جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه "loss of respect" در نشریات گروه "فقه و حقوق"

Considering the fundamental importance and basic requirement of respecting property, deeds and interests in proving civil liability, jurists have considered the action of the owners and agents to lose the respect as a nullity of the liability. In various jurisprudential chapters and discourses, relying on this idea that the result of holding on to the intellectuals’ attitude and reliances is customary, they have documented the fall of responsibility to the loss of respect for property and work by the owner or agent. There is an analysis of the action and the connection between awareness and jurisprudential invalidity. Loss of respect on the one hand, and researching the effect of this connection on the nullity or proof of the liability, on the other hand, are among the challenging issues in the field of civil liability in the transactions. A group of jurists have considered the commitment to the provisions of a void contract despite the knowledge of the nullity of the contract from the time the contract agreement was drawn up, as an example of obtaining the possession of property for free or doing work without taking money. Focusing on this idea, they have voted to drop respect and responsibility in various contracts. Using the descriptive-analytical method, this study along with introducing the concept and analysis of the basis of this view, has addressed the validation and critical rethinking of the aforementioned thought in the field of transactions. According to the selected point of view of this study, since the basic criterion of proof of liability is based on the intellectuals’ attitude, handing over property or carrying out work with full knowledge of the invalidity of the contract, without the intention of donation and gratuitousness, and with knowledge or indication of this intention, is not considered as an example of obtaining the possession of property for free or doing work without taking money, and as the loss of the respect of property and actions. Because such a feature does not have a forced or intentional adaptation to the mentioned titles, rather, knowledge of the nullity of the contract agreement, in the view of rational custom, is considered as a title for both free and donated intention. Based on this, the knowledge of the lack of legal entitlement of ʻiwaz does not have any contradictions with faithfulness to valid exchange in the eyes of rational custom. Knowingly committing to the provisions of a void contract with the intention of exchange, benefit or participation in profit, will not be prevented from the civil protection arising from the necessity of respect for property and actions.