جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « quantified conditional » در نشریات گروه « فلسفه و کلام »

Avicenna has presented various discussions about hypotheticals. In these discussions, he has sometimes used a quantified hypothetical propositions and sometimes a non-quantified hypothetical propositions. Why did Avicenna do this? In this article, we answer this question. In this way, we will first examine the way quantifieres enters the discussion of hypotheticals by Avicenna. Then, we have attended the question of why Avicenna used a non-quantified hypothetical propositions along with of a quantified hypothetical propositions, and examined the possible answers one by one and selected the most appropriate one. We have shown that in all the discussions where Avicenna used a non-quantified hypothetical, he is repeating the opinions of previous logicians. While quantified hypotheticas discussions have been formed regarding the discussions related to quantified predicatives. Alto summarize, it seems that the relationship between quantified hypotheticals and non-quantified hypotheticals is not clear to Avicenna, and this issue is the origin of the dual structure of hypotheticals in Avicenna's works, as well as some disagreements after him about the theory of hypotheticals.

In Muslim’s logic of conditionals there is a consensus that the value of necessity conditional is defined by relationship between antecedent and consequent and not by the value of antecedent or consequent. However, in their opinions there are discussions on possibility of truth or falsehood based on value of antecedent and consequent. In some of the Muslim logicians’ texts beside of truth and falsehood a different status is mentioned with different terms such as probable false and true, unknown true and false, etc. Examining the nature of this status is the main question of the current text. In this paper, by reviewing different views of Avicennian logicians it’s shown that this classification is related to discussions on conditionals before introducing quantified conditional by Avicenna and Avicennian logicians attempted to accord it with quantified conditional, we showed that from the opinions of Avicennian logicians the opinions that don’t accept third condition as a participant of truth and falsehood are closer to the fundamentals of Avicennian’s logic.