جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « اخلاق باور » در نشریات گروه « ادیان و عرفان »

The encounter with religious plurality and diversity, which is a main characteristic of life in the contemporary world, has posed a number of epistemological and theological problems. Awareness of religious diversity and religious disagreements presents challenges to the discharge of epistemic duties by the religious person. In epistemology of disagreements, as a branch of epistemology, an individual’s epistemic duties in the face of disagreements are specified, and various approaches have been adopted from quite conciliatory views to steadfast views. Comparative theology takes up a religious approach to respond to the challenge of religious plurality and diverse theological approaches in the face of such plurality in order to arrive at a deeper understanding of religious faith. In this article, we deploy the descriptive-analytic method to find an epistemic solution based on the epistemology of religious disagreements with which this newly emerged theology can attain its goals. We conclude that by adopting an intermediary approach between steadfast and conciliatory views and drawing on the graded nature of religious beliefs and rejection of the idea of epistemic peers, we can propose a normative approach to comparative theology so that it does not fall into suspension of beliefs, relativism, skepticism, or religious conversion.

The main purpose of this study is to influence the intellectuals of different Islamic denominations to create consensus and proximity between them. In this case, such an event will affect other members of society and eventually the Unified Islamic Ummah will be organized. It is clear that any proximity study can be considered as a background for sympathy between thinkers of different denominations. This article tries to realize a successful research. In order to do this, firstly, the ethics of belief in the proximity of Islamic denominations is explained, and it has been stated that there is evidence for the necessity of bringing denominations closer together, which makes a person believe in such a necessity and be responsible for it. It also introduces and explains epistemological principles such as coherence between propositions and the existence of fundamental beliefs. The conclusion is that the introduction of such principles can provide a platform for the attention and trust of thinkers following different Islamic denominations, so that as a result, with a more scientific style, they can consider the issue of proximity between Islamic denominations.

Of the supernatural doctrines of religions, life after death encounters the significant epistemic-moral question of whether the belief in it is moral or nonmoral. The question might sometimes be asked based on the well-known problem of ethics of belief and analysis of the components of be-lief under moral duties and norms which says that such a belief lacks a plausible epistemic support and is, therefore, nonmoral. And sometimes in consequentialist terms, such a belief is said to give rise to nonmoral outcomes, which is thereby rendered as nonmoral by itself—outcomes such as its entailment of horrors such as punishment, abuses by the powerful, exploitation of ordinary people, justification of social injustic-es, prevention of full-fledged mundane life, putting the fate of the earth at risk, and putting man in place of God. In this paper, I draw upon an analytic-critical method to evaluate the extent to which the belief in af-terlife accompanies such consequences, showing that there is no undeni-able interconnection between the belief in afterlife and such conse-quences, because, for one thing, some of these consequences might not be nonmoral, such as punishment, and for another, most of the un-doubtedly nonmoral consequences are not closely tied to religions and are indeed refuted by religious doctrines, although they are common among religious communities and individuals.

Rational virtues should be acquired by jurisprudents (fuqahā’) and mujtahids in the process of inferring jurisprudential rulings and at the stage of the acquisition of beliefs and issuing fatwas. The lack of such virtues will indubitably amount to lack of reputation and invalidity of the jurisprudential process. We presuppose that scholars of the religion are, like other intellectuals, subject to moral vices and problems either overtly or covertly. There are a number of virtues that contribute to the validity of our knowledge, such as open-mindedness, intellectual diligence, meticulousness and concentration, intellectual modesty, intellectual courage, intellectual caution, intellectual openness, intellectual fairness, and intellectual independence. Since a mujtahid’s beliefs play a role in his ijtihad and inference of jurisprudential rulings, in this paper we examine the role of the rational virtue of intellectual modesty in the process of inferring jurisprudential rulings. In fact, modesty removes the veil of egoism from the mujtahid and from evidence of the rulings, and paves the path to arrive at a more ethical ruling.