جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « تصور و تصدیق » در نشریات گروه « ادیان و عرفان »

The sentence is a whole predicative compound that reports beyond reality and hence it has the ability to be true and false. What is the basis of the proposition and what separates it from other sayings is approval or disapproval of the ratio between the two sides of the proposition? Scholars, despite accepting the central role of the sentence in the proposition, disagree about the nature of this element of the proposition. Most of them, following Aristotle, consider the sentence to be the abstraction of ratio (equivalent to affirmation and negation). Some other scholars have considered the sentence not as acknowledgment of occurrence and nonoccurrence, but as perception of occurrence and non-occurrence. Some have interpreted the sentence in a way that is equivalent to acknowledging the meaning of "imagination following the rule". Others believe that the sentence, on the one hand, is the acknowledgment of the soul in ratio to the proposition and, on the other hand, the mental form of the external relation. The following article examines these perspectives and shows that the best analysis of the nature of the sentence is the final one. The present paper, while examining the above views, shows that the best analysis on the nature of the sentence is the final one. According to which, the sentence is "belief in the approval or disapproval of the ratio of the proposition, which also indicates the reality of the relationship outside itself.

Scholars of rational knowledge have long believed that theoretical concepts, such as theoretical affirmations, should lead to self-evident perceptions; otherwise, they will involve infinite regression and there would not be concepts. And then they were encountered with the question of the source of the self- evident concepts. There were several views in this regard. Some believed that cause of self-evidence is generality and others believed in simplicity; some agreed with intuitive knowledge and still some others believed in differentiation. Using a problem-solving approach, this paper firstly distinguishes between concepts and affirmations, and then argues that in theoretical affirmations, validity is considered an important issue and the validity of affirmations is dependent on evident affirmations. But in theoretical concepts, validity does not matter; rather, knowledge of concepts is considered and knowledge of theoretical concepts is dependent on the knowledge of evident concepts, otherwise they will end in infinite regression. Secondly, due to the self-evidence of evident concepts, the ideas of intuitive knowledge, generality, simplicity and differentiation cannot provide an accurate explanation of it. Therefore, the simplicity view, together with of the intuitive knowledge of the known is the only view that is able to present a rational justification for the mystery of the self-evidence of evident concepts

That what epistemology is has since long been a significant issue proposed for critical examination. What elements play the fundamental role and constitute the definition of epistemology? Any answer to this question depends on our understanding of what epistemology is. The above question can be studied in three views: the view of Muslim thinkers, the view of contemporary epistemologists and the view of the Quran. In what follows, the author has studied and critically compared the three views. There are two first is the consideration of similarities and differences, and second is to show that the Quran is independent on epistemological issues.

Urmawi divides acquired knowledge into a simple concept (containing no judgment) and an assent (containing a judgment). This has given rise to the difference of opinion between QuÔb RÁzi and MullÁ ÑadrÁ. The former has objected to Urmawi's definition from different perspectives whereas the latter has answered his objections on the basis of certain philosophical principles. Having studied the two theories, one can infer from Ñadrian philosophy that assent is defined as the mental grasping (or as the reflection in the mind) of the essential forms of external things together with the assertion that the relation of correspondence between the objects and the external reality they represent is true whereas RÁzi considers assent as knowledge together with judgment. The present article studies RÁzi’s objections and ÑadrÁ's answers, thus showing the strengths and weaknesses of RÁzi’s opinion as well as the relations between the two opinions. According to the author, MullÁ ÑadrÁ intends to solve the problems within the logical system through philosophical principles, an approach that is worth considering.

A prominent 7th century (AH) philosopher and logician, Najm al-DÐn KÁtibÐ QazwÐnÐ played an important role in the development of Avicennian logical school in the world of Islam. A knowledge of his logical ideas and thoughts helps us a great deal to learn about the views and methodologies of logicians who came after him. In addition to elaborating some of Avicenna's logical innovations, he developed his own peculiar logical theories. Following Avicenna's methodology of writing logic, he made his own contributions. The writer seeks to deal with some of KÁtibÐ QazwÐnÐ’s logical ideas which can be recounted in the form of the following statements: judgment is composite; not every conception is self-evident, and it is in no need of being acquired; mutual relationship between ‘signification of complete accord’ and ‘signification by association’ is doubtful; eight unities being necessary as conditions in contradiction are reduced to two unities; and physical proposition exists and it is valid on its own as a special proposition.

Although Mulla Sadra is influenced by the views of Avecinnan philosophy in science of logic, he has innovations in this field that makes his logic distinct and thus rightly be called Sadraean logic. He is not only of original views in definition and argumentation, but also in respect with the relation of logic as a body of knowledge along with other sciences as well as in preliminary discussions he is of independent thought. On the basis of division of real sciences into theoretical and practical philosophy, Mulla Sadra include logic in the former and considers it as the branch of first philosophy, though according to his view from different angle with different criterion in mind and considering the object of science, logic belongs to practical sciences rather than practical philosophy. Mulla Sadra held propositional knowledge to be a concept that is identical to judgment and yet he believed that in the mental analysis judgment is composed of components. Prior to analysis the reality of judgment, therefore, is neither simple which requires conception of subject, predicate and propositional relation as philosophers said, nor a compound of three components (subject, predicate and propositional relation) as Fakhr Razi and his followers claimed.