جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « روسیه » در نشریات گروه « اقتصاد »

The high consumption and the increasing need of the European Union to import energy, especially from Russia, as the largest owner of gas resources in the world, has caused Moscow to use energy resources as a strategic lever to rebuild its empire and advance the Kremlin's policies towards Brussels. This has caused the security of sources and energy supply routes to be of great importance for Europe. In this regard, Europe has tried to reduce its vulnerability in this issue by diversifying these sources and routes, which has caused Europe to pay special attention to the South Caucasus region. Thus, the present study aims to analyze Europe's concerns about Russia's instrumental use of energy based on the components and indicators of energy security. This study will seek to answer the main question, what is Europe's concern about Russia's instrumental use of energy? The research hypothesis is that the European Union's concern about Russia's monopoly on the energy resources of Central Asia and the Caucasus; and on the one hand, the Kremlin's use of energy as a powerful weapon to advance its political and economic goals towards Europe, has a strategic impact on energy security. and the possibility of jeopardizing the national security of the Union; Therefore, in order to get rid of the crippling dependence on Russian energy sources and ensure high energy security, the Brussels authorities are trying to replace and diversify the imported oil and gas baskets </span>isolating Moscow in the energy market, increasing the bargaining power and helping European to act in regional and international equations. The results showed that Pursuing the policy of diversification and reducing Russia's monopoly on the energy market of the region will lead to greater independence of Europe in energy decisions and policies and the promotion of Europe's power and international status while reducing threats to energy security. The method used in this article is descriptive-analytical.

Economic sanctions are one of the tools to exert negative pressure on a country's economy to achieve political goals. They have been used in several cases in recent years due to their lower cost than war for the country that imposes them. What matters is the cost of economic sanctions for the imposing country and what it gains from it. The gain of sanctions for this country is the effects on the economy of the target country. Experimental observations show that, despite the same political disputes of different countries with one country (USA), the severity of sanctions imposed on these countries is different. Even despite the same sanctions imposed on the target countries, the economic responses of these countries to sanctions are different. Many studies have been conducted on economic sanctions and their impacts on the economic and welfare situation of the target countries. Not all of them have reacted the same way. In this article, we have discussed the differences in the impacts of economic sanctions on different countries, focusing on the situation of Iran and Russia. Due to the differences between the sanctions severity imposed on the two countries, the sanctions variable was initially quantified to provide an equal basis for our analysis. We entered resilience and vulnerability indices into our model to explain the different effects of the sanctions on the two countries. We also modeled the sanctions severity to consider the its differences in the case of different targets.

By comparing the effects of sanctions on the export and import of the target country to and from important trading partners, we estimated those effects using panel data with interactive dummy variables. The model proposed by Raul Caruso in 2005 was used to examine the impact of sanctions on the trade of the target countries. The trade data of Iran and Russia with five important partners between 1992 and 2018 were used in the model. We also used the US Congress report on the sanctions against Iran and Russia to quantify their sanctions. In the discussion of scoring sanctions, number zero is related to the period when no sanctions were imposed, numbers 1 and 2 are related to the mild and severe sanctions of the United States, numbers 3 and 4 are related to the mild and severe sanctions of Europe, and number 5 is intended for the sanctions imposed by the United Nations. Finally, by determining the severity of sanctions in different sectors of Iran's trade (different partners), we sought to show the effects using vulnerability and resilience as two indicators.

he results showed that economic sanctions have had significant and negative effects on Iran's trade with its important partners, but they have had no significant effect on Russia's trade with its partners. Since economic sanctions enter the economic systems as a negative shock, the difference in their impacts is considered to be related to the indicators of vulnerability and resilience. It was observed that resilience has reverse and vulnerability has direct effects on sanctions. This important finding shows that, by modifying resilience and vulnerability, we can affect the impacts of sanctions. Increasing resilience and reducing vulnerability can reduce the impact of economic sanctions on Iran. On the other hand, since Russia's economy is more resilient and less vulnerable than Iran, the difference between the impacts of economic sanctions on these two countries is explicable.

In this study, we tried to examine the reason for the differences in the impact of economic sanctions on different target countries. We focused on Iran and Russia because of the similarities in the nature of the exports and political disputes with Western countries. For the severity of sanctions imposed on the target countries, we used six levels (0-5). We also considered the trade of Iran with five important partners (i.e., Germany, China, India, Turkey and UAE) and Russia Trade with its partners (Netherland, China, Belarus, Germany and Turkey) as an index for measuring the sanctions impacts. It emerged that the sanctions have had significant negative effects on Iran's trade with its important trading partners, but thet have had no significant effects on Russia's trade. We entered resilience and vulnerability indices into our model to explain the difference of the effects on the trades of Iran and Russia. It was observed that the impact of sanctions is inversely related to resilience and directly related to vulnerability of an economy, meaning that the higher the resilience and the less vulnerable a country is, the less affected by sanctions.

Achieving regional and global order and security has always been one of the most important priorities and goals of the great powers. To achieve this, various approaches and strategies are being pursued by these powers in different parts of the world where the hegemonic approach is very thought-provoking. Hegemony is an order in which a great power alone plays a key role in the regions and tries to manage the security relations and communications of the regions through this. The hegemony in US politics and world order after the Cold War in the post-Soviet region has been very important and decisive. Using descriptive-analytical methods and library resources, this article, while conceptualizing the hegemonic order and its components, wants to address the question that how the United States did managed its relations in the post-Soviet region, especially with regard to Russia, after the Cold War through hegemony? Experimental and practical evidence suggests that, given Eurasia's importance to the hegemonic order of the United States, the United States pursue with three methods of nineteenth-century British balancing, Bismarkian policy (alliance, coalition, and economic, political, and military means), as well as a stabilization method based on the theory of hegemonic stability (American Pax Order), has faced security threats in the region. In this way, it has tried to manage its relations with countries in the post-Soviet region, especially with Russia and even China. Theoretical analysis of this hypothesis is based on Paul Papayano's theory in the book Security Order of Lake and Morgan and Hegemonic Stability Gilpin.

The authors’ main objective is to examine the nature of the relationship between the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI)'s gas export policy and its national security policies as well as its energy security policies. The research hypothesis postulates that success or failure of Iranian gas export policy is related to energy security criteria of the two sides of transaction. Moreover, this association is affected by Iran's national security policy. To gain conceptual framework for analyzing Iranian gas export policy, we try to compare gas export policies of Qatar and Russia, the two key natural gas exporters in the world. The studies of gas export negotiations conducted in the past three decades in addition to challenges toward mega project of Iran’s gas export clearly show lack of sufficient knowledge of Iranian energy policy-makers about energy security concepts. Overlooking the requirements of energy security in the process of gas export policymakig has greatly contributed to the loss of Iran's geo-economic potentials in spite of its considerable natural gas resources. Furthermore, Iran’s gas export policy is under pressure from the US imposed sanctions with "lack of supply security" justification for clients and is rooted in Iranian national security and foreign policy. Russia has also been striving to prevent major natural gas producers like Iran to enter the European market in order to protect its "demand security" across the continent.

According to the BP statistics, The Middle East with almost 40 percent of natural gas reserves is the richest region all over the world and Iran with more than 18 percent is the richest country. It means that Iran can become a great supplier in international natural gas markets. Transferring natural gas through the pipeline or transporting it in the liquefied form are the main options for natural gas trades in international markets. The geographical location of Iran in the Middle East makes it possible for Iran to export natural gas to Europe through the pipeline. In this trade two main issues should be considered. The pipeline should pass through Turkey and Russia as the main supplier has great bargaining power in the market. Trades in the natural gas market are restricted by the pipeline structure. So these markets can be considered a network and pipelines as the links of the network. Jackson (2005) introduced the link-based flexible networks method that can be used for the analysis of cooperative network games. In this paper, the effect of a coalition between Russia and Iran on the relative bargaining power of Iran, Russia, and Turkey have been studied. According to the results, Turkey, as the only available path to Europe, has considerable bargaining power and the coalition between Iran and Russia will have no effect on it. As Iran has no other choice to export natural gas to Europe through the pipeline, the coalition will have no effect on Iran’s bargaining power.

The effective process and driving forces in realtion between Iran and Russia confront with different evoiutions,  which cause to new kind of cooperation. Russia opposed to The West during the last decade in different fields such as crisises in Ukraine, Kosovo, Georgia (separation of south Ossetia), deployment of Amrica’s Missile shield in Czech, expanding NATO to East, etc. Caspian (Khazar) Energy issue is one of the other challenges between Russia and the West. Gas pipeline from Caspian to Europe through Russia , Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline and Nabucco pipeline are components which impress the relation between Russia and Europe. As Europe is looking for other energy sources, breaking dependence to Persian Golf energy, so Caspian energy sources are very important.Of course infiltration of America and Europe in Caspian domain, Caused to discord in their strategy of exporting energy. In this situation convergence between Iran and Russia –often are the same toward Europe– is too effective. So the processes and scenarios for would be convergence between Iran and     Russia –according to politic- economic evolutions and Caspian Energy Market – were clarified by the method of critical uncertainty

Russia deal with US sanctions has been able to gain a large share of world oil markets with its active economic and energy Diplomacy. With depencyEuropean economies to energy sorce of Russia have largely Deactivate US oil and gas sanctions, and even Russia has been successes against the United States Action and established a joint front with China and Venezuela against the United States. This article examines Russia's oil and gas strategies.The most important strategies of Russia are to depend on the European economy to Russia oil and gas, price regulation, transfer share of state oil companies to international companies, development of oil and gas pipeline, expansion of liquefied natural gas and its markets, and development of long-term cooperation with some of Iran's oil competitors Same as Saudi Arabia and Iraq. Also, given Europe's serious sanctions on joint ventures with Russia, its strategy has shifted from Europe to Asian countries. In the meantime, Iran's approach to using Russia's capacity as a partner or competitor in the oil and gas field is considerable. This article presents the Russian lessons learned in the above areas for the country. Russia has been attracting investment from Asian countries by establishing active diplomacy with Asian countries, which have largely resisted sanctions, and has offset the decline in relations with Western nations through this strategy. Transmission of oil through pipelines has been a factor in securing oil demand, and Russia has adopted one of its strategic policies in the field of transportation, oil and gas transmission through long-term contracts and pipelines. Increasing the role of international companies in Russia is part of its strategy to acquire technology or access its gas and oil export network.