جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه "آژانس بین المللی انرژی اتمی" در نشریات گروه "فقه و حقوق"

International law, while prohibiting non-nuclear weapon states from acquiring nuclear weapons, has allowed them to use nuclear materials in non-proscribed military activities and under certain conditions, exclude them from International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. Following the conclusion of the Pact between the US, UK and Australia in September 2021 to transfer of 12 military nuclear submarines by the first two states to Australia (known as the Aukus Pact), non-applicability of the Agency safeguard to these activities has become an international concern and the issue was placed on the agenda of the Board of Governors of the Agency. The legal definition of the this non proscribed military activity or and also legal base of permissibility of using nuclear materials in these activities in international law are question the present article has studied I in a descriptive-analytical way with an emphasis on the Ankus Case. The findings of this research indicate that the existing international law allows the non-nuclear weapon states to enjoy the non-proscribed military uses of nuclear energy and to exclude its related activities from the the Agency safeguards, but this is regarded as a grey area and a legal lacuna of the nuclear non-proliferation regime has caused international concerns.

Through the peaceful settlement of disputes outlook, the Joint Comprehensive of Action (JCPOA) deals with as a turning point. The issue of granting access to and monitoring via JCPOA on the Iran’s nuclear activities is growing increasingly sensitive in Iran. Incorporating two specific mechanism in JCPOA, routine and unannounced inspection, upon which the International Energy Atomic Agency (IAEA) is rested with to monitor such an access. The routine inspection in JCPOA is similar to an extent degree to the same inspection included in the IAEA monitoring system of the Safeguard Agreement, Additional Protocol and the modified Code 3.1. The innovation has been occurred in the JCPOA is pertained to the transparence- derived activities. The challenging, and somehow discriminating, point which may be made here is that the unannounced inspections in the JCPOA is capable of offering an adequate facilitation for potential leaking of Iran’s nuclear confidential information. With regard to reviewing JCPOA’s contents, the paper would make an examination to the related instruments in order to reach a conclusion as to the question how the method and qualification of access in the JCPOA would be.

On 18 September 2004, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution on "The Implementation of the NPT Safeguard Agreements in I.R. of Iran". This article examines analytically the resolution as a practice of the IAEA in light of public international law. It concluded that this practice of the Board is contradicted with well-established principles of international law.

Non-proliferation, in its strictly meaning, is a system for the control andprevention of making new nuclear states. While the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has been enforced for more than three decades and the UN Security Council as well as the IAEA Board of Governors have issued many resolutions on this matter, they could not transform it into UN international customary norm. This Article analyzes the non-proliferation regime and its international legal nature as a conventional or customary norm. The author believes that the discriminatory rights and duties of the NPT's state parties that is unconformity with the equal sovereignty of states, have impeded the opinio juris necessary to formation of a custom as an important part of international community. In addition, enforcing a system by some states under an inevitable condition and within a political impulsion environment can not necessarily emerge the opinio juris or collective opinion in the international community.