جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « باور » در نشریات گروه « ادیان و عرفان »

Descartes, as a prominent representative of traditional foundationalism, starts from a general methodological doubt in order to achieve certainty and as the first step, he achieves certainty about his own existence whereby he explains knowledge of God and of the world. In his intellectual path, Descartes tries to reduce the credibility of senses and give more credit to intellectual intuitions. He takes clarity and distinctness to be criteria of truth and takes immunity to any doubts as a criterion of certainty. BonJour—a contemporary epistemologist—defends foundationalism but he modifies the Cartesian view in order to save it from objections and provide a new criterion for the infallibility of beliefs. BonJour’s ‘constitutive awareness’ theory seeks to account for infallible beliefs. Constitutive awareness is a level of non-conceptual awareness that can be transformed into a conceptual belief through a descriptive process. BonJour’s view might be compared with the theory of knowledge by presence in Islamic philosophy, though in BonJour’s view, there is fallibility in the beliefs formed from non-conceptual awareness, but it is not rational to care about such fallibility.

According to the standard view, emotions are always obstacles to the proper thinking and in order to think properly we should try our best not to be affected by emotions. Catherine Elgin rejects the generality of this view and believes that in many cases emotions have reliable epistemic products. But it seems firstly that Elgin’s argument for this claim cannot be defended and secondly even if we can give a right interpretation of her view it is not what the standard view rejects.