جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه "competition council" در نشریات گروه "فقه و حقوق"

In order to achieve an advanced market where consumer rights are protected in the best way, regardless of the need to pass progressive and dynamic regulations and guarantee criminal, legal and disciplinary enforcements, the presence of strong supervisors is necessary. In addition to monitoring the activities of the players in that market and trying to implement the laws and regulations and deal with the violators, it supports the rights of the weak segment, who are weak in terms of economic and informational power, i.e. consumers. The stock market is no exception to this and the most important task of its supervisory bodies, which are the Supreme Council of the Stock Exchange and the Stock Exchange Organization, is to protect the rights of investors, especially small investors or consumers of this market. Due to its importance, this issue has been noticed by all advanced countries and it has been mentioned along with investors, publishers and intermediaries, as the four basic and important pillars of the above market, but the models of this supervision are different. In some countries, such as Australia, Austria, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Japan, Mexico, South Korea, Hungary, and Sweden, there is an institution that oversees all financial markets, which is called the integrated or unified model, and on the other hand, others such as England, France, Switzerland and the United States of America have appointed a supervisor for each of the financial markets, which is referred to as the institutional method. Our country follows the recent model and each of its capital, money and insurance markets has special supervisors, and according to Article 3 of the Unorganized Money Market Regulation Law approved in 1383 and also Article 18 of the Monetary and Banking Law of the country approved in 1351, the supervision of the money market with The Central Bank and the Money and Credit Council supervise the insurance with the Central Insurance of Iran based on Article 1 of the Law on the Establishment of the Central Insurance of Iran and Insurance, approved in 1350, and the supervision of the capital market, as stated, with the Supreme Council and the Securities and Exchange Organization. May the description of their structure and duties be found in articles 2 to 7 of the Securities Market Law approved in 2014, and according to Article 3 of the Securities Market Law approved in 2014, the council is the highest pillar of the securities market, which can be compared to the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC). mentioned in the United States of America that all the activities of stock exchanges and trading of all types of securities must be under its supervision, and it was created according to Section 4 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. In our country, unlike today, during the rule of the former regulations, i.e. the Law on the Establishment of the Stock Exchange approved in 1345, there was a single pillar supervision and only the Stock Exchange Council was in charge of this matter. Article 3 of the Securities Market Law approved in 2014 enumerates the members of the Supreme Council of the Stock Exchange, which is 12 members and consists of representatives of the executive branch, the judiciary and the private sector, which is responsible for approving the macro policies of the securities market. Article 5 of the same law also called the stock exchange organization a non-governmental public institution with an independent legal and financial personality and with a board of directors consisting of five members from among trustworthy people with good reputation and experience in the financial field, exclusively from non-governmental sector experts who Their salaries and benefits are paid and administered from the organization's budget with the approval of the Supreme Council of the Stock Exchange (Articles 6 and 13 and Clause 11 of Article 4 of the Market Law). The chairman of the board of directors of the organization, who is the head and the highest executive officer, is appointed from among the members of the board of directors upon the proposal of the members and the approval of the council (Article 9 of the Market Law). Article 7 of the market law also describes the duties and powers of the organization's board of directors. Needless to say, since the supervision of the stock exchanges is usually carried out by specialized supervisory institutions, in recent years after the global financial crisis, the discussion of intensifying the supervision of the stock exchanges and the government's involvement or lack of it has been raised, and there is a consensus in this regard. does not have. The important question is; The Competition Council, which by approving the law amending the articles of the Law of the Fourth Program of Economic, Social and Cultural Development of the Islamic Republic of Iran and implementing the general policies of the forty-fourth (44) article of the Constitution approved on 3/25/1387 and in its ninth chapter under the title "facilitating competition and Prohibition of monopoly" officially and specifically as a type of single administrative institution model overseeing the performance of companies and competition in the market and with the combination mentioned in Article 53 of that law with the aim of facilitating competition and prohibiting monopoly and preventing disruptions in competition or removing obstacles It is on the way to form a competitive situation and is considered as the only authority to deal with anti-competitive procedures, does it have the right to interfere in the stock market of our country despite the presence of supervisors such as the Council and the Stock Exchange Organization? through comparative study; We will try to clarify the above issues. Regarding the last question, it seems that it is difficult to accept it according to paragraph "c" of article 36 of the law on permanent orders of the country's development programs approved in 2015.

The telecommunications industry, after being liberalized and removed from state ownership, operates as a "multiple monopoly," whereby telecommunications services are typically provided to consumers by three or four operators. Due to this monopoly, the coordination of matters related to these operators, including tariff determination and license issuance, is the responsibility of the regulatory authority. One of the goals pursued by any regulatory body in the telecommunications industry is to maintain and enhance the competitive environment, which conflicts with the authority of the Competition Council as the general body responsible for competitive affairs. In the U.S. legal system, the Supreme Court has only allowed the enforcement of competition laws when they provide an advantage over regulatory rules, and it has also assumed that there is no advantage in enforcing competition laws. In Iranian law, the telecommunications regulator must always comply with the Competition Council while implementing its decisions and actions; however, regarding tariffs, only the approval of pricing guidelines falls under the Council's jurisdiction. According to the Administrative Justice Court, the determination of prices is the responsibility of the telecommunications regulator, and the Regulatory Authority must set tariffs in accordance with the pricing guidelines announced by the Competition Council.

By explaining a set of principles and rules governing the behavior and communication and agreements between companies, competition law prevents the deviation of the market structure to monopoly and improves its performance, and is actually the most important tool of competition policy in order to compensate for the lack of form and substance of private law regulations. As the most general and fair means of monitoring the economy, it has stepped into this field to increase the welfare of consumers through increasing the efficiency of resources.Considering the negative consequences of monopoly, including; Disruption of the market balance, the loss of consumer rights and the removal of other economic actors from competition, governments generally try to adopt measures such as the adoption of anti-monopoly regulations and the establishment of regulations facilitating competition in order to establish healthy and free competition in the relations of economic actors, while supporting Consumers' rights and creating balance in the market also prevent the formation of unnatural monopoly. Automobile manufacturing is one of the industries that, although it does not seem to have a monopoly, but in practice, this industry can be considered as one of the monopoly industries in Iran. This article was written with the aim of investigating the application of the rules of competition law in the Iranian automobile industry in a library manner using descriptive, analytical and inferential methods.The results confirm the fact that due to the monopoly of automobile manufacturing in Iran, competition laws are not applied in this industry.

Competition in trade is the cause of economic growth and is considered as one of the principles of economic development in countries and it leads to commercial success,which has caused the creation of laws under the title of commercial competition rules by the legislator.One of the main topics of competition law is the abuse of a dominant position.Contemplation among different legal and criminal laws indicates the existence of many legal articles that are charged to the wrongful company or manager according to the type of crime or violation. In the current research,the limits of the powers of thecompetition council in terminating the contracts that are based on the dominant position and everything related to the abuse of the dominant position are examined in order to clarify the guarantee of the implementation of the abuse of the dominant position compared to the contracts concluded based on the powers of the competition council.How is that?Are such contracts can be terminated or not and who are the beneficiaries of such claims?Finally, in which authority can the appeal against the decisions of the competition council be made in terminating the contract?Through the investigation,it was found that the competition council has the authority to terminate the contract in different ways and regarding the possibility of appealing the decision of the competition council, it should be acknowledged that the decision issued by the appeals board of the competition council can be contested and finally as an administrative decision can be contested in the court of justice.

The application of competition rules in legal systems necessitates defining the market and measuring market power. These two prerequisites form the basis for enforcing competition laws, and their regulation becomes increasingly crucial with the expansion of internet-based platform businesses and their impact on consumer rights. This research addresses the challenges in setting prerequisites for applying competition rules in digital platforms and offers new solutions. The traditional approach to competition analysis involves defining the relevant market and assessing market power. However, the unique characteristics of digital platforms present obstacles in achieving these objectives. To establish rules governing market definition and market power measurement, a three-step process is proposed. Firstly, the traditional rules for market definition and market power measurement in conventional businesses are examined, as they are commonly used in judicial authorities. Secondly, the specific competitive challenges in digital platforms are assessed to identify cases where traditional criteria fall short in providing  prerequisites. Finally, new criteria for market definition and market power measurement in digital platforms are proposed. The research reveals that both market definition and market power measurement in platform businesses face significant challenges. Defining the market in digital platforms proves difficult due to the inability to assert that virtual and traditional businesses coexist within the same market. Additionally, the traditional product and market scope determination method (SSNIP test) may not apply to two/multi-modal platforms and platforms offering products with zero prices. Furthermore, traditional indicators for calculating the market area, such as "transportation" and "main area," do not apply to virtual markets with cross-border transactions. Measuring market power in digital platforms presents its own challenges. Relying solely on income as a criterion is inadequate, as it cannot be compared to other factors like the number of active users, volume of traffic, or time spent on the platform. Furthermore, using income to determine market share is not applicable to platforms with zero-priced products. Measuring product demand elasticity using the Lerner index is also hindered by the zero marginal cost of many platforms. Moreover, identifying effective entry barriers specific to digital platforms and devising mechanisms for measuring them presents a challenge not yet addressed by legal systems. To overcome these challenges and provide new criteria for market definition in digital platforms, a three-step process is proposed. The identification of non-linear value chains helps identify platform components. Assessing whether each component constitutes a separate market or a part of the same market relies on their correlation and their contribution to specific services. To address challenges in defining the product and scope, the research suggests using the SSNDQ test (small but significant and stable reduction in quality) instead of the SSNIP test. Criteria such as "service speed," "data protection," "privacy protection," "exchange cost," "negotiation cost," and "search cost" can measure the quality of service provision in digital platforms. For measuring market power in digital platforms, distinguishing between "transaction-based platforms" and "audience-based platforms" is suggested. The "users' payment" criterion, instead of platform income, can determine market share using indicators like the number of users, traffic volume, time spent, and number of visits. Recognizing new structural and strategic entry barriers in digital platforms within relevant laws and regulations is crucial. Evaluating the three-stage process of "possibility of entry," "possibility of competitive influence," and "possibility of limiting market power" in platform markets offers potential solutions to measuring market power in this context.

The expansion of the Internet and its ever-increasing rate along with the rise of smart mobile phones have made Internet-based businesses one of the inseparable sectors of today's economy. The part that this type of business plays in today’s world economy is so much that now the top companies in the world, in terms of capital and market value, are companies in the field of digital economy. This is a reality that Iran will also face in the not-too-distant future; then, companies in the field of digital economy will take a significant share of the market. So, today, it is especially necessary to pay attention to the issue of competition in digital platforms and to set the appropriate rules to govern them.

Literature Review:

Until the writing of this article, most of the issues raised in Iran's competition law are devoted to the examination of rules governing competition in traditional markets. Only one article titled "Competition Council and Internet Businesses" by Zarei et al. (2019) has been written in relation to platform markets, and this work is also based on the traditional rules of competition law and regardless of the specific challenges of this field. Analysis of the vote number 306 of the Competition Council. Therefore, it can be claimed that the explanation of the characteristics and challenges of platform markets and its effect on the regulation of competition in this field, which is examined in this article, qualifies as innovation.

In order to correctly set the new rules applicable in the field of digital platforms’ competition, it is necessary to go through a three-stage system: first, we must get a correct understanding of the prominent features of the digital platform markets that affect the issue of competition. In the second stage, the competitive challenges arising from these characteristics, with which the traditional rules are not able to fully deal, should be examined and evaluated; and finally, new rules of competition in the field of platform markets based on the aforementioned characteristics and challenges should be put in place.As the title of the article suggests, the purpose of this article is to explain and analyze the first and second stages of the aforementioned process to show the deficiency of traditional rules in response to the competitive challenges of the field of digital platforms and the necessity of revising them. For this purpose, after explaining the meaning of "platform" and its conceptual evolution over time (the first part), the prominent features of digital platforms that affect the issue of competition are counted, identified, and evaluated (the second part) and finally, the challenges due to the aforementioned characteristics and the inadequacy of the traditional rules in response to them will be explained (part three) to prove the necessity of revising the traditional rules of competition law in the field of platform markets.

Based on the findings of this article, the main economic features of digital platforms are such as "the network effect", "reduction of transaction costs", "replacement of ownership with access", "fragmentation of supply and demand", "economy of scale and economy of significant scope", "simultaneous improvement of economies of scale and personalization" and "fundamental importance of data". Although they are not entirely new and traces of them can be seen in traditional markets, their simultaneous presence in digital platforms makes the market tend towards them. In addition, this problem may be aggravated by the actions of digital platforms to strengthen and expand their position in the market. It is noteworthy that none of the aforementioned features that have led to the occurrence of the mentioned challenges have been recognized in the traditional rules of competition as an obstacle to entering the market or as an anti-competitive practice. Therefore, the first competitive challenge of platform markets, which requires the regulation of appropriate rules, is the growing monopoly of these markets. Naturally, the most suitable solution to get out of this situation is to recognize the aforementioned features as specific types of entry barriers for digital markets.It should also be kept in mind that the preliminary stages to apply anti-competitive rules and guaranteeing them in digital platform markets face serious challenges. In these markets, it is not possible to identify the product as easily as it is in traditional markets, and the application of the conventional SSNIP test cannot be applied to many platforms that offer zero-price services or two- or multi-modal platforms. This makes it a serious challenge to recognize the exact share of the platform in the market and, accordingly, to recognize the market power. It seems that the transition from "quantitative criteria" to "qualitative criteria" is the way out of such challenges.Also, following the traditional rules in recognizing the anti-competitive behavior of platforms, causes many platforms to be accused of aggressive pricing at the very beginning due to having zero marginal cost. In addition, the existence of the aforementioned features has facilitated the conditions for committing anti-competitive acts, such as establishing exclusive conditions in the transaction, selling a package of products, collusion, etc. It seems that the requirement to overcoming such challenges is to promote ex-ante regulations along with the implementation of the current (mostly a-posteriori) regulation model.Finally, it seems that the simultaneous presence of these features in digital platforms has largely led to the reemergence of traditional issues of competition law as current issues, and this will consequently require a review of competition laws in this area, as countries such as the United States, China, and the European Union have followed the same path.

The Iranian Competition Law has been introduced under the General Policy Implementation Law of Article 44  of the Constitution. One of the major issues in competition law is the competition body. There are such institutions in different countries, from countries with a long history of competition law, such as the United States, to countries in the Middle East. In Iran, the Competition Council is the only nationally-recognized authority to review anti-competitive practices and has the authority to make various and important decisions. Because these decisions can seriously affect the rights of stakeholders and economic actors, it is necessary to monitor and control their decisions. Due to its paramount importance and existing disagreement, competence of the Administrative Court of Justice in exercising judicial review over the decisions of the Competition Council and its Appeal Board will be investigated in the present study. The research method is descriptive-analytical. Results of the study indicate that to identify the authority competent to exercise judicial review over the competition council, one should pay attention to the structure and nature of the said council and the type of its decisions. The conclusion of the article is that the Administrative Court of Justice has the authority to exercise judicial review over general decisions, case decisions and the decisions and opinions of the Competition Council in the capacity of dealing with anti-competitive procedures. Moreover, the decisions of the Appeal Board of the Competition Council as well as the decisions and actions of the National Competition Center and their officials are subject to judicial review and criminal prosecution of the court.

One of the issues that have received less attention in competition litigation cases in our legal system is the litigation costs problem. The Competition Council has several tasks under "the Act of the execution of the General Policies of Article 44 of the Constitution"(2007), which requires a great deal of expense to perform optimally. At present, these costs funded by the government. Although in the current state of the economy with considering other countries' approaches to financing these costs, it is better to have at least some of the funding required by the council from other sources (such as receiving fees from private applicants).This study investigates the experiences of the US, Canada, Japan, Turkey, Denmark, the UK, Swiss, Ireland, South Africa, and Hong Kong legal systems in providing competition litigation costs.This article, in an analytical way, examines the justification for collecting litigation costs. Using the experience of other legal systems, it proposes a method (along with suggesting some articles) for allocation of litigation costs in the Iranian competition law and merger control regime to introduce a basis for reforming the law and optimizing Iran's competition system.

Competition rules are enforceable in different markets to facilitate competition, prohibit monopolies, and encourage economic enterprises to comply with these rules. The present study seeks to answer how competition ruled can be applied to the film industry through public enforcement of competition law. It is descriptive-analytical research using library and Internet resources. This study examines the Iranian competition system especially Chapter 9 of the Act of the execution of the General Policies of Article 44 of the Constitution (2007) and other laws and regulations related to competition and the film sector.In this regard, we explored the role of the Competition Council in monitoring the market and management of anti-competitive behaviour of enterprises and the role of Satra as a regulatory body in the field of visual media, and it was found that there are doubts about Satra's competence in competition issues.This study shows that the film industry is one of the most important and influential industries in the economic system.  With measures such as reforming the mechanism governing state aid in the cinema sector and digital media, including online media distribution and, We can increase competition in the film market and ban monopolies.