جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « grace » در نشریات گروه « فلسفه و کلام »

The Holy Quran and a number of hadiths refer to the fate of a person, that is, happiness or misery. Khwaja Yusuf Hamadani (440-535 AH) is one of the devoted- to-law Sufis who presented his distinctive views on happiness and misery in detail in the book Al-Kashf ‘an Manāzil al-Sā'irīn ilā Allah. Khwaja has also discussed this issue in Rutbat al- Ḥayāt. Al-Kashf is the most detailed work of Khwaja, but it has not been edited and published yet. In this article, based on the newly found manuscript of al-Kashf, we have extracted, examined and analyzed his views about happiness and misery. Theologically he belongs to a Maturidism. The result of this research is that Khwaja, with the support of his Maturidism and Sufi teachings, has shown that happiness originates from God's grace and misery from God's justice, both of which are God's acts that the servant obtains them through servitude. In other words, they seem to be in opposition to each other, but they both come from the Real.

Discussion about the divine attributes has a long term history in theology and philosophy. Among all of the divine attributes, “knowledge” has received more attention because of its effectiveness in determining all of the verbal issues related to interpretation of this divine specification. Avicenna and Duns Scotus are representatives of the two main theories about the Gos’d knowledge among the Islamic and Christian philosophers whom I have studies and compared in this research. The main difference between these two philosophers in divine knowledge can be recorded as Scotus’ God is a purposeful actor (fa’el-e bel-qasd), however, Avicenna introduces the God as the wise and single-minded actor (fa’el-e-bel-enayah) justifying the creation based on the grace. While there is this big difference, there are many similarities between these two opinions; such as, both of them consider God as a cause for creation. Both believe in existence of creatures in divine knowledge before their real creation without considering reasonable forms or platonic parables as separated creatures. Both of them believe that God has no other purpose except for his essence for creation of universe or human.

Parmenides and Xenon’s argument for denying motion turned this issue from its obvious form into a theoretical one for the first time. Aristotle showed the possibility of motion with the theory of force and action, but did not offer an argument for the existence of motion. Many philosophers after him, without mentioning the issue of acknowledging the external existence of motion, seem to have taken its externality for granted. Ibn Sina considered the argument for the external objectivity of motion to be metaphysical, yet he made no attempt to prove the external existence of motion. However, we can derive arguments from all of his works and ideas to prove the objectivity of motion. In this article, the theory of grace has been used as an argument for the objectivity of motion. Since grace is the permanence of the divine act, and hindering the series of causes is impossible, the occurrence of time is the same as motion. In other words, the continuity of divine grace is nothing but movement. This movement has manifested itself in material objects. His view of time and its relation to objects is also presented as another argument for proving the externality of motion. Ibn Sina considers the existence of time as a proof of the existence of objects.

One of the most important and most complicated discussions in theology is the divine knowledge rooted in God's essence and extending to His attributes and actions. We have investigated this issue under the title of the orders of divine knowledge in the transcendental philosophy and concluded that those orders are four. They are as follows: (a) Grace (ʿināyat) with fifteen features, the most important among which are knowledge, causality and divine eternal consent of the best system; (b) Divine Decree (qaḍāy rabbānī) which includes rational and general forms of all beings in the universe in divine domain with features of collectiveness, synopticness, simplicity, and innovativeness; (c) Providential Knowledge (qadar ʿilmī) which includes minute and detailed forms of all beings in the world of celestial souls; and (d) External Providence (qadar khārijī) including the minute forms in the external matters. The Grace has no position, and the Providence and Decree have [certain] positions. The position of Decree is the Sublime Pen and the Preserved Tablet, and the position of Providential Knowledge is the non-sublime pen and the Effacement and Affirmation Tablet. And the position of the External Providence is the material world. Due to regarding both the immateriality of 'the known' and the immateriality of 'the knower' as [necessary] condition in knowledge, Mulla Sadra does not consider the external providence as the last order of divine knowledge, except through the scientific providence, which is free from objections for some thinkers.

The purpose of this article is to examine and answer this fundamental question: Given that the theory of grace in Ibn Sina's thought means grace and the "necessary" overflow of beings from the Almighty, how does this theory conform to the divine will? In other words, how can one combine "necessity" and "will" in the context of the theory of grace, when in appearance these two categories negate each other? Based on the metaphysical foundations of Ibn Sina's theology, the author has reached the following conclusions First, the theory of grace in Ibn Sina's thought is based on certain metaphysical and theological principles and principles that in some respects have the same principles and principles as Ibn Sina's philosophy. Secondly, for this reason, the theory of grace can be understood only on the basis of the same principles. Thirdly, according to Ibn Sina's view of the principles of beings, the structure of the universe, the essence and attributes of transcendence, especially his objective knowledge and will, the necessity of grace is not only not contrary to the divine will; Rather, it arises from his essence, knowledge, will and obligation. That is, the world is an essential requirement of the obligatory essence according to its essential will; Therefore, no possibility other than the Supreme Being can impose a necessity on him. The difficulty of und

In this study, we shall assess the claim concerning the negative effect of sin and positive effect of grace on proper function of reason and cognitive faculties through the lens of the Calvinist tradition and the Reformed Epistemology. Although the noetic effect of sin has already been discussed probably by tracing the role of the non-epistemic factors in acquiring knowledge in general, approaching the issue by focusing on ‘scientific knowledge’ is novel and, to the best of my knowledge, has not been attempted before. This study will be developed by means of an evaluation of Stephen Moroney’s project. Through a critical survey of the views of a number of prominent Christian theologian, he tries to develop a model for the cognitive influence of sin. In our review of his work from the canons of Critical Rationalism, we shall try to show that Moroney's conclusions are inconsistent with his explanation of the effect of sin on the natural sciences. Our main arguments are as follows: what Moroney describes as scientific knowledge from a Christian point of view is more a technological awareness rather than scientific knowledge proper. Furthermore, it is the scientist who is affected by sin and not his scientific claim.

For Paul Tillich, "symbolic language" is the only appropriate means of expressing, analyzing, and examining religious subjects that transcends the ability and limitation of conventional worldly terms, as well as the conceptual language of philosophy. The purpose of the present study is to demonstrate the feasibility of analyzing issues such as "divine grace", "inductive virtues" and "delightful vision" in the philosophical theology of Thomas Aquinas with a symbolic language approach. The theory of "symbolic language", because of its contradictory and polar features, provides an understanding of the divine bliss, divine grace and inductive virtues in its context. It also views these issues as symbols that are appropriate answers to the fundamental and existential issues of human. On this basis, it can be said that God's grace is a response to the issue of "inherent sin" and the defects of human nature. Induced virtues are a response to insufficient acquired virtues to achieve supernatural happiness. The delightful vision is a response to one's desire to know the beginning and the origin of the existence. And true happiness in heaven is a response to man's natural desire for eternity with peace and goodness.