, the Akhwan al-Safa explained the influence of these natural factors such as temperament, weather, astrological rulings at the time of birth, etc. on ethics at the beginning of their treatise on ethics, but continued with the plan of dividing ethics into "centered" ethics. and "acquired", shows that these factors do not lead to predestination and lack of control and moral responsibility is still established. Addressing the impact of these issues on the part of the Brotherhood is because by planning these factors, the ground can be prepared for people to live more morally.

The first condition of moral responsibility is discretion. In order to explain free will in ethics, Ibn Sina deals with the intellectual foundations of goodness and badness for how virtues are created in humans. According to Ibn Arabi, this is the case that moral virtues are the union with the fixed virtues of man, which is the manifestation of one of the names. In the present study, an attempt has been made to compare the viewpoints of these two Islamic philosophers in the field of human agency in the realm of moral responsibility.

Ibn Sina emphasizes that goodness and badness in the sense that they have ontological aspects can be inspired by the Sharia and active intellect and by revelation to the Prophet and be the basis of practical and moral laws. The answer to the problem of reparation in the will of man, which arises for man due to the obligation to the divine Sharia, is that the perfections of moral limits are found from the Sharia, but then the theoretical powers of man take possession of it through knowing the laws and applying them in detail. Is possible. In Ibn Arabi's view, predestination has an ontological aspect, but man's knowledge of his fixed object and the will to unite with it gives man a kind of free will to create moral virtues. The difference between Ibn Sina's and Ibn Arabi's theories is in the philosophical approach, Ibn Sina's "science and will of mercy" and the theological-mystical approach, Ibn Arabi's "personal unity of existence".

Aristotle’s theory of moral responsibility, as a pioneer theory of ethics of virtue, presents a new approach to responsibility because of its particular attention to moral conduct. Aquinas, a follower of Aristotle, has provided a new interpretation of moral responsibility with an emphasis on character and a focus on completely voluntary human acts and the role of apriori reflection on act. In the views of these two philosophers, moral agent is an agent who possesses knowledge, personality vice, and the ability to perform completely voluntary acts. Accordingly, children and animals are never subjected to moral evaluations because they lack such moral capacities and characters. Aristotle and Aquinas believe that the realm of moral agents, in addition to evil and virtuous people, includes restrained and non-restrained ones. Following a descriptive-analytic method, the present paper investigates the conditions under which the acts of moral agents are subjected to ethical evaluations in the views of Aristotle and Aquinas. Based on the findings of this study, those acts that become the subjects of moral responsibility must be done voluntarily based on the moral character of the agent as a non-accidental stimulus for act, even if they do not originate in deliberation and are not based on prior decision making. This is because sudden acts also originate in certain sources and function as clear references for moral evaluations.

Emphasizing the need to pay attention to the environmental crisis, the current research has dealt with the most important attitudinal roots of the creation of this crisis with a critical approach. "Man's exclusive consciousness", "distorted teachings of the Torah and the Bible and inappropriate interpretations of it", "honoring human rights" and "staying away from natural Islamic teachings" are among these roots. This research, with the method of library data processing and with a descriptive-analytical method, considers the best way out of this crisis based on religious teachings, "paying attention to the correct attitudinal foundations" and "morally responsible attitude" of humans in facing the environment. . This attitude is formed on the basis of "belief in the obligation to respect plants and animals", "belief in moderation in the use of the environment", "belief in the inherent value and public life" and "belief in responsibility combined with trustworthiness". . In this view, the environment, in addition to its inherent sanctity, also has instrumental sanctity and aims to achieve human perfection, which should not be treated in any way.

In this study I have tried some meta-ethical reflections on moral responsibility involving disinformation. For this purpose, the conceptual analysis and the reflective equilibrium methods were used. Then, the study was focused on the conditions that this phenomenon occurs. Thus, I first tried to examine whether committing disinformation is a moral dilemma. I used some citations to philosophers and some examples to show dilemmatic view of moral problems is logically fallacious. In the second step, it has examined that whether committing disinformation takes place in the pressure condition and then, the possibility of moral decision in pressure condition was examined. The outcome of study in second step showed that ideal morality fails to explain actions in pressure conditions and implications of care ethics and doing best practices is the best way for doing in such conditions, if the provision of “helping to elimination of poverty and bridging the gap between poor and wealthy” fulfilled. In the third step, I tried to examine disinformation in the context of akrasia and weakness of will and the possibility of them from the moral philosophical point of view. By reviewing arguments of some philosophers, I introduced will and wish as a building blocks of the akrasia and weakness of will phenomenon. Then, 8 rules were predicted for determining moral responsibility in akratic and weakness of will conditions. At the end, i proposed the Fischer’s “Moderate reasons responsiveness” idea for determining moral responsibility in the “irresistible wish” condition.

Tusi wrote works in the name of Ismaili elders and in those books he praised the elders of this sect. There is also a serious possibility that during his presence in this sect, he wrote treatises confirming their religious beliefs. But tusi, a Muslim scholar, is considered to be one of the twelve Imami Shiites, and based on moral responsibility, he is obliged to protect the correctness of the beliefs of his fellow believers, and morally, he cannot approve and promote the beliefs of other sects. Based on our inference from the method of statistics and analysis and comparison of related data, in addition to his explicit statement in the rewritten preface of Akhlaq Naseri, it follows that freedom in choice and agency in action, which The main conditions of moral responsibility were not there during the time of Khwaja''s presence among this sect. Therefore, he cannot be held responsible for the possible consequences of writing those books in support of the beliefs of this sect.

The main issue of this article is how to harmonize determinism and moral responsibility (the classic problem of free will) by reconsidering the philosophy of Avicenna. Certainly, Avicenna believes in determinism and in various works has emphasized the necessity of the effect by its sufficient cause. Avicenna, on the other hand, certainly believes in the moral responsibility of autonomous agents, including human beings. We have shown in the first step that he denies free will in the libertarian sense (the ability to do otherwise) for any agents; Because this notion of free will requires objective possibilities and is not compatible with causal determinism. Avicenna has identified a new type of voluntary agent who does not need to have an over-intentional intention to do something. Here, he looks very similar to proponents of agent causation; His idea, however, was not intended to defend a libertarian notion of free will, but to get rid of the challenge of the infinite regress of wills. Hence, Avicenna can be considered one of the few proponents of the "compatibilist agent causation." In the second step, an overview of Avicenna's theory of action is drawn. Here, in particular, emphasis is placed on the activity of the soul in the stages of the causal process leading to action, and the quality of these activities is introduced as a criterion for the morality degree of the agent..

Assuming responsibility for other human beings has been amongst ethical issues which is underlined in different ethical schools of thought and justified through various argumentations.  The current research is an attempt to investigate this issue in the light of the normative theory of divine command and enjoy the divine books to answer this question that why Man is required to feel responsible and benevolent toward other human beings. Accordingly, major reasons and components of this issue are explained in keeping with the divine books. It was revealed that God is the primary source of human responsibility toward others. The incentive of divine promise, divine love and giving thanks to the most beneficent as well as human resemblance to God and His succession on the earth  as a divine creature are amongst major reasons and components in theories of divine command which motivates Man toward feeling responsibility and benevolences for others.

Revisionism about moral responsibility is the view that there is a difference between descriptive account – as we think- and prescriptive account - as we ought to think- about moral responsibility. It is a Revisionist view to believe that (1) the folk intuitions of moral responsibility are incompatibilist, (2) the incompatibilist conception of moral responsibility is incorrect, and (3) the folk intuition of moral responsibility must be reconsidered. Vargas calls the revised concept of responsibility "the responsibility system" and believes that this new concept has all the functions of the previous concept; In other words, it can provide a new justification for individual and social activities that we have formed based on the traditional concept of responsibility - such as blaming, praising, punishing, etc. But it seems that because the model of justification in "the responsibility system" is forward-looking, it is not able to justify retributive justice. At the same time, Vargas must be able to defend the revised concept of responsibility against the "four-case manipulation" argument. This defense is shown to be unsuccessful.

The whole human will be known in Islam by the Mu'tazila theologian sect. Judge Abdul Jabbar is a prominent thinker of retreat with the aim of defending divine justice and explaining its compatibility with the issue of duty as well as moral responsibility, considers human actions independent of the Divine Will. On the other hand, in contemporary Western philosophy, Roderick Chizam introduces himself as the ultimate source of action in order to explain the compatibility between human causality and the principle of causal necessity. In this study, by using analytical-descriptive method, while expressing the views of both thinkers on human moral responsibility, will be expressed that despite the fundamental differences in the worldview of Chizam and Judge Abdul Jabbar on matters such as human nature and the types of causality in the world, on the issue of human free will, there is a kind of coherence and closeness, However, by accepting the total independent will of man, both thinkers, while being caught in a non-monotheistic view, have achieved wrong conclusions about human activity.

The present paper analyzes and evaluates Michael J. Zimmermann's view on the relationship between moral luck and moral responsibility. In moral philosophy, this relationship is considered from conceptual and subjective aspects. Conceptually, in moral luck, people’s moral judgments about each other are based on involuntary and chancy actions while the moral responsibility of these judgments are based on free actions. Moral luck, concerning its subject, faces a problem that involves old discussions about the conflict between determinism and free will and moral responsibility that goes beyond that problem. By accepting freedom as having volition and desire in action and initiating a difference between the degree and scope of moral responsibility, Zimmermann, a well-known philosopher, denies moral luck and defends moral responsibility. He also claims to have solved the problems of moral luck and moral responsibility. This paper, after exploring the meaning and relationship between responsibility and moral luck, explains Zimmerman's view on moral responsibility, freedom, and rejection of moral luck. Ultimately, an assessment of this view will show that, despite Zimmerman's innovations, his extremism in defending moral responsibility has made it difficult to accept his view.

This article examines Manuel Vargas’s revisionism, which is a theory of free will as a condition of moral responsibility. In this theory, both diagnos tic and prescriptive account of free will and moral responsibility in commonsense are explained. The diagnos tic account describes commonsense beliefs about free will and moral responsibility and prescriptive account aims to tell us how we ought to think about free will and moral responsibility. Commonsense intuitions about free will are Incompatibilis t and especially Libertarianis t. But prescriptive account can’t be Libertarianism, since it has to assume indeterminism specifically in the subjective decision-making process, and this goes beyond the available evidences. It also can’t be Eliminativism, because we can revise common sense about these things, in a way that to be consis tent. The prescriptive account is a kind of Compatibilism, free will, in this regard, is the ability to recognize moral considerations and guide their behavior in the light of these considerations. At the end, Vargas’s use of Consequence Argument, citing empirical evidence, the use of a Compatibilis t concept of can and relying on Libertarianis t norms for interpretation his Prescriptive account has been criticized.

Global poverty is one of the most important challenges encountering human beings. Thousands of people die every day and 18 million people die every year as a result of poverty and its problems. The main question in this regard is whether the rich have a moral responsibility for poverty or not. Taking advantage of descriptive-analytical methods, this article examines the views of Peter Singer, John Rawls, Amartya Sen, Martha Nussbaum, and finally Thomas Pogg, and asserts the critiques of each. Each of them seems to be facing serious challenges in proving moral responsibility for the poverty of the needy. Finally, it explores this issue based on Islamic thought and believes that according to the Islamic moral system (practical intellect in the sacred wisdom of Islam in terms of the taste of the Shari'a), it is necessary and apt to rule the need to help the non-disobedient non-Muslim needy.

Does Artifacts Have Morality?Bruno Latour and Technology Ethics In this paper, discussing Bruno Latour’s concept of technological mediation, we will claim that according to three kinds of technological mediation there would be three kinds of relation between morality and technology; Technology is part of our ethical actions, we delegate some of our ethical actions to technology, and technology can create, or change our, ethically important intentions. We will then discuss moral responsibly. Separating responsibility from accountability, we will show that networked actions do not nullify human’s moral responsibility or do not grant moral responsibility to technology, yet meaningfully, we can talk about "technology punishment.

Moral responsibility is one of the most philosophical subjects with practical significance. Based on this practical significance, P. F. Strawson argued that we can, and we should, ground our theory of moral responsibility on the reactive attitudes like blame and praise free-will-debate freely. In this paper, we study Strawsonian approaches that are known as reactive attitudes approach. For this, we propose “history challenges” for this approach. Then we argue that this approach can be successful against these challenges only by grounding a limited notion of moral responsibility on a limited list of reactive attitudes as Scanlon did. We argue that although Scanlon’s theory is not intuitive, it has the virtue of self-consistence. We also show that there are two levels of responsibility that Scanlon’s “two forms of responsibility” better describes it than the popular Attributability-Accountability distinction. We also show the significance of this limited, but successful, case of reactive attitudes approach.

Readiness for change as the guarantor of the survival and development of organizations can be developed effectively in the light of moral philosophy and moral responsibility. The aim of this study was to investigate the relationship between moral philosophy and readiness for change with the mediating role of moral responsibility. This is a descriptive-correlation research. The study population includes all employees of Bu Ali Sina University. 165 employees were selected by using stratified random sampling as sample group. Data were collected by three standard questionnaires; moral philosophy, readiness for change and moral responsibility. Data were also analyzed by Pearson correlation coefficient and path analysis. The results showed that the relationship between moral philosophy and readiness for change (emotional, behavioral and cognitive) with mediating role of moral responsibility was positive and significant. Therefore, moral philosophy and moral responsibility should be attended to improve readiness for change at universities