جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « the president » در نشریات گروه « فقه و حقوق »

The fundamental rights and freedoms enjoyed by members of society are essentially interpretations of the broader concept of "human rights" at the international level. These rights are enshrined and updated in the constitutions of various countries, reflecting different historical contexts and governing principles. Human rights encompass a set of privileges and entitlements that people inherently possess simply by virtue of being human. To clarify, a right can be understood as a "guaranteed individual preference" mandated and protected by a higher political authority. This guarantee and obligation remain constant regardless of the social status of the individual claiming the right or the moral implications of exercising it. This understanding of rights rests on two fundamental elements: "moral agency" or "being a person," and consequently, "inherent dignity." This necessitates the existence of legal institutions to uphold both the personhood of individuals as conscious agents and the inherent dignity or ultimate value of human beings. According to the key principle of moral actuality, humans, as rational beings, possess the capacity to make valuable decisions and govern their own lives. Consequently, all individuals, regardless of external circumstances like cultural, social, economic, or political conditions, possess equal dignity, value, and rights. Furthermore, based on the principle of individual moral agency and self-regulation, people should have the freedom to determine their own destinies and manage their lives without obstacles to implementing their decisions. Since the concept and institution of rights were created to protect these fundamental aspects of human life, they necessarily possess an "organic and instrumental" character. However, as "individual" preferences, rights can sometimes compete with other normative claims. They are balanced with other value demands, such as public interest and collective existence, by adhering to supporting theories of justice. Consequently, rights constitute a "minimum" domain belonging to justice and cover only a limited part of it. Furthermore, rights are designed to support individuals' sovereignty over their destinies and are "morally neutral," meaning they support individuals' decisions without moral judgment. Human rights view the human moral agent as one who governs their destiny, making choices that should be respected regardless of their moral content. This discussion aims not to impose moral options but to support individuals' chosen options. Hence, rights, in the theory of preference, lack objectives under any condition, solely serving fundamental values like inherent dignity and moral effectiveness. Therefore, if fundamental values could be maintained without the aid of legal institutions throughout the development of collective human life, there would be no need for the concept of rights. This necessitates a continuous process of diagnosing and redefining the concept of rights while considering social transformations and addressing specific societal needs, always within the framework of fundamental values. It's worth mentioning that human rights have many aspects and manifestations, categorizable under different patterns. Accordingly, the Islamic Republic of Iran has enumerated and recognized numerous examples of human rights in the third chapter of its constitution, advancing fundamental rights and freedoms. Furthermore, in addition to strong constitutional provisions, the drafting of the Law on Respect for Legitimate Freedoms and Protection of Citizen Rights, ratified on May 15, 2013, by the Islamic Council, aims to ensure the people's fundamental rights and freedoms.  Despite the emphasis in these laws, debates about protecting fundamental rights and freedoms often arise due to reliance on special methods, potentially conflicting with established legal standards. Ensuring the aforementioned rights and freedoms faces ambiguities, as seen in discussions around drafting a "Citizenship Rights Charter" by the presidency. Here, we will explore the case of the "Citizenship Rights Charter" to illustrate the challenges in upholding fundamental principles like the rule of law, separation of powers, supervision, and accountability.

According to Article 124 of the Constitution; The president can have deputies to carry out his legal duties. On the other hand, Article 133 of the Constitution states that the responsibility of the ministries is on the president's chosen minister who has received a vote of confidence from the Islamic Council. Since, according to Article 113 of the Constitution, the President, who is the highest official of the country, heads the executive branch, including the ministries -except in matters directly related to the Supreme Leader’s powers, the powers of a vice president may interfere with the powers of ministers. Considering the obscurity of Article 124 and the legal gap regarding the limits to the powers of the vice presidents, the framework grounded for the powers of the vice presidents and the limits to the powers of the ministers should be determined.

Research Question:

This essay seeks to answer the question "Could the president appoint deputies with duties that are in the jurisdiction of the ministries?". The exact answer to this question depends on analyzing whether, on a legal basis, it is possible to appoint a vice president in the jurisdiction of the ministries or not. On the other hand, it should be investigated as to what extent this type of appointment has occurred in the legal system of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and what is the opinion of the Guardian Council as the main judge in this matter? And finally, considering the capacities provided in law, how can this conflict be prevented or solved?

Literature Review:

Before this research, the subject of vice presidents has not only been examined under the general concept of the president and the first vice president’s powers but also specifically in articles such as "The legal requirements of delegating the powers of the president to deputies in Iran's constitutional law system with regards to the opinions of the Guardian Council", "A look at the assignment of president’s legal duties to the deputies" and "Regulations for the appointment and the position of special representatives and deputy presidents". However, these articles did not deal with the issue of any interference between the competence of the president and the ministers and thus, their topic is fundamentally different from this research. Regarding the relationship between the vice presidents and the ministries, there has been a report on "carrying out executive affairs through the vice presidents instead of the ministries", which is also different from this research because it focuses on the possibility of doing executive affairs by the vice presidents instead of the ministries, irrespective of the issue of interference of their powers. Therefore, the innovation of this research is first, in its topic of examining the conflict between the legal powers of the vice presidents and ministers and, second, in its analysis at two theoretical and practical levels, and third, in its examination of the plausible legal answers and providing an innovative solution to overcome this problem.

The current essay has been done through library research and adopting a descriptive-analytical approach meaning that, in addition to identifying the qualifications of vice presidents and ministers, we have analyzed the research problem using logical arguments.

According to Article 124 of the Constitution, the president can have deputies to perform his legal duties. By examining the detailed summary of the deliberations of the Constitutional Revision Council, the proposed arguments, and the systematic approach taken to the enactment of the Constitution, we find that the deputy is considered a representative of the president by the legislator and a non-authentic person, and since the authority of the president is limited, he cannot appoint a deputy within the jurisdiction of the ministries.From the opinions of the Guardian Council regarding the issue of the "consulting minister", it is also deduced that the president can create institutions under his supervision and delegate matters to them to handle some extra-ministerial affairs and his special duties such as "supervising the work of ministers", "harmonizing government decisions", "formulating the government's programs and policies", "synchronizing and policy-making of executive bodies" and "mobilizing the facilities of executive bodies for a specific issue", but other duties and executive affairs that are not part of the president’s special duties which are under the jurisdiction of the ministries, cannot be entrusted to his affiliated institutions, and such assignment would be against the Constitution.In the current status, vice presidents are assigned in four ways: by the Constitution, the resolution of the supreme councils, the statutes, and by the decree of the president. On the other hand, the only bodies that determine the ministers’ powers are the statutes, and in case of a conflict between the powers of the vice presidents and the ministers, conflict resolution of the above-mentioned bodies with the statutory law should be examined. In case of adding to or changing the powers of the ministers by the statutory law and their conflicts with the powers of the vice presidents; If the founding document of the vice president is the statutory law or the decree of the president, the recent statute is applied, but if the founding document is the Constitution or the decree of the supreme councils, the recent law is invalid. To change or establish the powers of the vice-presidents, only the parliament or supreme councils such as the Cultural Revolution Council have the authority to appoint vice-presidents acting in duties that are considered to be in the jurisdiction of the ministers.

A conflict between the powers of the ministers and the vice presidents is only problematic where the founding body for appointing the vice president is the decree of the president himself, and in order to get out of this problem, it is possible to use the capacity provided by the constitution in the matter of supervision of the General Inspection Organization of the Country, the supervision of the parliament in Article 90 of the Constitution, and the case law of the Court of Administrative Justice; However, these solutions are difficult to reach and only reactive; Therefore, it is suggested that in the statutory law, the president -while appointing the vice presidents- should be required to approve bylaws on the limits of their authority in the cabinet so that the speaker of the parliament can prevent the interference of the authorities a priori, and that filing a well-grounded complaint in the administrative court of justice would become less complicated and problematic.

The Interpellation of the president is one of the strongest tools of parliament to supervise the executive, which is accepted in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran under Article 131. This legal mechanism has been used only once after the Islamic Revolution which was before the Constitutional Review and the change in the parliamentary regime and that's why not much legal content has been produced to clarify the details of this process, as well as to determine the duties of the executive after the Interpellation and dismissal of the president. This has made the oversight tools which is typically used in tense and inflammatory conditions, unclear and non-transparent. In this descriptive-analytical study, we intend to consider the constitution and other related legal norms, including the Rules of Procedure of the Islamic Parliament of Iran and Rules of Procedure on how to check the political inadequacy of the President. We also evaluate the legal preparations and sequences of the president's interpellation and investigate the challenges that exist in this area, such as the absence of the president in the interpellation session, the condition that the Leadership disagrees with the dismissal of the President or the substitution of the first vice president, How to supervise the performance of the deputy and the Presidential Council during the substitution etc. We also provide reasonable suggestions to rectify these weaknesses. We have also answered the question, how are the preconditions and results of the president's impeachment analyzed in the Iranian constitute.

One of the Legislative's informative tools is questioning which provides the opportunity for people's representatives to be informed of the performance of the executive branch. In the Parliamentary and the semi-presidential system, representative's questioning from higher authorities of the executive branch is tangible in comparison to other monitoring tools. In the UK -as the origin of the parliamentary systemsthe House of Commons has an important function in questioning the ministers and the prime minister. In Iran, the Islamic consultative assembly has also anticipated the possibility of representative's questioning ministers and the president in the Constitution and in the parliamentary procedure. The process of questioning and responsiveness of higher authorities and its effects are different in the two legal systems. While representative's questioning and responsiveness of higher authorities of the executive branch in the UK House of Commons has a significant effect in terms of quantity, in Iran different legal effects are expected from questioning in terms of quality: questioning the president could result in referring to the judiciary and questioning the ministers may ultimately lead to the interpellation plan. Developing a comparative approach and an analytical method, this article has paid attention to different aspects of representative's questioning the higher authorities of the executive branch in Iran's Islamic consultative assembly and the UK's House of Commons. Using the results of comparative studies, some recommendations have been provided for Iranian legal system.

The principle of separation of powers has been accepted by all political systems as a way to divide tasks between government institutions and good governance. However, due to the wide range of tasks and competencies of governmental powers, the regulatory mechanisms and methods are also provided which lead to better organize policies and promote harmonious relations between the powers of government and to prevent theoretical and practical conflicts in their competences. Besides these regulatory procedures, in case of dispute, legal systems according to their constitutional structures, have provided some institutions and mechanisms for dispute resolution between governmental bodies to prevent the occurrence or spread of tensions in the Country. In the legal system of Iran it is in the authority of the Supreme Leader to resolve disputes and regulate the relations of the three branches of the government under paragraph 7 of principle (110) of the constitution. Accordingly, he issued the verdict in August 2011 for establishment of the panel of dispute settlement and adjustment of the relations between three branches as an advisory body in order to play the above-mentioned role.

The term “vice – president” has been employed in some articles of the Islamic Republic of Iran Constitution, especially in the article 129. This term that legally has a special meaning, implyes independence of vice – president from president in different aspects. We can see two kinds of deputyship in the excutive: In one hand, some organizations, for example, atomic energy organization, whose heads have beem defined as vice – president, have been constituted in the government body. On the other hand, some deputyships as parliamentary one, have been established with respect to the dignity of vice-president. This article discusses some conceptions of the concerned government organs about the term vice-president and consistency or inconsistency of these ones with correct legal concept of it. Finally, this article concludes that legislators could not respect worthily the correct meaning of the term of vice – president, which has been stipulated by a number of members of the council for revision of the constitution. Thus, their conception from that term is inconsistent with the correct legal concept.

The President has the responsibility for executing the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The concept of the responsibility of executing of the Constitution is facing some ambiguities in the legal system of Iran. It seems that the President is responsible for executing the Constitution as a whole except those affairs that the leader performs them himself. The responsibility of executing of the Constitution contains the duty for executing the Constitution itself and accountability towards it.In order to do this responsibility, the President has the legal powers.

Supervision over the ratifications of the Executive Power is of paramount importance. Enjoying financial and administrative power as well as instruments such as approval of the budget and rules such as regulations, this power has a unique role to play in the scene of citizen's rights and obligations; and for the same reason, control of and supervision over the ratifications of this Power have been always of interest. Judicial control of administrative and executive actions of this Power by the Court of Administrative Justice (Article 173, Constitution),judicial supervision over governmental regulations by the judges (Article 170, Constitution), semi-judicial supervision exerted by ational General Inspectorate (Article 174, Constitution), the state audit office (Article 55,Constitution), and control exerted by the Speaker of the Islamic Consultative Assembly over governmental rules such as ratifications and regulations elaborated by the government as to their conformity with the Law (article 138, Constitution) are examples of the instruments designed in the legal system of our country to control actions of the Executive Power. This shows importance of control of and supervision over this Power in the governmental structure of the Islamic Republic of Iran.As far, the role played by the President of the Republic to control and supervise the ratifications of the Executive Power- headed by him-, has not been sufficiently noticed; and the point has been ignored in the writings concerning the Constitution of the Islamic Republic.The present article tries to provide a reply to this essential question: "how and by which instruments can the president supervise the ratifications of the Executive Power? The right to nullify and reject ratifications, which will be explained accordingly, and even the right todismiss the minister are among such instruments.