جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « بیمه سپرده » در نشریات گروه « اقتصاد »

Deposits insurance, as an integral part of the set of strategies, plays a preventive role (through prudential supervision) as well as a forward-looking role (by guaranteeing public deposits) in the financial health of countries. The stability of the financial sector has been discussed.

The main purpose of the present study is to evaluate deposit insurance in the useless banking industry in Iran. Statistical population of Iran and the sample of selected banks include Parsian, Pasargard, Saman, Melli, Sepah and Housing in the period of 1385-1397.

The research method is descriptive-applied. Firstly, using the statistical data of the above mentioned banks, the credit risk of the banks is obtained and then using the GARCH model the estimation of the deposit insurance pricing is done.

The results show that the credit risk of different banks is different and therefore, the pricing of deposit insurance is different for private and public banks, it is suggested that the deposit insurance pricing system In Iran, it be calculated on a yearly basis according to the risk of each bank.

The nature of Islamic banking in the distribution of profits and losses among all major stakeholders on the one hand, and the payment of predetermined interest to depositors in conventional banking, has created the desire and expectation in some Muslim depositors that receive the fixed profits, which are already specified. The question that arises here is whether this issue can be realized in some way with the insurance mechanism? In other words, can the risk of loss in Islamic financial contracts be transferred to the insurance company with the insurance mechanism of depositors and the Islamic Bank itself so that depositors can enjoy a definite predetermined profit? In this article, at first, we review the principles of Islamic banking and the principles of the insurability of risks. Then, the analytical-descriptive method is used to deal with the issue that the risk of profit and loss is not insurable and as a result, it is not possible to offer an insurance product commensurate with this risk by insurance companies. Therefore, depositors must accept the risk of loss.

Bank runs can be considered as one of the bad effects of financial crises, which is very important to confront. Present paper investigates the ways to confront runs on banks. Meanwhile it provides an analysis about the financial crisis in 2008. Using approaches provided in Diamond & Dybvig paper (1983), a model is provided to analyze means and policies applicable to manage assets and liabilities, and to reduce the bad effects of runs on banks. The research method is analytical. The research investigates specifically three

“contract of lags in deposit withdrawal”, deposits insurance” and “central bank loaning”. The results show that liquidity crises and bank runs cannot be prevented by using these methods; rather these methods can only delay these crises, or in case of confrontation with these crises can reduce the intensity of damages. The model provided in this paper can be a basis for the development of complementary researches about the bank run problem in interest-free banking system in this transition period and the existing banking system of Islamic Republic of Iran.