جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « quiddity » در نشریات گروه « فلسفه و کلام »

The primacy of existence (aṣālat al-wujūd) serves as the basic and fundamental pillar of transcendent philosophy, and all the ingenuity of Mullā Ṣadrā is a direct result of it. Various interpretations of Mullā Ṣadrā about the posteriority and unreality of quiddity (māhiyyah) have led to the formation of a range of interpretations by the proponents of transcendent philosophy. This article examines the correct interpretation of the role and position of quiddity in four stages. At the first stage, the locus of conflict between the primacy of existence and the primacy of quiddity is elucidated. At the second stage, by accepting the primacy of existence, various interpretations of the position of quiddity are examined. The third stage addresses the impact of different interpretations of the primacy of existence on the theory of substantial motion. The fourth stage demonstrates which interpretation the theory of substantial motion fundamentally supports and endorses. The findings of the article, based on a descriptive-analytical approach, indicate that in the issue of the primacy of existence, considering quiddity as a mental concept (i'tibārī) is akin to a mirage, as interpreted by ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī. It appears that the theory of substantial motion, while confirming this interpretation, has a greater compatibility with it. Some researchers have suggested that accepting ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī's interpretation somehow negates nativism and leads to falling into idealism or perhaps nominalism. However, it must be noted that: Firstly, in this interpretation, the external existence of physical universal is not only not negated, but it also has a greater compatibility with the foundations of the primacy of existence. Secondly, the interaction of the mind with objective reality demonstrates that quiddity is not solely a construct of the mind, but due to existence of a real source of abstraction, it signifies the external reality.

Philosophers and theologians before Mullā Ṣadrā had diverse views about the ontological status of existence. Paying attention to their opinions is very important to understand Mullā Ṣadrā's doctrine of ontological priority of existence. On the other hand, philosophers and theologians have dealt with this issue in different positions, and in some cases, there seems to be an apparent inconsistency. In contemporary works, there is no comprehensive examination about these diverse views. This article seeks to shed light on this issue. Peripatetic philosophers considered existence to exist and most likely considered it to be an accident. Suhrawardī and his followers criticized this opinion and considered existence as a secondary intelligible and non-existent. Many later philosophers and theologians also preferred Suhrawardī's viewpoint. While denying that existence is an accident, some theologians considered it to exist outside but to be identical with quiddity. They thought that their view is immune to Suhrawardī's criticisms. According to this opinion, for existence to exist, it does not need to be an accident to quiddity. Another related problem was that philosophers maintained that the universal concept of existence has external instances called particular beings. This is incompatible with existence being a secondary intelligible. ʿAbd-al-Razzāq Lāhījī tried to resolve the inconsistency. According to Lāhījī's solution, existence is external, but does not exist in external reality. This solution can be criticized.

In the fourth chapter of Pointers and Remarks (Al-Ishārāt wa al-Tanbīhāt), Avicenna draws conclusions from the univocality of extension within a certain category, positing the existence of an immaterial entity alongside materialistic extensions. Avicenna’s treatment of the relationship between universals and their extensions often resembles the familial bond between fathers and sons (plurality within plurality). However, in the fourth chapter of Pointers and Remarks, he introduces a novel model akin to the relationship between a single father and his sons (unity within plurality). By examining interpretations and comments on Pointers and Remarks, we delve into this conceptual tension. While Avicenna’s argument establishes the existence of universals in the external world, it falls short of proving their immaterial nature. His perspective aligns with realism, yet it also echoes Hamedani Man (al-Rajul al-Hamidānī)’s stance on universals—a viewpoint that necessitates reform and reconstruction. Employing a historical approach, we critically assess these ideas to arrive at a more coherent perspective.

Rajab Ali Tabrizi is considered the third systematic philosopher in the Isfahan School of Philosophy, following in the footsteps of Mirdamad and MollaSadra. He founded a New-Peripatetic school by offering a fresh interpretation of key Peripatetic ideas and reevaluating their terminology. Tabrizi engaged deeply with the pressing philosophical issues of his time, particularly the crucial matter of ‘the relationship between existence and quiddity.’ He challenged the viewpoints of MollaSadra and Mirdamad, relying on his unique understanding of ‘quiddity qua quiddity’ and ‘descriptive existence.’ Tabrizi rejected the notion of considering any pair of existence and quiddity as unoriginal, advocating for the generation of quiddity in the presentation of existence. According to his perspective, this approach resulted in the concrete combination of things from both existence and quiddity. Given that this idea has not been sufficiently elucidated in the limited contemporary research on the subject, this article aims to clarify the ambiguities surrounding Tabrizi’s theory. We do this by exploring the philosophical roots of Tabrizi’s perspective within the context of Avicenna’s philosophy and conducting a detailed analysis of the foundational principles underpinning his views on this contentious issue. To achieve this goal, we will address questions that arise, such as the relationship between the principle of subordination and the external presentation of existence on the quiddity. Additionally, we will explore the use of ‘principal and subsidiary’ instead of ‘original and unoriginal’ terminology by Tabrizi’s students. Finally, the research will conclude by aligning the general, specific, and special meanings of the complementary concepts of ‘originality’ and ‘unoriginality’ with Tabrizi’s stance on existence and quiddity.

Mulla Sadra has demonstrated "The Principality of Existence" as the basis of the Transcendent Philosophy based on solid arguments and by studying the scholars before him, he considered the peripatetics to believe in The Principality of Existence and the Ishraqi in the principality of Quiddity. Although the question of the principality of Existence or Quiddity has not been raised in this way by early scholars, by examining their works and expressions, one of the parties to the issue in question can be attributed to them. This research seeks to find the opinion of 'Ghias al-din Mansur Dashtaki' on this matter. By examining his texts and expressions in a descriptive-analitical method based on Sadra's philosophy; while providing convincing evidence, the belief in the 'The Principiality of Quiddity' can be deduced from Ghias al-din Mansur. The above evidence will be presented and the claim will be explained in this research. Ghias al-din considers the concept of 'Existence' as one of the validations of the secondary intelligible and redundant on quiddity, denying the realization of any individual and external instances for it.

For a long time, the question of God's quiddity has been discussed in the words of philosophers and theologians. Most of the theologians have been positive about God's having a quiddity and most of the philosophers have opposed it. Both groups have presented several proofs for their claims, some of which are based on specific foundations. Examining these arguments shows that the interpretation and explanation of the truth of the existence and essence of the Necessary can be so decisive in this debate. Noticing the concomitants of quiddity can also help to reach a conclusion in the discussion. If we consider quiddity to be completely dependent on existence or if we consider the limitation as one of its concomitants, then we must negate quiddity from the Necessary, but if both of these are refuted, then we cannot negate quiddity from Him. In this article, the first claim is proven to be true and the second to be incomplete. The evidence supporting the necessity of quiddity for God is not sufficient, and therefore, because quiddity is essentially dependent on existence and cannot precede existence in any way, quiddity is negated from God.

Comparing the intuitions and thoughts of Muslim mystics and Suhrawardī regarding the existence of God and the Light of lights and extracting the differences and commonalities of their views provide the ground for promoting their thoughts and also the optimal use of their works. This article, with a descriptive-analytical method, tries to prove the states of inclusive unity (wāḥidiyya) and exclusive unity (aḥadiyya) in the essence of the Light of lights and argue for the ontological primacy of existence in the Illuminationist philosophy of Suhrawardī. Two questions are dealt with in this article. The first is whether, despite his lack of explication, the intuitive divine states of inclusive and exclusive unity of mystics' God can be ascribed to Suhrawardī's Light of lights, too. The second issue is whether according to Suhrawardī's implicit endorsement of the primacy of existence, the existence of Suhrawardī's God is the same as the existence of mystics' God, and according to his endorsement of the primacy of quiddity, they are not the same. The result is that Suhrawardī has implicitly accepts the mystic states of inclusive and exclusive unity of God and renders the existence of God and the Light of lights identical, not their quiddities.

In ten of his works, Al-Fārābī discusses ousia/substance and its derivatives. Among these works, we frequently encounter quotations from Aristotle and Al-Fārābī's interpretation of them. He accepts the established meaning of ousia as substance and doesn't argue against its translation to maujūd, Eyn, maahiy[y]at and ẕāt. This article tries to show the similarities and differences between Al-Fārābī and Aristotle conceptions of substance and then to bridge between the two innovative theories of Al-Fārābī: one in his division of existence and another regarding his view on reality. In discussing the concept of substance, Farabi seeks to create a unity between Plato and Aristotle's views. In another way, this claim can be expressed that Farabi aims to create a unity between the book of metaphysics and Aristotle's treatise on categories. In this direction, his innovative theory of substance is born. Also, this paper shows some inconsistencies existing in his discussion, which makes his philosophical language even more ambiguous than Aristotle's in Metaphysics and subject to various interpretations. Finally, the relation between the concept of substance and the concepts of shai and tashakhkhos is discussed.

Being and knowledge as two main elements of Islamic philosophical tradition have their own relations and semantics. In this research, we analyze being and knowledge’s relations in Peripatetic, Illuminative, and Transcendent Islamic and philosophical schools. Our research approach is fundamental, through analyzing-illustrating methods and by using a meta-combination style. Since meta-combination through integrating previous investigation’s data tries to introduce new data that make new conceptions and ideas. Therefore, we try to integrate and categorize between being and knowledge based on Sadrean’s school which is different from Peripatetic and Illuminative understanding regarding their relation. So through making ontological integration between being and knowledge, we reach to a new conception of transformation in the ontology of knowledge. The data and findings of the research show that there are two approaches regarding the ontology of knowledge based on the meta-combination method between being and knowledge that includes, first, the separation of being and knowledge, second, their unity or integration. The bases of their separation are quidditive relation between being and knowledge, and considering knowledge as a quiddity. And the basis of their unity is the ontological approach to being. On the other hand, paying attention to Mulla Sadra’s bases regarding integrity between being and knowledge or their equality or unity guides us to the deep gap between Transcendent Wisdom from Peripatetic and Illuminative schools concerning the relation between being and knowledge.

Research regarding any academic topic possesses the required importance and necessity and this importance and necessity is twofold regarding foundational issues and especially if the research topic is one of the topics on which other philosophical issues depend. Certainly, the necessity of research regarding that is considered one of the first priorities. Thus, the topic “Critiquing the View of the Attribution of Existence to Quiddity” holds such importance that if the view of the non-consequentialist critics were to be correct; it would inevitably result in an impasse in the Avicennan philosophical system. In fact, it can be claimed that the measure of the importance of the study, assessment, and reaching the right judgment in this regard is beyond any philosophical issue. And it has been indicated regarding the history of the research that apart from ancient philosophical texts and related works that have been addressed in the three philosophical systems of the Islamic world, no independent works that have addressed this topic have been considered.To find the answer to the main question of the research which is whether the view of the attribution of existence to quiddity is internally incompatible with the essential foundations of Avicenna’s ontology, the author first indicates the difficulty of the attribution of existence to quiddity through the problem statement of the study, explaining the point of conflict, and a short explanation regarding the main terms because considering the founders of the Avicennan, Illuminationist, and Sadrian philosophical systems consider the existence of two primaries in the external world to be incorrect, the question regarding the relationship between existence and quiddity in the mind and external world, and explaining the manner it happens, beyond the primacy and the mentally-positedness of each existence and quiddity, the main concern is that each philosophical system must present a clear answer for that because all three philosophical systems are in consensus on the issue that the relationship between existence and quiddity in the mind is in the form of analytical attributions; that is, existence is attributed to quiddity; however, Shaykh al-Ishraq cites Avicenna’s statement in which he asserts the attribution of existence to quiddity as well as the interpretation that has been made from the words of his student Bahmanyar and assumes that attribution according to Avicenna refers to external attribution and accordingly, in the first judgment with the Peripatetics in the book Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, he claims that the Peripatetics have based their philosophy on existence whereas existence is mentally-posited and he presents six arguments for the claim that the external attribution of existence to quiddity is incorrect.

sometimes, imagination of philosophy issue is more important and more difficult than its judgment, and principality of existence issue is from these issues. in this article, we have surveyed to some of imagination meanings of this issue.also we have surveyed to two explanation of disputable point; and we have surveyed with reasons of principality of existence to some of imagination meanings. explanation of disputable point, which is an important issue in this field, is not mentioned in Mullah Sadra's books. But people like Sabzevari, Tabatabai and others have paid it. In the meantime, modares Zunuzi has written a comprehensive and precise explanation of disputable point on the issue. Some have criticized this and we have responded to them. In this article, the meanings of the quiddity, existence, imagination meanings, and limitation of the dispute are discussed. It addresses issues such as whether there are personal or some kind of phenomena in this issue.

Numerous ambiguities surround the issue of 'principality of existence' in the contemporary Islamic philosophy in a way that some have considered it a verbal or fruitless conflict. On the contrary, some adherents of the principality of existence (such as Ayatollah Fayyazi and Mr. Ubudiyyat) have offered new interpretations and challenged the contemporary understandings of the issue. Ayatollah Fayyazi maintains that Mulla Sadra's principality of existence is consistent with true realization of quiddity. He has proceeded to prove his claim by offering detailed premises and discussions. Similarly, Mr. Ubudiyyat has prepared new insights in this issue by finding the roots of the issue in Suhrawardi's view. He maintains that although Mulla Sadra believes in principality of existence, he accepts the true existence of quiddity in another sense. In this article, the defects and drawbacks of these two interpretations are shown and then, by relying on the historical evolution of the arguments, a clearer and less defective image of the issue as well as the view of principality of existence is offered.

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In addition to a study of the major interpretations of the "principality of existence", (ʾIṣāla al-wujūd) this article studies Mullā Ṣadrā's view through the third person narration method. According to this method, the main point in "principality of existence" is the distinction, the rules and the relation of existence and quiddity. Mullā Ṣadrā describes his view in the form of the proposition, "Existence exists", and he claims that this proposition is a "common technical Predication." This proposition can be interpreted as follows: 1. Quiddity has instantiations in the external world. 2. Quiddity does not have any instantiation in the external world. 3. Quiddity, primarily, does not have any instantiation in the external world, but it has instantiations through existence. There are many explanations for each of the three interpretations. The major point of this article is that it is not possible for quiddity in-itself to exist in the external world.

Mullā Ṣadrā has used the same terminology and style of the earlier logicians in many of his discussions on logical belief (Taṣdīq); while his two theories, “principality of existence” and “union of the knower and the known”, require that he address the issue to present the problem of “conception and belief” in a philosophical system different from the philosophical system of the sages. According to the theory of principality of existence and using the method of textual analysis, this article has re-read Mullā Ṣadrā’s view in explaining the truth of logical belief and has analyzed his approach in the face of the view of previous logicians. In this regard, it was concluded that Mullā Ṣadrā has expressed his view with two different approaches and on two levels: One approach is based on the principles of earlier logicians (essential approach) and the other approach is based on the theory of the principality of existence (existential approach). It was also argued that Mullā Ṣadrā’s view of the truth of logical belief was the same as Fārābī’s view, emphasizing that such a view was based solely on Mullā Ṣadrā’s existential approach and backed by theories of the principality of existence, the gradation of existence, the substantial motion and the union of the knower and the known.

The present research seeks to answer the two questions from “What does the impossibility of knowledge of the divine essence mean?” and “What are the reasons for this impossibility?” The following conclusions have been obtained in this research: the nonidentity of essence and attributes, and the nonidentity of existence and quiddity in God cannot be accepted; the inconceivability of God essence is true, but there may be other ways of knowing Him. Furthermore, some of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s reasons are similar to like examples than independent reasons. Therefore, the data and results seem to show that Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī does not have a consistent manner on the issue and in some cases believes in the knowability of the divine essence. The authors will address the possibility of the knowability of the divine essence from the perspective of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī in another independent study.

The principiality of existence and mentally-positedness of quiddity are the main bases of Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy and his particular theories. On the other hand, he has not provided a clear and accurate picture of these two theories in his philosophical system and has referred to quiddity using different terms. Each of the contemporary commentators of the Transcendent Philosophy have interpreted quiddity and existence in a way based on their own views and theoretical principles and have tried to predicate it on Mullā Ṣadrā’s theory. However, given the fundamental role of quiddity and quiddative concepts in gaining acquired knowledge, disagreement in the interpretation of quiddity will affect the quality of explaining acquired knowledge. Hence, following a descriptive-analytic method, the present study aims to provide a correct interpretation for quiddity from the viewpoint of contemporary commentators of Sadrian philosophy and, then, investigate whether our acquired knowledge of existents, which is attained through quiddative concepts, is positive or negative. Accordingly, the authors have examined and criticized such commentators’ interpretations of quiddity and the way it explains existence. A short answer here is that, apparently, based on the correct view, which belongs to Professor Javadi Amuli, quiddity is the manifestation of determined existence, and quiddative concepts speak of limited existence, which is clearly a positive rather than a negative and purifying statement.

 Detailed & precise study on Qādī Sa‘īd writings represents that every existent’s quiddity in Qādī Sa‘īd’s thought is identical to what by which it is what it is or quiddity in general (al māhiya bil ma‘na al a‘am) & quiddity as whatness has not been his target in arguments. In explanation two problems on external realization of quiddity, that are the problem of creation & the problem of distinction, he declares that every quiddity is created by simple creation of it’s creator & denies every kind of beingexistence for quiddity before creation of it’s creator, as well he names the creation of creator as the just cause of distinction of every existent, so the externality & distinction of quiddities does not need to accident of existence to become existent & also does not need to attributes to become distinct.

Mulla Sadra's view of the principality of existence has been interpreted in various ways. In the prevailing interpretation of the theory of the principality of existence, the quiddity is purely subjective, and since it is not present in external reality, it cannot literally represent external reality. The interpretation of Obudiyyat - which is the explanation of the interpretation of Agha Ali Modarres Zenozi - while at the same time emphasizing the subjectivity of quiddity and recognizing quiddity as an image, introduces quiddity's representation as a true indication. This paper, with a descriptive-analytic approach, examines Mulla Sadra's statements and shows that this interpretation cannot be a proper explanation of Mulla Sadra's view of the principality of existence. Mulla Sadra, influenced by the mystics, depicted the relationship between God and the creatures between existence and quiddity and used the mystic's words to depict the relationship, including image, fantasy and Representing the creatures from God. Contrary to Zenozi and Obudiyyat's understanding, such words have been used in the ontological rather than the epistemological sense; hence, they cannot be interpreted as a purely mental object in Sadra's view.

Aristotle’s discussion of the Ousia are diverse and confusing since there are various definition of the term especially in Metaphysics, Physics and Categories. He refers to it sometimes as the underlying layer, sometimes he means something similar to the meaning of being, and sometimes as essence and quiddity. Hence, the difficulty and disagreement among the translators and interpreters on the best equivalent for Ousia in other languages. In the present paper, after a short historical discussion about Ousia, I examine some common equivalents for the Ousia in Latin and English and attempt to discuss the different reasons for and against each equivalent. My argument, in general, goes for the term Substance, and I will bring 8 reasons to establish the argument.